

YEAR
STAMP

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PART

FILE No. **71C1N**

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The
UPGRADE

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

R. P. O'Connell
(Sgt.)

Date 19/1/71

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. **NEJ 1/4** (Part **D**) ⁽¹⁵⁷⁻²⁸⁶⁾

TITLE: INTERNAL SITUATION IN JORDAN

[illegible]

SECURITY
N.B. The g
UPGRADE

YEAR STAMP

1970

HPW 9903/6/69

USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

TRANSFERS:

Folio 242 — NET 1/10

LAST FILE: PART 'C'

NEXT FILE: PART 'E'

OTHER RELATED FILES: _____

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157

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UPHER CAT A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 500

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 SEP 1970 NET 1/4
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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 500 DATED 10/9/70 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO BEIRUT BAGHDAD BERNE CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NUMBER 3 AS AT 101600Z

SINCE MIDDAY THERE HAS BEEN SOME EASING OF TENSION, INCREASE
IN TRAFFIC MOVEMENT, AND A FURTHER REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF
SHOTS HEARD. AMMAN RADIO STATES THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND
CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAVE AGREED ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO BRING
THE SITUATION BACK TO NORMAL.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO BERNE PARIS WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR PHILLIPS

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 497

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 SEPTEMBER

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 497 DATED 10/9/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD JISNE MOD DI4 AND WASHINGTON

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 SEP 1970 NET 1/4
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JORDAN INTERNAL

TIME OF ORIGIN 101400Z

AMMAN RADIO HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PLO HAVE MET AND AGREED TO TAKE STEPS
TO
INSURE THAT FIRING IS STOPPED AND THE TENSE SITUATION
EASED, AND THAT LIFE IS RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE TWO SIDES
AGREED TO CONTINUE TO MEET IN CASE ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS
OCCURED.

pr
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r/s

2. THE GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED BY ABDUL MUN'IM AL-RIFAI
(PRIME MINISTER), AKEF AL-FAYEZ (MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRIME
MINISTERIAL AFFAIRS), JA'FAR AL-SHAMI (MINISTER OF PUBLIC
WORKS) AND MASHOUR HADITHA (C-IN-C ARMED FORCES). THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVES WERE YASIR ARAFAT (FATAH), MUNIF
RAZZAZ (ALF), AHMED AL-YEMANI (GROUP UNKNOWN), AHMED
ZA'ROUR (APO), DHAFI JUM'ANI (SAIQA), IBRAHIM BAKR
(INDEPEDANT) AND ABDEL RAZZAZ YAHYA (COMMANDER, PLA).

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON.

MR. PHILLIPS

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
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ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 602

10 SEPTEMBER 1970



UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 602 OF 10 SEPTEMBER AND R F I TO AMMAN,
BEIRUT, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

JORDANIAN CRISIS.

UNDER THE BANNER HEADLINE '' MASSACRE IN JORDAN - JORDANIAN
REACTIONARY ELEMENTS AIM AT LIQUIDATING COMMANDO MOVEMENT''.
THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, AS WELL AS THE ARABIC PRESS, OF 10 SEPTEMBER
PUBLISHES THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION SIGNED BY YASIR ARAFAT AND
ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT BAKR AND TO OTHER ARAB HEADS OF STATE.
REFERRING TO WHAT IT CALLED THE '' MASSACRE'' OF FEDAYEEN IN
SOUTHERN JORDAN, IRBID AND THE SHELLING OF COMMANDO POSITIONS
IN AMMAN, THE STATEMENT CALLED UPON THE ADDRESSEES TO '' SHOULD
THEIR HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY AND TO COME FORWARD TO DELIVER OUR
PEOPLES FROM THE FORCES OF OPPRESSION AND CONSPIRACY AND PRESERVE
THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION, ''.

2. THE NEWSPAPER ALSO PRINTS A SIMILAR STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE
ARAB LIBERATION FRONT WHICH HOWEVER DOES NOT INCLUDE THE SPECIFIC
REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION.

MR. HAWLEY

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CYPHER CAT/A

FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 493

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 493 (101045Z) SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD **NEJ** AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS N.Y. BONN MOD DI4 JIS(NE) **1/4** JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

*pr
um
7/9*

SITREP NO2 AS AT 101015Z.

DURING THE LAST FOUR HOURS FIRING HAS SLACKENED TO THE EXTENT
THAT ONLY OCCASIONAL BURSTS ARE HEARD. MORE CARS ARE MOVING
ON THE STREETS AND UK BASED EMBASSY STAFF HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET TO
WORK. SOME SHOPS ARE OPEN. THE OFFICIAL JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN
HAS QUOTE "NOTHING TO REPORT BUT THE SITUATION IS GETTING BETTER
EVERY HOUR". NO JORDANIAN OR IRAQI TROOP MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN
REPORTED. NO CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED AMONGST THE BRITISH
COMMUNITY.

AMMAN AIRPORT IS OPEN AND WORKING.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO BERNE PARIS WASHINGTON DEFCOMCEN AND NEW YORK

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MOD DI4 JIS(NE) JIS GULF.

MR. PHILLIPS.

(SENT TO D.C.C.)
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 493

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
10 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 493 (101045Z) SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD **NEJ** AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS N.Y. BONN MOD DI4 JIS(NE) **1/4** JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

*pr
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7/9*

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AMMAN AIRPORT IS OPEN AND WORKING.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO BERNE PARIS WASHINGTON DEFCOMCEN AND NEW YORK

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MOD DI4 JIS(NE) JIS GULF.

MR. PHILLIPS.

(SENT TO D.C.C.)
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PHIER CAT 'A'
FLASH MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 1015

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 SEPTEMBER 1970

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REGISTRY NO. 10
NEWJ 1/4
NUMBER

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM
1016 OF 4/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO NEW YORK AND
IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT,
TEL AVIV, JIS(NE) AND JIS (GULF).

Prum
17/9

YOUR TEL. NO. 741. (132)

NEW 2/3

I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE VICE-MINISTER VINOGRADOV AT
1600 LOCAL TIME TODAY. IN THE LIGHT OF NEW YORK TELEGRAM
NO. 1837, I SHALL VOLUNTEER NOTHING, UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT ME
TO THE CONTRARY, ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE TO THE JORDANIAN REQUEST
FOR A FOUR-POWER STATEMENT, AND SHALL STALL IF QUESTIONED.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS (FLASH) TO NEW YORK AND (IMMEDIATE) TO
WASHINGTON , PARIS AND DEFCOMMCEN.

DEFCOMMCEN PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) AND JIS (GULF)

SIR DUNCAN WILSON

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./

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CYPHER CAT A

ASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 504

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 504 DATED 11/9/70 REPTD FOR
INFO TO BEIRUT BAGHDAD BERNE CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
WASHINGTON MOD DI4 JISNE JIS GULF AND UKHIS NEW YORK.

RECEIVED
REGISTRY NO. 70
11 SEP 1970
NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NO 4 AS AT 110700Z SEP.

NIGHT 10/11 WAS QUIET. JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN SAID AT
2100 HRS LOCAL TIME QUOTE " ONLY HOTHEADS ARE FIRING NOW"
UNQUOTE. THREE MORTAR BOMBS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE FALLEN AT 1900
HOURS LAST NIGHT IN THE RJAF CAMP AT THE AIRPORT BUT NO OTHER
INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED. THE AIRPORT CAN BE REACHED BY
ROAD THIS MORNING AND IS OPERATING AS NORMAL.
TRAFFIC IN AMMAN IS MOVING WELL. LOCAL EMBASSY STAFF HAVE
RETURNED TO WORK.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MOD DI4 TO JISNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCOMCEN BERNE PARIS WASHINGTON AND
NEW YORK

MR PHILLIPS

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CYPHER CAT A

ASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 504TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
11 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 504 DATED 11/9/70 REPTD FOR
INFO TO BEIRUT BAGHDAD BERNE CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
WASHINGTON MOD DI4 JISNE JIS GULF AND UKHIS NEW YORK.

RECEIVED
REGISTRY NO. 70
11 SEP 1970
NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL

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ROAD THIS MORNING AND IS OPERATING AS NORMAL.
TRAFFIC IN AMMAN IS MOVING WELL. LOCAL EMBASSY STAFF HAVE
RETURNED TO WORK.

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE MOD DI4 TO JISNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCOMCEN BERNE PARIS WASHINGTON AND
NEW YORK

MR PHILLIPS

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FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 514 (111200Z)

11 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESS TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 514 (111200Z) SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE BERNE BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV
MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON LHMIS NEW YORK MOD DIA JIC(LE) AND JIS CULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 5 AS AT 111200Z.

RECEIVED IN

NEJ 1/4

1. AMMAN HAS BEEN QUIET THIS MORNING WITH TRAFFIC MOVING NORMALLY.
THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL REPORTS OF FEDAYEEN ROAD BLOCKS ESTABLISHED
IN CENTRAL AMMAN AND ON THE AMMAN ZERQA ROAD. NO REPORTS OF
INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BUT TENSION REMAINS AND IS INCREASED
BY CONFLICTING REPORTS ON THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE
RELEASE OF HI-JACKED AIRCRAFT PASSENGERS.

2. CORRESPONDENTS REPORT THAT JORDANIAN ARMY TANKS HAVE BEEN
WITHDRAWN FROM THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE HI-JACKED AIRCRAFT
AND THAT SARACEN ARMOURD PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND SCOUT CARS REMAIN.

3. "FATAH" NEWSPAPER TODAY PUBLISHES DEMANDS BY THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "NATIONAL AUTHORITY"
THAT WOULD REMOVE FROM THE STATE, ARMY AND PUBLIC SECURITY MACHINES
ALL "MALEVALENT ELEMENTS AND AGENTS".

VASFI AL-TELL (FORMER P.M.) AND ZEID AL-RIFA'I (HEAD OF THE ROYAL
DIWAN) ARE SINGLED OUT FOR PARTICULAR ATTACK.

FCO PSS IMMEDIATE TO BERNE PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND
DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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FLASH AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 518

11 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDITION TO FCO TEL TO TIS DATED 11/1/73 REPTD FOR INFO TO
BERNE BACHDAD BEIRUT FORT CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW

PARIS WASHINGTON UHHIS NEW YORK NICOSIA MOD DI4 JISNE AND JIS GULF

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NO 6 AS AT 111600Z

REGISTRY NO. 10

NET 1/4

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO VISIBLE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION IN AMMAN SINCE OUR LAST SITREP. MILITARILY IT HAS BEEN A QUIET DAY. NO INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY THE OFFICIAL JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN BUT A NEW DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN APPOINTED. BRIGADIER H H SHERIF ZEID BIN SHAKER IS STILL ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS.
2. THE AMBASSADOR SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS MORNING. THE KING SAID THAT ONLY THIS MORNING HE HAD SUCCEEDED, AT THE LAST MINUTE, IN RESTRAINING ONE OF HIS ARMoured UNITS FROM AGAIN ATTACKING THE FEDAYEEN NEAR IRBID. A SIMILAR INCIDENT A FEW DAYS AGO STARTED THE RECENT FIGHTING. CORRESPONDENTS REPORT THAT A JORDANIAN ARMY COLONEL IS ACTING AS A LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN THE ARMY AND PFLP AT THE HI-JACKED AIRCRAFT LOCATION.
3. EVACUATION. SEVENTY MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY INCLUDING COMMONWEALTH CITIZENS AND SCHOOLCHILDREN ON HOLIDAY HAVE LEFT JORDAN DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS OUT OF A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 JISNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN BERNE BONN PARIS WASHINGTON

NEW YORK AND NICOSIA.

MR PHILLIPS [REPEATED AS REQUESTED. SENT TO D.C.C.]

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SYMPHER CAT A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 522

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
12 SEPTEMBER 1978

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ADDRESSED TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 522 120815Z SEPTEMBER 1978
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO BACHDAD
TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BOHN
JISNE JIS GULF AND MOD DI4.

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NO 7 AS AT 120815Z

NEJ 1/4

1. NIGHT 11/12 SEPTEMBER WAS QUIET. DA'S STAFF HAVE VISITED CENTRAL AMMAN, AIRPORT AND SUMEILIN THIS MORNING AND HAVE FOUND ROADS CLEAR AND CROWDED WITH TRAFFIC THOUGH THE REMAINS OF ROAD BLOCKS ARE EVIDENT. SHOPS ARE VERY BUSY. AIRPORT IS OPEN AND OPERATING.
2. FEW ARMED FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN SEEN ON THE STREETS OF AMMAN IN THE SUQ AREA. A FOUR VEHICLE ARMED GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN POLICE PATROL WAS SEEN BETWEEN SUMEILIN AND HADI ES SIR CROSS ROADS EAST OF AMMAN. TROOPS IN ARMY VEHICLES SEEN ARE ALL ARMED AND LOOK VERY ALERT. CHECK POINTS AT THE SPORTS STADIUM, SUMEILIN AND NEAR HADI ES SIR WERE MANNED BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE AS USUAL BUT NO FEDAYEEN POLICE WERE EVIDENT. NO ARMoured CARS WERE NOTED AT THESE CHECK POINTS WHICH IS UNUSUAL.
3. THE JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAS NOTHING TO REPORT BUT STATES THAT THE ROAD TO THE SYRIAN FRONTIER AT RAMTHA IS OPEN AND ALSO THE ROAD TO ZERQA.
4. THERE HAS CLEARLY BEEN SOME RELAXATION OF TENSION BUT WE HAVE LEARNT THAT AMMAN'S NORMAL APPEARANCE TODAY CAN BE DECEPTIVE.
5. EVACUATION. TWO MORE HAVE LEFT SINCE LAST SITREP

/6. WE

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- 2 -

6. WE DO NOT INTEND TO SEND NEXT SITREP UNTIL LATE THIS AFTERNOON
UNLESS WE HAVE ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT TO REPORT.

DEFCONCEN PASS MOD DI4 JISNE AND JIS GULF IMMEDIATE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN PARIS WASHINGTON PERNE UKMIS NEW YORK
AND BONN.

MR PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
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FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 530

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
12 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 530 DATED 12/9/70 REPTD FOR INFO TO
IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS
WASHINGTON BEIRUT UKNIS NEW YORK LONN MOD DIA JISNE AND JIS CULF

NETS 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NUMBER 8 AS AT 121600Z

1. OTHER THAN SOME FIRING IN CENTRAL AMMAN BELIEVED TO BE CONNECTED WITH A FEDAYEEN FUNERAL PARTY, NO INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED TODAY FROM THE CITY AREA. THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THERE ARE SOME FEDAYEEN CHECK POINTS ON THE MAIN AMMAN/ ZERQA ROAD.
2. BRITISH CITIZENS FROM IRBID CONFIRM THE ARMY AND LEFT WING FEDAYEEN CLASH EARLIER THIS WEEK APPARENTLY CONFINED MAINLY IN THE AREA TO THE WEST OF THE TOWN AND NOT IN THE TOWN ITSELF. FEDAYEEN (FATEH) ARE CHECKING CARS ON ROAD TO IRBID. THEY REPORT THAT FATEH FEDAYEEN ARE ARRESTING PFLP LOOTERS IN THE IRBID AREA.
3. OFFICIAL JORDAN ARMY SPOKESMAN HAS REPORTED THAT THE THREE HI JACKED AEROPLANES WERE BLOWN UP AT 1429 HOURS LOCAL TIME. MINIBUSSES CARRYING HOSTAGES AND ESCORTED BY JORDANIAN MILITARY POLICE AND FEDAYEEN ARRIVED AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL IN AMMAN AT 1230 HOURS LOCAL TIME. BRITISH SCHOOL CHILDREN WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE HOTEL TO BE CARED FOR BY EMBASSY STAFF. THEY ARE IN GOOD HEART BUT NATURALLY TIRED. IT WAS NOTED THAT A SMALL IRAQI DETACHMENT WAS PRESENT AT THE HOTEL AND ACTING AS SUPPORT OF PFLP OFFICIALS. AT 1735 HRS LOCAL TIME A LARGER CONVOY ARRIVED AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL

/HOTEL

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HOTEL. THE JORDANIAN ARMY ESCORT WAS LARGER AND INCLUDED
A COUPED CAR. PFLP ESCORT CONSISTED OF THREE LANDROVERS
MOUNTING MIG'S. A FURTHER CONVOY IS REPORTED AS DUE SOON.
IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHAT HOSTAGES ARE IN THESE LATTER GROUPS.

DEFCON GEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 JISNE AND JISGULF

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK AND
BONN

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [SENT TO D.C.C.]

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 538 (130800Z)

TO F.C.O.

SEPTEMBER 1976

167


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ADDRESSED FLASH TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 538 DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1976

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO DEFCON CATHEDRAL
TEL AMMAN MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN
MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 9 AS AT 130800Z.



- 1.. NIGHT 12/13 SEPT WAS QUIET. TRAFFIC IS MOVING AS NORMAL.
NO FEDAYEEN CHECK POINTS ARE REPORTED AND ROADS TO AMMAN
AIRPORT ARE OPEN.
- 2.. JORDAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAS NOTHING TO REPORT AND STATES
ROAD TO SYRIAN BORDER OPEN.
- 3.. BRITISH SCHOOLCHILDREN FROM HI-JACKED AIRCRAFT WERE EVACUATED
BY AIR EARLY THIS MORNING EN-ROUTE FOR NICOSIA AND U.K.
THEIR CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT WAS ESCORTED BY JOINT JORDANIAN
MILITARY, CIVILIAN, AND FEDAYEEN PATROLS. ANOTHER CONVOY EN-
ROUTE TO THE AIRPORT PASSED THIS EMBASSY AT 130800Z.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN
AND DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

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ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

EMERGENCY STAFF

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URGENT AMMAN

TO FCO

TELEGRAM NO 531

(121915Z)

SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 531 (121915Z) SEPTEMBER 1970 - REPEATED
 FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD
 BERNE UKHIS NY WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL (121915Z).

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE THIS EVENING (12 SEPT) ISSUED A STATEMENT
 WHICH IT STATED THAT:-

A. THE COMMITTEE DID NOT TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HI-JACKING
 OF THE THREE AIRCRAFT.

B. THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE PFLP IN THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE FROZEN
 FOR CONTRAVENTING THE COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTIONS OF 6 AND 10 SEPT.
 REGARDING THE HI-JACKING.

C. THE COMMITTEE WOULD AVOID ANY CONTACT OR DEALINGS WITH THE
 PFLP, AS THAT ORGANISATION HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

D. THE COMMITTEE WOULD TAKE A DECISIVE STAND AGAINST ANY BEHAVIOUR
 BY THE PFLP WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO BERNE UKHIS NY AND WASHINGTON

MR PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO F.C.O. LONDON

TELEGRAM NO 544 (131600Z)

SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 544 (131600Z) SEPTEMBER 70
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO TELRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD
TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON BERNI UKNIS NEW YORK BONN
MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

RECEIVED
REGISTRY N

NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREM NO 10 AT 131600Z.

1. IT HAS BEEN A QUIET DAY IN AMMAN THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF A FEW STRAY SHOTS BUT OF NO MAJOR INCIDENTS.
2. ARMED FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN SEEN TOURING THE CITY IN LANDROVERS. IN ONE AREA SOME 400 YARDS FROM A WELL KNOWN ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND HQ ELEMENTS BELIEVED TO BE PDFLP HAVE BEEN SEEN DIGGING HARD.
3. JOINT MILITARY CIVIL FEDAYEEN POLICE PATROLS HAVE BEEN IN EVIDENCE.
4. THE EVACUATION OF HOSTAGES WHO MOVED IN CONVOYS TO THE AIRPORT ESCORTED BY JORDANIAN ARMY FEDAYEEN AND CIVIL POLICE HAS PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY.
5. THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS UNABLE TO HELP BOAC IN THEIR EFFORTS TO HAVE THE REMAINS OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TECHNICALLY INSPECTED. BOAC BELIEVE SOME PARTS OF THEIR AIRCRAFT ARE WORTH SALVAGING. THE ARMY HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE PALESTINIAN RED CRESENT BE CONTACTED.
6. THERE IS NO DOUBT TENSION REMAINS HIGH CERTAINLY IN THE JEBEL HUSSEIN AREA.
7. AN ADDITIONAL 15 MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAVE LEFT TODAY.

/FCO

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS WASHINGTON DEPT OF STATE NEW YORK
BONN AND DEFCONCEN

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

MR. PHILLIPS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./


FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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BRITISH EMBASSY

PARIS

NET 1/4

4 September, 1957

170

(J 1/1)

See Philip.

Jordan and Iraq

Sir P. Adams.
Mr. Makins & Co.
smoothed ruffled
feelings in
Paris. J. P. Sub
10.9

Although one may hope that the tension in Amman will have died down a little by the beginning of next week, the situation created by the Iraqi "ultimatum" seems likely to come up when Peter Tripp and Christopher Makins come here for their day of talks at the Quai d'Orsay on 8 September.

116

2. This being so and at the risk of making my first letter to you sound a little reproachful, I feel that I must express some regret that we were not able to explain to the French our reaction to the Jordanian appeal described in Amman telegram No. 445 before rather than after the despatch of F.C.O. telegram No. 248 to Amman. We are lucky enough to have a direct and rapid London-Paris telephone link and it would have been not only helpful to me personally but, much more important, of value in terms of our relationship with the Quai if, when de Leusse raised the matter with me, I had been able to convey our reactions, in a context of consultation rather than, as I subsequently had to, of information. As you may have heard, he is an exponent (and, I believe, a sincere one and for the right reasons) of closer Anglo/French consultation across the board and, as you will have seen from my telegram no. 779, he was in fact seeking to consult me about our views before submitting his own recommendations to Schumann.

121


131

3. I am not making this point simply from the relatively restricted viewpoint of our natural desire to improve relations generally with the French - important though that is. But this was in fact a good example of a situation where our reaction was clearly right and realistic, whereas that of the French, because probably unrealistic, was also probably wrong. If I had had a chance of arguing our case with them, although I might not have convinced them, they might have had second thoughts about launching into the fray in New York. As it was, the fact that we sparked without seeking their views will have strengthened them in the latter and may also have inclined them, once again, to the feeling that, in a crunch, we tend to say "Amen" to whatever the Americans want. Since this is not the case and in the light of our sensible and balanced attitude, as expressed so clearly in the recent exchange between John Freeman and Peter Hayman, it is a pity for us to give the French any excuse to believe the contrary. Part of the problem this week has been the absence on leave of Luc de Nanteuil who, as you may have heard, is not only the Quai's principal expert on the Middle East, but also the man there with the most balanced assessment of the American attitude and how the French should react to it. If he had been in Paris, there might have been a more realistic response. But even he would not, I think, have prevented a reaction which flows from the increasingly

/strongly

Sir Philip Adams, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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strongly held view here about what is seen as an American/Soviet attempt to run the Middle East and to keep us and the French out of it. It was significant that, in speaking to me as recorded in the last sentence of my telegram no. 779, de Leusse used the phrase "a new Yalta" which, as I had already told Denis Greenhill in the context of Alphand's visit, seems to be indicative of a certain trend of thought in the Quai.

4. I write this letter with diffidence because the Department have been so consistently helpful about our relationship with the French in the Middle East context. In any case, the issue will no doubt come out in the wash during next week's talks; and I was grateful for the authority in paragraph 3 of F.C.O. telegram No. 1105 to UNIS New York. Incidentally, I hope that you yourself will be able to find time to visit us before too long. I know that Bruno de Leusse will be keen to meet you when you can manage it.

Yours ever,

Richard Palliser

(A.M. Palliser)

c.c. J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near East Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RECEIVED IN SECRETARY No 10 11/9/90
NET 1/4

11 September, 1990.

CONFIDENTIAL

11/9/90 14h
✓

Jordan and Iraq

(170)

Thank you so much for your letter J 1/1 of 4 September and for your welcome to me in this job. I personally feel very strongly that it is important for us to keep very close to French officials on matters concerning the Middle East and I found my association with Merillon in Amman very rewarding. I met Nanteuil in Jordan but confess that I failed completely to arouse his interest. Nonetheless, I look forward to meeting him again under your auspices in Paris one day.

2. I am sorry that, perhaps through the ineptitude of a beginner, we did not handle the business of the Jordanian appeal for help with the Iraqis very tidily. Peter Tripp will have explained to you what were the considerations at this end and I hope that in the end everything worked out without too much damage to your relations with your French colleagues.

(Philip Adams)

A.M. Palliser Esq., C.M.G.,
British Embassy,
Paris.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 1 SEP 1970 NEJ 1/4

Record of a Conversation between H.M. Ambassador and
Vice Minister Vinogradov on 4 September, 1970.

The ambassador began by expressing his regrets at the news of the death of Mr. Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, which had occurred during his absence on leave. He then went on to the question of Jordan, expressing H.M.'s serious concern at the situation in this country. If the worst came to the worst such a situation might lead to Jordan withdrawing her agreement to participate in the Middle East talks under Jarring, which would lead to the collapse of the negotiations as a whole. In particular, HMG was worried by reports that the Iraqi government had threatened military intervention in certain circumstances. We had heard these reports from the Jordanian Government and from Baghdad Radio. HMG was well aware of the difficulties: Iraq, for its part, had refused to accept the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 and committed itself to all-out support for the Fedayeen. HMG nevertheless hoped that the Soviet Government would be ready to use its influence with the Iraqis to restrain them from any dangerous and irresponsible behaviour.

2. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government also regarded the Jordan situation as troublesome, though at present it was difficult to identify the origins of these problems. The Soviet Government was particularly preoccupied because such a course of events did not create favourable conditions for the Jarring Mission. Such feuds were bad not only for the common Arab cause, but also for the task of the Four Powers, in their attempts to establish peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, he had now heard that negotiations between the Jordanians and Iraqis were in progress and that the Arab League was meeting in Cairo. The Jordanian Government had not

approached the Soviet Union with any request for help: the Jordanians had merely informed the Soviet Government of what was happening. He had asked the U.S. Ambassador for a day or two before what approach the Jordanians had made to them and Mr. Dean had confirmed that they too were merely being kept informed. The Arab League meeting was a positive factor and on the whole events in Jordan appeared to be calmer than a few days ago. For anyone to take action, there must first be a request: otherwise one might be accused of interference. The Soviet Government, after all, did not know the terms of the agreement between the Jordanians and the Iraqis dealing with the Iraqi military presence in Jordan.

3. The Ambassador said that he understood that at least the British, American and French Embassies in Amman had been approached by the Jordanian Government with a view to some possible quadripartite statement.

4. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government had received no such approach, and had merely been given details of the assassination attempt and of the Jordanian Government's rejection of the Iraqi ultimatum. The Soviet Government had not been approached in the subsequent two days. He repeated that there had been no request for either unilateral or multilateral action. The Soviet Government however shared the British Government's concern with the situation.

5. The Ambassador expressed the hope that none the less if a suitable opportunity were to arise, the Soviet Government might see its way to making these points to the Iraqis.

6. Mr. Vinogradov said that it was a fact of life that no-one liked to hear advice from another. It was necessary first of all that the Iraqis and Jordanians should clarify their positions. He did not believe that the Jordanian Government had yet raised the question of the Iraqi presence in Jordan with the Iraqi Government.

For the Jordanians, the first step was an approach to the Iraqis: there was no point in turning to outsiders first of all. The Soviet Government could not interpret the Jordanian approach as amounting to any kind of request for assistance; if the Soviet Government were to make an approach to the Iraqis, this might displease the Jordanians. The Soviet Government was watching the Jordanian situation closely.

7. The Ambassador said that his government had asked him to approach the Soviet Government, in the belief that the Soviet Ambassador in Amman had been approached in terms similar to those used by the Jordanian Government with our own Ambassador. The Jordanian Government had suggested a quadripartite statement, and he believed that there had been some discussion of this idea between Delegations in New York. The suggestion with which he had come today was somewhat different, being made on HMG's initiative.

8. Mr. Vinogradov understood that some kind of statement was under discussion at New York. The Soviet representative in New York was merely being told what he himself had told the French Ambassador on 3 September, namely that the Soviet Government were watching the situation, that they had not received a request of any kind, and that they hoped that the situation would calm down. Would H.M. Ambassador like to expound on his idea that events in Jordan might lead to Jordan's withdrawal from the Jarring talks?

9. The Ambassador explained that HMG were afraid lest, if the situation were to get completely out of hand, there might be a change of government in Jordan, leading perhaps to significant changes in policy.

10. Mr. Vinogradov admitted that they had not seen the situation in quite the same way. He then turned to the state of play in New York, drawing particular attention to the continued absence of Ambassador Telush.

11. The Ambassador said that he had heard on the radio that Telsoh might be returning on Sunday, 6 September.

12. Mr. Vinogradov and his assistant both asked for confirmation of this fact. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government was very worried by the Israeli reluctance to get on with the talks. He had told Mr. Dean that if the U.S. wanted their initiative to succeed they would have to put pressure on Israel.

13. The Ambassador thought that Israeli actions were in part dictated by their grave suspicions regarding infringements of the ceasefire. He was sure however that the U.S. Administration was putting very significant pressure on the Israeli Government.

14. Mr. Vinogradov said that it was vital that the negotiations be resumed. The Arabs were very impatient people: President Nasser's acceptance of the U.S. initiative had led to strong criticism. He expressed regret that there should be those among the Arabs who played into the hands of those elements which opposed progress towards peace.

15. The Ambassador said that it was unfortunate that there had been moves on the West Bank of the Suez Canal, infringing the ceasefire agreement.

16. Mr. Vinogradov said that such reports might be true and yet again they might not. They had not themselves heard any such reports. And what about the UAR's complaints about Israeli activities on the east side of the Canal? The Israelis and Americans were ignoring these. However negotiations were the main thing: if they could get properly under way then such problems might be dealt with. He was afraid that the Israelis, aware of the U.S. Administration's interest in the success of their initiative, might be able to blackmail the Americans.

17. The Ambassador said that HMG was equally anxious to see the start of the talks.

18. Mr. Vinogradov understood that there was a possibility that Mr. Gikhal might return with useless instructions, confined to talking about prisoners of war and economic infringements. Part of the trouble lay in the fact that the Rogers' plan had too many weak points. It was good however that the Arabs had taken it up. The Israelis on the other hand did not seem to be so interested in it.

19. The Ambassador hoped that Mr. Vinogradov was being too gloomy. He drew attention to the Israeli statement on the question of withdrawal, which was at least more forthcoming than anything they had said before.

20. Mr. Vinogradov thought all such statements were relative: it might be a move in the right direction. He then drew the Ambassador's attention to Mr. Brezhnev's statement at Alma Ata, which provided a clear, unambiguous picture of the Soviet position. The Soviet Government would like to cooperate with the British Government to secure progress in the right direction.

21. The Ambassador shared Mr. Vinogradov's hope that there would be such cooperation, and, on that note, wondered whether he might trouble Mr. Vinogradov with a message for Mr. Kozyrev. He had seen Mr. Kozyrev that morning, but the message had arrived since. The Ambassador handed over the text of the announcement of the Prime Minister's plans for visiting New York, explaining that he had been asked to pass these to the Soviet Government as a matter of courtesy, before their release on 5 September.

22. Mr. Vinogradov agreed to pass on this text to those directly interested.

CONFIDENTIAL

reference Moscow tel. no. 1022
of 4 September



(2/87)



With the compliments of

CHANCERY

(N. H. Livingston)

7 September, 1970

J.I.S. (Gulf),

F.C.O., London S.W.1.

BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

Record of a Conversation between H.M. Ambassador and
Vice Minister Vinogradov on 2 September, 1970.

The Ambassador began by expressing his regrets at the news of the death of Mr. Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, which had occurred during his absence on leave. He then went on to the question of Jordan, expressing HMG's serious concern at the situation in this country. If the worst came to the worst such a situation might lead to Jordan withdrawing her agreement to participate in the Middle East talks under Jarring, which would lead to the collapse of the negotiations as a whole. In particular, HMG was worried by reports that the Iraqi government had threatened military intervention in certain circumstances. We had heard these reports from the Jordanian Government and from Baghdad Radio. HMG was well aware of the difficulties: Iraq, for its part, had refused to accept the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 and committed itself to all-out support for the Fedayeen. HMG nevertheless hoped that the Soviet Government would be ready to use its influence with the Iraqis to restrain them from any dangerous and irresponsible behaviour.

2. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government also regarded the Jordan situation as troublesome, though at present it was difficult to identify the origins of these problems. The Soviet Government was particularly preoccupied because such a course of events did not create favourable conditions for the Jarring Mission. Such feuds were bad not only for the common Arab cause, but also for the task of the Four Powers, in their attempts to establish peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, he had now heard that negotiations between the Jordanians and Iraqis were in progress and that the Arab League was meeting in Cairo. The Jordanian Government had not

approached the Soviet Union with any request for help: the Jordanians had merely informed the Soviet Government of what was happening. He had asked the U.S. Ambassador a day or two before what approach the Jordanians had made to them and Mr. Dean had confirmed that they too were merely being kept informed. The Arab League meeting was a positive factor and on the whole events in Jordan appeared to be calmer than a few days ago. For anyone to take action, there must first be a request: otherwise one might be accused of interference. The Soviet Government, after all, did not know the terms of the agreement between the Jordanians and the Iraqis dealing with the Iraqi military presence in Jordan.

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4. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government had received no such approach, and had merely been given details of the assassination attempt and of the Jordanian Government's rejection of the Iraqi ultimatum. The Soviet Government had not been approached in the subsequent two days. He repeated that there had been no request for either unilateral or multilateral action. The Soviet Government however shared the British Government's concern with the situation.

5. The Ambassador expressed the hope that none the less if a suitable opportunity were to arise, the Soviet Government might see its way to making these points to the Iraqis.

6. Mr. Vinogradov said that it was a fact of life that no-one liked to hear advice from another. It was necessary first of all that the Iraqis and Jordanians should clarify their positions. He did not believe that the Jordanian Government had yet raised the question of the Iraqi presence in Jordan with the Iraqi Government.

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9. The Ambassador explained that HMG were afraid lest, if the situation were to get completely out of hand, there might be a change of government in Jordan, leading perhaps to significant changes in policy.

10. Mr. Vinogradov admitted that they had not seen the situation in quite the same way. He then turned to the state of play in New York, drawing particular attention to the continued absence of Ambassador Tekeah.

11. The Ambassador said that he had heard on the radio that Tekoa might be returning on Sunday, 6 September.
12. Mr. Vinogradov and his assistant both asked for confirmation of this fact. Mr. Vinogradov said that the Soviet Government was very worried by the Israeli reluctance to get on with the talks. He had told Mr. Dean that if the U.S. wanted their initiative to succeed they would have to put pressure on Israel.
13. The Ambassador thought that Israeli actions were in part dictated by their grave suspicions regarding infringements of the ceasefire. He was sure however that the U.S. Administration was putting very significant pressure on the Israeli Government.
14. Mr. Vinogradov said that it was vital that the negotiations be resumed. The Arabs were very impatient people: President Nasser's acceptance of the U.S. initiative had led to strong criticism. He expressed regret that there should be those among the Arabs who played into the hands of those elements which opposed progress towards peace.
15. The Ambassador said that it was unfortunate that there had been moves on the West Bank of the Suez Canal, infringing the ceasefire agreement.
16. Mr. Vinogradov said that such reports might be true and yet again they might not. They had not themselves heard any such reports. And what about the UAR's complaints about Israeli activities on the east side of the Canal? The Israelis and Americans were ignoring these. However negotiations were the main thing: if they could get properly under way then such problems might be dealt with. He was afraid that the Israelis, aware of the U.S. Administration's interest in the success of their initiative, might be able to blackmail the Americans.
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22. Mr. Vinogradov agreed to pass on this text to those directly interested.

JORDAN PRESS EXTRACTS,
Tuesday, 1.9.1970.

p. 2. shows the
outrageous he.
Fateh is putting
out.

Headlines :-

Ad-Dustour : Official statement on the Amman incidents.
(Repeated in Ad-Difaa).

An appeal to officials and citizens to
resume work. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa).

Dr. Farra leaves for New York.

Ad-Difaa : The Foreign Minister says that Israel
seeks to maintain her occupation.

Agreement between Jordanian officials
and commanders on eliminating all symptoms
of tension and provocation.

Fateh of
Monday : Statement by the Central Committee on
incidents.

Fateh of
Tuesday : Details of the plot carried out by the
authorities in Amman.

Al-Sharara : Details of the Nasser-Hussein talks.

Amman asks for the withdrawal of the
Iraqi army.

Note : Ad-Dustour and Ad-Difaa did not appear on Monday.

Ad-Dustour and Ad-Difaa

Incidents in Amman

Amman : JNA : An official spokesman made a statement on
the incidents which took place in Amman on Sunday. He said :

At about 8.45 p.m., unknown persons opened fire
from automatic weapons on GHQ Armed Forces, the Directorate
of Public Security and Police Headquarters, Amman. This
compelled the guard to return fire. As a result, a member
of the guard at General Headquarters was seriously wounded
and two civilians were wounded.

Through cooperation between the responsible
authorities and the Central Committee of the Resistance
Movement, the situation was brought under control within
a short period and it began to return to normal.

Fateh of Monday says that fire was opened from different
weapons on Sunday evening by the following Jordan Army and
Public Security posts in Amman :

GHQ Jordan Army.
Police Headquarters, Abdali.

Incidents in Amman (Cont'd)

The American Embassy.
The British Embassy.
The Palaces.
The Citadel.
The Reservoir.
The Post Office.
The Wireless.
The Radio Station.

There is conclusive evidence to prove that the resistance forces have shown discipline. Only those places which were hit by bullets of the authority and which suffered losses were compelled to try to silence the sources of fire. Firing by the authority continued until 11.30 p.m.

Fatch of Tuesday carries a report in which Fatch's internal affairs editor says :

The authority in Jordan tried to evade responsibility for the bloody plot in Amman on Sunday night by issued a false statement on alleged attacks on centres of the authority in Amman... Warning to begin implementation of the conspiracy was given from Jordanian Intelligence building. At the same time, fire was opened from a place in the Shmeisani Quarter between the Unions Building and the Villa Rosa. Fire was also opened from GHQ building. The warning was given when Jordan Television finished transmission of King Hussein's speech. Fire was opened from these places in all directions. A few minutes later, the following positions opened heavy fire on offices and establishments of the revolution and on residential areas :

GHQ Jordan Army
Abdali
Reservoir - Jebal al Taj.
The Citadel
The American Embassy
~~The British Embassy~~
The Spanish Embassy
Police Headquarters
Royal Palaces - Basman and Zahran
Security Battalion. Arjan
Automatic telephone exchange building
Radio Station..

Four shells fired by the Palace Guard fell near the Prince Hassan School, Jebal al Taj. Heavy fire was later opened on the al Taj area. Some shells hit the offices of the Democratic Front.

Jebal Amman : At 8.45 p.m., fire was opened from the "American" Embassy, the Central Post Office and the Spanish Embassy in all directions and, in particular, on the Wadi Seer road and the tiger-cubs camp, Jebal Amman. There was concentration on the Strand Hotel and the Tabba' building.

Jebal Lwebdeh: Fire was opened on Jebal Lwebdeh from the Citadel and the automatic telephone exchange building. The American Embassy guard fired in all directions. Public Security HQ and the Police College fired at the Lwebdeh area. Fire was opened in the direction of the tiger-cubs camp. GHQ Jordan Army fired in the direction of the Liberation Organisation's office.

Incidents in Amman (Cont'd)

Jebal al Akhdar : Heavy fire was opened on Jebal al Akhdar from the Kurdi farm, the Zahran post office and the British Embassy.

Jebal al Nazif and Ashrafiya : One shell fell on Jebal al Nazif. Fire was opened from the Al-Taj Reservoir on some offices of the revolution on Jebal Ashrafiya. Fire was also opened on the tiger-cubs camp.

Our revolutionaries showed self-control. Only those positions which were directly hit returned fire...

The authority contacted the headquarters of the revolution claiming that cease-fire orders had been issued. However, firing intensified...

Two Fatch revolutionaries, a PLA soldier, a civilian and a member of the Popular Front were killed.

The following were wounded :

Ziad Hassan Kheirallah	}	Arab Liberation Front.
Faris Nimr Ahmad		
Saleh Mustafa	}	Fatch.
Khalil Abdo		
Ibrahim Ismail Abu Ismail	-	Popular Liberation Forces.
Farid Saleh	-	Al-Sa'iqa.
A member of the Popular Front.		
10 civilians.		

The aims of the authority are :

- 1- to create an atmosphere of intimidation and confusion and to provide an excuse for striking at the revolution.
- 2- to cause an estrangement between the army and the revolution.
- 3- to paralyse the revolution and establish tranquillity on the frontier in order to implement the Rogers plan.
- 4- to test the revolution's power and preparedness and the discipline of its elements.
- 5- to estimate the forces of the revolution and determine their positions and arms...

Fatch of Tuesday also says :

- 1) When firing began in Amman, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Director of Operations and the Director of Planning were at GHQ.
 - 2) Suspicious radio stations transmitted orders requiring the revolutionaries to fire rockets at a time when no such orders were given by the revolution's command...
 - 3) The British Embassy guard established fortifications on buildings near the Embassy 48 hours before the implementation of the plot.
- /4...

of a military government will be announced in a few days' time. Martial law will be declared.

Agreement between Jordanian officials
and commandos

Amman : At a meeting yesterday evening, Jordanian officials and the Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance Movement agreed to eliminate all symptoms of tension, military preparation and provocation in Amman. This meeting was held in the residence of Prime Minister Abdul Munem al Rifai. It was attended by Sayid Ikiif al Fayiz, Sayid Abdul Wahhab al Majali, Dr. Daud al Husseini, Sayid Suleiman al Hadidi, Sayid Ja'far al Shami, Sheikh Abdul Hamid al Sayeh, Lieut. General Mashhour Haditha and Major General Zuhair Mattar.

Abu Ammar led the commando delegation, consisting of

Abu Iyad (Fateh)

Abu Maher (Popular Front)

Bahjat Abu Gharbiyeh (Popular Struggle Front)

Ibrahim Barghouthi (Fateh).

According to a reliable source, the commando delegation told the Jordanian side that the revolution rejected the American initiative and that the case was the case of the Palestinian people.

An appeal to officials and citizens
to resume work

Amman : JNA : The Prime Minister's office issued a statement yesterday morning in which it appealed to all government officials and citizens to resume work.

Dr. Muhammad al Farra

Amman : JNA : Dr. Muhammad al Farra, Jordan's Ambassador to the United Nations, left Amman for New York via Beirut yesterday evening after holding consultations with senior officials.

Statement by Foreign Minister
Anton Atallah

Amman : Reuters : Foreign Minister Anton Atallah stated yesterday that he was not surprised at Israel's delaying of the Middle East peace talks following a split in the Israeli Cabinet over alleged Egyptian cease-fire violations.

Replying to a question by Reuters, Sayid Atallah explained that President Nasser and officials in Cairo had denied Israeli charges as unfounded.

He said that ever since the November 1967 U.N. Security Council resolution Israel had been creating obstacles to obstruct that resolution, which called for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis.

Sayid Atallah said that Israel was inventing excuses for hindering the Jarring mission because she did not wish to reach a settlement and was seeking to maintain her occupation of the Arab territories.

/5...

Sayid Nayif al Hadid

Amman : Foreign Minister Anton Atallah decided to transfer Sayid Nayif al Hadid, First Secretary, Jordanian Embassy in Cairo, to the Jordanian Embassy in London.

...-...-...

Secrets of the Nasser-Hussein talks

At the talks held between the Jordanian and UAR delegations from August 20 - 23, the leader of the Jordanian delegation raised three questions :

- 1- liquidation of commando action ;
- 2- withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Jordan; and
- 3- supply of arms and military equipment by Cairo to the Amman Government.

President Nasser pointed out that it was too early to discuss items 1 and 2 because steps to implement the U.N. Security Council resolution had not started...

King Hussein raised the question of liquidating commando action at a meeting with President Nasser. He told the President that Jordan's friends were exerting pressure on her and that he had redeployed his forces in the Amman area for this purpose. The President again pointed out that the liquidation of commando action was not on the agenda... Before the return of the Jordanian delegation to Amman, Al-Ahram reported that it had been agreed to protect commando action, to keep the Iraqi army and to continue consultations regarding current negotiations for implementation of the Security Council resolution...

Amman asks for withdrawal of the Iraqi Army

Al-Sharara learns from reliable sources that a senior official left Amman by air for Baghdad at 7 p.m. on Saturday, August 29, carrying a secret message from King Hussein to the Iraqi Government. In his message, the King asks Iraq to ensure that her forces in Jordan will keep silent and maintain complete neutrality with regard to the expected conflict between the authority and the resistance movement "otherwise Iraq will have to withdraw her forces from Jordanian territory forthwith." The Jordanian envoy is still in Baghdad...

Events show that reaction is taking all political and military measures to begin negotiations in New York for implementing the Rogers plan, to dissolve the Eastern Front and to prepare for withdrawal of the Iraqi army in order to enforce surrender...

Acceptance of reaction's call for withdrawal of the Iraqi forces will lead to fulfilment of the aims of reaction and expose the rear of the resistance movement to the blow for which preparations are being made by reaction...

Editorials

Ad-Dustour and Al-Difaa carry no editorials today...

Editorials (Cont'd)

The Fateh editorial of Monday accuses "agents in Jordan" of responsibility for the firing incidents in Amman... If the authority seeks a clash, our revolution will be compelled to fight... But the clash will certainly be the last one and our armed masses will certainly attain victory...

The Fateh editorial of Tuesday says that the events in Jordan and in Amman form part of a plan prepared by the authority with the object of striking at the revolution... The plan was prepared by agents in accordance with orders by the American Embassy in Amman... The revolution wants tranquillity to prevail in Amman so that it can devote itself to the fight against the occupiers...

ENDS.

PRESS OFFICE,
BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN - JORDAN.

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reference Moscow tel. no. 1022
of 4 September



(2/87)



142

With the compliments of

CHANCERY

(N. H. Livingston)

7 September, 1970.

J.I.S. (Near East)

F.C.O., London S.W.1.

pr
15/9

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 548

14 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 548 DATED 14/9/70 REPTD FOR INFORMATION
TO PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON
BERNE UKHIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI4 JISNE AND JIS GULF.

RE
REG. NO. 11
NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NO 11 AS AT 140900Z

1. NIGHT 13/14 SEP WAS QUIET. THE EMBASSY GUARDS SAY THAT A SHOT WAS FIRED AT THEM LAST NIGHT AND THERE ARE REPORTS THAT GUARDS AT TWO OTHER PROTECTED BUILDINGS WERE FIRED AT BY CIVILIANS.
2. THE SITUATION IS HOWEVER MORE TENSE AGAIN FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF FEDAYEEN INCLUDING FATAH OFFICERS NEAR IRBID, AND ALSO BECAUSE AS A RESULT OF THE SPLIT BETWEEN PFLP AND OTHER FEDAYEEN GROUPS. FEDAYEEN IN GENERAL ARE NERVOUS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY THINK THIS A FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK THEM.
3. DA SAW JORDAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN THIS MORNING. SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE WHOLE JORDAN VALLEY FRONT AND SOUTH JORDAN WAS QUIET. HE EXPLAINED THAT TROOPS IN THE IRBID AREA HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSIDERABLE PROVOCATION BY FEDAYEEN RECENTLY AND INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS HAD BEEN SEIZED INDISCRIMINATELY AND DETAINED. LAST WEEKS SPONTANEOUS ARMY ACTION AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE PFLP. (THIS IS NOT TO SAY OTHER FEDAYEEN DID NOT GET INVOLVED). HE THOUGHT THAT FEDAYEEN REPORTS OF SOME FORTY KILLED AND ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER WOUNDED WERE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED FOR ONLY SOME FOURTEEN BODIES WERE PRODUCED AT THE MOSQUE. THE SPOKESMAN SAID HE DID NOT THINK CASUALTIES IN AMMAN DURING LAST WEEKS FIGHTING WERE AS HIGH AS HAS BEEN REPORTED AND HOPES TO HAVE OFFICIAL ESTIMATES SOON. INCIDENT LAST NIGHT WHEN ARMY WAS REPORTED TO HAVE QUOTE SHELLED UNQUOTE TWO TRUCK-LOADS OF FEDAYEEN AT IRBID INVOLVED FATAH ELEMENTS AND THE ARMY HAVE BEEN TAKING QUICK MEASURES TO INVESTIGATE IT JOINTLY WITH FATEH.

/COMMENT:

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- 2 -

COMMENT: LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN SOME UNITS, PARTICULARLY IN THE IRBID AREA, AND ALBEIT IN FACE OF PROVOCATION FROM FEDAYEEN, HAS BEEN WORRYING THE KING AS WELL AS OTHERS.

4. TRAFFIC IS MOVING NORMALLY IN AMMAN AND THE AIRPORT AND THE ROADS TO IT OPEN.

5. EVACUATION: THREE MORE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAVE LEFT SINCE OUR LAST SITREP. A TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY SEVEN REMAIN. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES EMBASSY STAFF.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN AND DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

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/SENT TO D.C.C./


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C.W. Long,

Near Eastern Dept.



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113

Ref. our tel. No. 439.

Papers 1 to 4 give a
good account of the
stones being put out
by the different sides.


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14 September, 1970.

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Mr. Lay
NAD

(82)
9/ix

UNCLASSIFIED

(2/87)

Dear Makins -

The situation in Jordan

Soviet press comment on the clashes between Jordanian forces and Palestinians has avoided coming down on one side or the other: so much so that Pravda on 1 September carried reports both confirming and denying the attempt on King Hussein's life and avoided all comment. They did report Radio Baghdad's story that the Palestinians had turned to the Iraqis for help. Izvestia of 5 September reported that the UAR are supporting the Palestinians' demand for a meeting of the Arab League to examine the Jordanian crisis.

pr
15/9

Yours ever-
Nick Livingston

(N. H. Livingston)

The Hon. C.J. Makins,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W. 1.

c.c. Chanceries: Washington, UNMIs New York,
Paris, Cairo, Tel Aviv,
Beirut,

C.L.G. Mallaby, Esq.,
Eastern European and Soviet Department,
F.C.O.

CLAIR
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 551

TO F.C.O.
14 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 551 DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD WASH-
INGTON BERNE BONN UKMIS NEW YORK.

P.F.L.P. PRESS CONFERENCE.

REG. 11.10

NEJ 1/4

168 THE PFLP HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT, 13 SEPTEMBER.
A SPOKESMAN FOR THE FRONT READ OUT A LONG STATEMENT WHICH WAS
MAINLY CONCERNED WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S DECISION TO FREEZE
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE POPULAR FRONT IN THE COMMITTEE (OUR TELNO
531). THE STATEMENT SAID THAT THE PFLP WOULD NOT NOW BE BOUND
TO THE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH IT WAS AT PRESENT COMMITTED.
IT HELD THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR "KEEPING OUR
REVOLUTIONARIES IN ISRAELI JAILS", IT SEEMS THAT THE COMMITTEE
WANTED THE PFLP TO "SUBMIT TO THE WILL OF OUR ENEMIES".
THE DECISION TO FREEZE THE PFLP MEMBERSHIP TO THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, TAKEN WHILE THE PFLP'S REPRESENTATIVE WAS ABSENT,
WOULD CREATE A SPLIT IN THE RANKS OF THE REVOLUTION.
THE STATEMENT ATTACKED "LIBERATED" ARAB COUNTRIES WHO HAD
CRITICISED THE HIJACKING AND SAID THAT THE PFLP WOULD NOT BECOME
A "TAIL" TO ANY OFFICIAL REGIME OR TO THE LOOSE FORMULA WHICH
SET UP THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE FRONT, AT THE TIME WHEN THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS FORMED, HAD RESERVED ITS RIGHT TO CONTINUE
ITS OWN POLICY, DESPITE THE DISAPPROVAL OF OTHER GROUPS.

2. THE STATEMENT STRONGLY CRITICISED THE LEADERS OF OTHER
FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS, ESPECIALLY YASSIR ARAFAT, THOUGH HE
WAS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME. THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT WAS ALSO
CRITICISED AS HAVING FIRST SUPPORTED THE POPULAR FRONT, AND THEN
HAVING RETREATED. IT SEEMED THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WISHED
TO CHANGE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PFLP. THE PFLP WAS NOT AFRAID
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN
BECAUSE THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES WERE ARMED.

/3.

3. AHMAD AL YEMANI THEN ANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE HOSTAGES BEING HELD BY THE PFLP. HE CLAIMED THAT SOME OF THEM WERE PHANTOM PILOTS. THE PRESS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THEM ONCE INVESTIGATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THE PFLP CONSIDERED THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI HOSTAGES AS FORMING ONE GROUP BECAUSE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED SHOULD BE CONCERNED FOR THEIR OWN CITIZENS, AND RESIST U.S. AND ZIONIST PRESSURE, WHICH IS OBSTRUCTING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. AHMAD AL YEMANI REPEATED THAT THE BRITISH HOSTAGES WOULD BE RELEASED WHEN LEILA KHALED WAS SET FREE. HE DENIED THAT THE PFLP HAD SUSPENDED CONTACTS WITH THE RED CROSS MISSION - THE RED CROSS THEMSELVES HAD SUSPENDED THE CONTACTS. THE NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN IN ISRAELI PRISONS WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE SET FREE TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE ISRAELI HOSTAGES WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AFTER ISRAEL HAD SAID THAT SHE WAS PREPARED TO CONCLUDE SUCH AN EXCHANGE.

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MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
14 SEPTEMBER 1970

177

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 559 DATED 14/9/70 REPTD FOR INFO TO
PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON
BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI4 JISNE AND JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL
SITREP NO 12 AS AT 141600Z

NEJ

1/4

1. A QUIET DAY IN AMMAN. JOINT MILITARY/FEDAYEEN AND CIVILIAN POLICE PATROLS ARE OPERATING. NO INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED.
2. IN OUR PREVIOUS SITREP WE REPORTED THE LATEST ARMY AND FEDAYEEN (FATEH) CLASH IN THE IRBID AREA. JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN NOW CONFIRMS THE FATEH NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE NEAR AL TURRA, SOME 15 KILOMETRES NORTH EAST OF IRBID, AT A POINT ONLY 2 KILOMETRES FROM THE SYRIAN FRONTIER. COMMENT. TROOPS IN SUCH AN AREA ARE PERHAPS LIKELY TO BE TRIGGER HAPPY.
3. JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE PLA FORCES DETACHED TO THE IRAQI FORCES HAVE NOW REVERTED TO UNDER COMMAND THE PLA.
4. FATEH NEWSPAPER TODAY STATES QUOTE EVERYTHING INDICATES THAT THE AUTHORITIES ARE CONTINUING THEIR CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE REVOLUTION. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS THE PUNISHMENT OF THE MURDERERS, WHO MUST BE EXECUTED UNQUOTE. THE PAPER CALLS ON THE MASSES TO OBSERVE A GENERAL STRIKE UNTIL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL AUTHORITY.
(SEE OUR TEL 514). AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAYS THAT THE GENERAL STRIKE WILL TAKE PLACE ON 17 SEPTEMBER.

DEFCOMCEN PASS DI4 JISNE AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS DEFCOMCEN PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK
AND BONN.

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 300

TO AMMAN

14 SEPTEMBER 1970
(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 300 OF 14 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

PARA 5 OF BERNE TELNO. 257 : KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DANGER FOR THE
REGIME IN ALLOWING THE PRESENT SITUATION TO DRIFT ON WITHOUT
MAKING ANY ATTEMPT TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY. THIS DOES NOT, OF
COURSE, IMPLY THAT WE IN ANY WAY SUPPORT THE IDEA OF " BASHING
THE FEDAYEEN." OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION CONTINUES TO BE THE WELFARE
AND EARLY RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES DETAINED BY THE PFLP.

2. BUT WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO YOU TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION
WITH KING HUSSEIN AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY AND ELICIT FROM HIM HIS
IDEAS ABOUT HOW HE CAN BRING THE SITUATION BACK UNDER CONTROL.
IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO THE KING IF YOU WERE TO GIVE HIM IN GENERAL
TERMS AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BERNE GROUP TO SECURE THE
RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES. WE WOULD NOT HOWEVER WISH TO DISCLOSE
TO HIM ANY DETAILS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
CONCERNED, ESPECIALLY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. WE WOULD BE
MOST INTERESTED TO KNOW HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE MINIMUM DEAL WHICH

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- 2 -

IT WOULD IN THE END BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND OF WHAT INFLUENCE HE COULD BRING TO BEAR IN FAVOUR OF A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. HOW IMPORTANT DOES HE RATE THE PUBLIC DISAPPROVAL BY THE IRAQI, SYRIAN AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF WHAT THE PFLP HAVE DONE ?

3. YOU MAY THINK IT USEFUL TO HAVE A SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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MOD (INT)

CABINET OFFICE
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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 565

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
15 SEPTEMBER 1970

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TO PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON
BERNE UK MIS N.Y. BONN MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL
SITREP NUMBER 13 AT 150900Z.

- 1.. NIGHT 14/15 SEP WAS GENERALLY QUIET. TRAFFIC IS MOVING NORMALLY IN AMMAN AND THE AIRPORT AND THE ROADS TO IT ARE OPEN.
- 2.. WE HAVE HAD A REPORT FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT FEDAYEEN FIRED KATYUSHA ROCKETS AT CAMPS IN THE ZERKA MILITARY COMPLEX ABOUT TWO DAYS AGO. EMBASSY DRIVERS LIVING IN ZERKA CONFIRM TENSION IS HIGH THERE.
- 3.. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI ARMY ELEMENTS FROM FORWARD AREAS AND THAT THE PLA FORCES RECENTLY UNDER IRAQI COMMAND BUT NOW UNDER PLA COMMAND WERE INVOLVED IN LAST WEEKS CLASH IN AMMAN.
- 4.. ARMED FEDAYEEN IN VEHICLES HAVE BEEN SEEN PATROLLING IN AMMAN THIS MORNING.
- 5.. PETROL SUPPLIES WHICH RAN SHORT LAST WEEK NOW APPEAR TO BE BACK TO NORMAL.

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/6. EVACUATION

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-2-

6.. EVACUATION:-

173 MEMBERS OF BRITISH COMMUNITY REMAIN.

7.. JORDANIAN ARMY SPOKESMAN HAS NOT YET ADMITTED A FURTHER ARMY FEDAYEEN CLASH WHICH IS REPORTED BY TODAYS FATAH NEWSPAPER TO HAVE OCCURED AT MALKA WHICH IS NORTHWEST OF IRBID AND SOME 5 KILOMETRES FROM THE SYRIAN FRONTIER. 3 FEDAYEEN ARE REPORTED KILLED.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN
AND DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
15 SEPTEMBER 1970

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INFORMATION TO ROUTINE WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD
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178
YOUR TEL NO 300: KING HUSSEIN'S POSITION.

I ALREADY HAVE A DATE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOR TOMORROW
MORNING 16TH AND AM TRYING TO ARRANGE ONE WITH THE KING, ALSO
PROBABLY FOR TOMORROW. I SHALL SPEAK AS SUGGESTED.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 578

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
15 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 578 DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO BACHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND IN
JIS GULF.

REGISTRY No 10
1970
NEJ 1/4

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 14 AS AT 151500Z

- 1.. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF ANY INCIDENTS IN AMMAN THIS MORNING
- 2.. AT ABOUT 1430 HOURS LOCAL TIME INTERMITTENT AND AT TIMES
HEAVY FIRING COULD BE HEARD FROM THE ZERQA DIRECTION. A RELIABLE
JORDANIAN ARMY SOURCE CONFIRMS THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN ARMY FEDAYEEN
CLASH IN THE ZERQA CAMP AREAS THIS AFTERNOON, BUT, HE SAYS,
THAT IT IS NOT SEVERE. FIRING HAS CONTINUED FOR AT LEAST TWO HOURS
AND WE CONSIDER HE MAY BE MINIMISING EVENTS. TAXIS ARE NOT
AVAILABLE TO GO TO ZERQA.
- 3.. AMMAN AIRPORT IS OPEN. JOINT PATROLS ARE OPERATING IN AMMAN.
- 4.. QUEEN ZEIN THE QUEEN MOTHER HAS LEFT THE ZAHRAH PALACE ON
JEBEL AMMAN AND HAS REPORTEDLY MOVED TO THE ROYAL RESIDENCE AT
HAMMAR OUTSIDE AMMAN.

FCO PASS PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN AND
DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

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 LASH AMMAN
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
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 15 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELECCAN NO 584 DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1970
 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV BEIRUT



JORDAN INTERNAL.

TWO MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WERE SUMMONED TO THE PALACE TONIGHT BY PRINCE HASSAN AND ZEID RIFAI (THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF, (MASHHUR HADITHA) HAD RESIGNED, AND THAT A MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS ABOUT TO BE FORMED. THIS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT 0400Z TOMORROW. THE INTENTION WAS THAT THE ARMY WOULD THEN SURROUND AMMAN AND SETTLE ACCOUNTS WITH THE FEDAYEEN

THE TWO EMBASSY STAFF CONCERNED HAVE JUST BEEN SUMMONED BACK TO THE PALACE, AND WE MAY THEREFORE HEAR MORE LATER.

2. IF A SHOWDOWN DOES IN FACT TAKE PLACE, COMMUNICATIONS TOMORROW MORNING MAY BE INTERRUPTED, BUT WE SHALL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP YOU INFORMED

MR. PHILLIPS. [COPIES SENT TO NO.10 D.ST. & CABINET OFFICE]

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P.U.S.D.	COMMS.D.
NEWS D.	D.W.S.
A.T.D.	M.O.D.(INT.)

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO MOD UK

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 111100Z

11 SEPTEMBER 1973

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EXAMINERS

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FOLLOWING FOR MOD FOR DIA FROM BRITMILAT TEL AVIV.

FOH 111100Z SEP.

REFERENCE YOUR FOH 101100Z SEP.

FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN.

ONE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO GIVE PRECISE INFORMATION FOR BOTH STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION. THE IDF SAY TOTAL STRENGTH OF ALL GROUPS VARIES BETWEEN FIVE AND TEN THOUSAND. THE IDF ASSUME THAT THE FEDAYEEN GROUPS WOULD UNITE IN EVENT OF SHOWDOWN WITH ARMY THEREFORE UPPER FIGURE OF TEN THOUSAND WOULD REPRESENT MAXIMUM STRENGTH.

TWO. DISPOSITIONS ARE DIFFICULT AS MAIN CONCENTRATIONS ARE IN TOWNS OF AMMAN, IRBID AND ZENKA AND THERE IS CONSTANT MOVEMENT BETWEEN GROUPS AND TOWNS. THE MAIN CONCENTRATION IS IN AMMAN ITSELF WHICH HAS ABOUT HALF OF THE TOTAL FEDAYEEN STRENGTH IE ABOUT 5000. THE IDF BELIEVE THE JORDAN ARMY HAVE CLEARED MOST OF THE FEDAYEEN FROM THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY AND THERE ARE VERY FEW GROUPS OUTSIDE THE TOWNS. IN PARTICULAR THE BORDER AREAS FACING ISRAEL ARE RELATIVELY FREE OF FEDAYEEN WHO MOVE IN FOR ANY OPERATION AND THEN DEPART. THE ROADS JERICHO-AMMAN AND JERICHO-SALT-AMMAN HAVE ALSO BEEN CLEARED BY THE JORDAN ARMY.

THREE. THE IDF STATE THAT THE DESERT STRIP KNOWN AS QUOTE

THREE. THE IDF STATE THAT THE DESERT STRIP KNOWN AS QUOTE
DANJONS FIELD UNQUOTE IS HELD BY ABOUT ONE COMPANY OF
FEDAYEEN. THEY DO NOT ESTIMATE THE TOTAL STRENGTH TO
BE MORE THAN 100. THE JORDAN ARMY ALSO HAVE ABOUT ONE
INFANTRY COMPANY IN APCs PLUS ABOUT 10 OR 11 TANKS IN SAME
LOCATION WATCHING THE FEDAYEEN.

FOUR. IT IS CONFIRMED YOUR INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING
HANDLING AND NOT DIVULGING YOUR INTEREST HAVE BEEN
FOLLOWED.

FCO PLEASE PASS DEFCONCEN

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS MOD UK

M. Barnes

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FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. 320

15 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET (152321Z)

182

YOUR TEL. NO. 584 [JORDAN INTERNAL]

MAY WE PASS THIS INFORMATION TO THE AMERICANS, SWISS, GERMANS
AND ISRAELIS. WHO ARE AT PRESENT MEETING IN BERNE AT THE REQUEST
OF THE GERMANS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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A. AND T. DEPT.

EMERGENCY STAFF

SECRET

185

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. 315

15 SEPTEMBER 1970 (NED)

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL 151825Z

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 567.

180

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ADAMS.

ARAFAT EL-HEJAZI, PRESIDENT OF THE JORDAN PRESS ASSOCIATION NOW ON A SPONSORED VISIT, ASKED ME THIS AFTERNOON WHETHER I HAD HEARD ANYTHING TODAY ABOUT KING HUSSEIN. WHEN I SAID NO AND LOOKED SURPRISED, HE SAID THAT SA'AD JUMA'A HAD TOLD HIM THIS MORNING THAT THE KING WAS SERIOUSLY THINKING OF QUOTE GIVING UP UNQUOTE BUT THAT HASSER HAD BEGGED HIM TO HOLD ON. HEJAZI SAID HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD AND SEEMED TO SEE IN THE REINSTATEMENT OF HADITHA A POSSIBILITY THAT CONFIDENCE COULD BE RESTORED BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE FEDAYEEN. BUT HE WAS VERY GLOOMY ABOUT THE INABILITY OF ANYONE TO CONTROL THE PFLP AND APPEARED TO THINK THAT THEY MIGHT YET DESTROY JORDAN.

pr
un
17/9

DOUGLAS-HOME

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EMERGENCY STAFF

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EN CLAIR

FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 587

TO F.C.O. LONDON

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 587 DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV
WASHINGTON JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4

JORDAN INTERNAL.

NEJ 1/4

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGREEMENT REACHED ON 15 SEPT. BETWEEN THE
FORMER JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE P.L.O.:—

1. EXISTING GUARD IN ALL POSITIONS IN AMMAN WILL BE REPLACED BY CIVILIAN POLICEMEN. THIS INCLUDES EMBASSIES AND PUBLIC UTILITIES. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ROYAL DIWAN, THE ZAHRAH PALACE, THE CITADEL AND THE RESERVOIR ON JEBAL AL TAJ.
2. EXISTING GUARD OF THE RESERVOIR ON JEBAL AL TAJ AND THE CITADEL WILL BE REDUCED.
3. ALL SECURITY FORCES, WHICH HAVE OCCUPIED NEW POSITIONS, WILL BE WITHDRAWN.
4. ALL MILITARY FORCES AROUND AMMAN WILL BE WITHDRAWN.
5. FEDAYEEN WILL WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE POSITIONS RECENTLY OCCUPIED BY THEM IN THE STREETS OF THE CITY.
6. ALL ROAD BLOCKS WILL BE REMOVED FROM ALL PUBLIC ROADS.
7. THERE WILL BE NO OBSTRUCTION BY FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS TO CIVILIANS AND MILITARY MEN.
8. FEDAYEEN WILL CEASE SEARCHING HOUSES AND ARRESTING PERSONS.
9. ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC SECURITY MEN WILL NOT OBSTRUCT ANY FEDAYEEN ELEMENT IN ANY PLACE.
- /10. THERE WILL.

10. THERE WILL BE A SYMPOIC PRESENCE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE
IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:-

POST OFFICE. ELECTRIC WATER PUMPING STATION GENERATORS AT
RAS AL EIN.

11. FEDAYEEN MILITARY BASES WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE CITY.

12. THESE MEASURES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED FROM WEDNESDAY MORNING
16-9-1970 AND IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE COMPLETED BY 6 P.M.
ON THE SAME DAY.

13. A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL BE FORMED AS FOLLOWS:-

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT:-

MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMAD KHALIL ABDUL DAYEM
COLONEL ABDUL RAHMAN MAHADIN
COLONEL AL-EIT MATTAR
LIEUT. COLONEL KHALIL QA'WAR.

ON BEHALF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:-

COLONEL SAMIR AL KHATIB
COLONEL AHMAD 'AFANA
LIEUT. COLONEL ABDUL RAHMAN AL ' ARMOUTI
LIEUT. CONLONEL ABUL ' ALAA.

AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MEASURE IN AMMAN, STEPS WILL
BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THEM IN ALL TOWNS OF THE KINGDOM.

FCO PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON .

MR. PHILLIPS [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR

FLASH AIRTEL TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

NO. 588

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

(187)

pm

ADDRESSED TO FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 588 DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BACHDAD
JIS NE AND MOD DI4 AND ROUTINE TO PARIS WASHINGTON MOSCOW
UKMIS N.Y. AND SAVING TO JEDDA AND TRIPOLI.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

NEJ 1/4

THE FOLLOWING IS THE NEW JORDANIAN CABINET ANNOUNCED TODAY:-

BRIG. MUHAMMED DA'UD

PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE

BRIG. MAZEN AJLUNI

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MIN. OF
STATE FOR PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
AFFAIRS

MAJOR-GENERAL NUTLAQ EID

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

BRIG. SALEH SHARE'I

MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND WAKF

BRIG. IBRAHIM AYUB

MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS AND
TRANSPORT

BRIG. FAHD JARADAT

MINISTER OF FINANCE

BRIG. AWWAD AL KHALIDI

MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
AGRICULTURE

COL. DR. YACUB ABU GHOSH

MINISTER OF HEALTH, SOCIAL WELFARE
AND RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

LT. COL. ABDULLAH SAYYEL

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS

/MAJOR MIFLEH AWATALLAH

MAJOR MIFLEH AWATALLAH

MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS

MAJOR IBRAHIM SAYEGH

EDUCATION

MAJOR ADHAN ABU AUDEH

CULTURE, INFORMATION, TOURISM AND
ANTIQUITIES

2.. THE FOLLOWING APPOINTMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN ANNOUNCED:-

FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL MAJALI
(LPR 73)

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

LT.GEN. MASHHOUR HADITHA
(FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF)

MILITARY ADVISER TO THE KING

ZEID AL-RIFA'I
(FORMER HEAD OF ROYAL DIWAN)

AMBASSADOR IN LONDON

AHMED TOUQAN (LPR 107)
DEPUTY P.M. TILL JUNE)

HEAD OF THE ROYAL DIWAN

FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI

GENERAL MILITARY GOVERNOR

BRIG. MAZEN AJLUNI

DEPUTY GENERAL MILITARY GOVERNOR

MAJ-GEN QASSEM MA'AITA

GOV. OF BELQA AND KERAK

BRIG. SALEM AUDEH INJIDAT

GOV. OF MA'AN

/BRIG. KASIB SUQ

BRIG. KASIB SUQ

GOV. OF AMMAN

BRIG. BAHJAT MUHEISIN

GOV. OF IRBID

BRIG. MOHAMMED IDRIS

GOV OF ZERKA

FCO PASS ROUTINE PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND
SAVING TO JEDDA AND TRIPOLI

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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(i) Pl enter J/felgner v. l. h.

(i) 4/11 ~~Rec'd~~
sent
PUS 17/9



(i) Mr Evans ~~gls~~ R.E. 16/9.

1/1

(i) P. - 17/9

RECEIVED IN
RICHMOND 10
17/9

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.

3 September, 1970

188

Dear Christopher,

NEJ 1/4

The Kidnapping of Salim al-Sharif

The following rather sordid story may be of some interest to you as an indication of the times through which Jordan is at present passing. Salim al-Sharif was born about fifty years ago in Gaza, and has been a newspaperman for most of his life. In 1953 he became one of the founders of the Jerusalem paper, "al-Jihad", and during the following years he prospered, largely, it is rumoured, because of money he was paid by the Americans for supporting them in the columns of his paper (we have, however, no firm evidence that the Americans were in fact involved with him). He still owns property (including a hotel) in Jerusalem, where his former partner is editor of al-Quds newspaper. About eighteen months ago he approached the Jordanian authorities for permission to start publishing a paper in Amman, to be called "al-Jihad". He is widely thought to have received a quarter of a million dinars from palace sources to set himself up in business; in return, his paper was to be pro-government and anti-fedayeen. Certainly he had enough money to buy the most modern printing equipment in Amman and to hire a substantial number of journalists. "al-Jihad" has, however, never appeared (Salim al-Sharif has explained that he was waiting an "opportune moment"), though its owner/editor has for many months now been going round Amman boasting that he will outsell every other paper in the country and will probably force several other printing presses out of business. He has been a constant visitor to Jerusalem throughout this period, and the whisper has gone around that he is in the pay of the Israelis. I am told that he is rude, arrogant, slimy, boastful and dishonest - in short, one of the least desirable characters this side of the Euphrates.

2. On the night of 20 August he was accosted by armed men while returning to the Intercontinental Hotel, was driven away and has not been seen since. Prince Hasan, we understand, is worried about Salim al-Sharif's fate, and has been trying to get the intelligence and police authorities to find him, so far without success. None of his potential rivals in the press world are showing much concern. Although it was almost certainly a fedayeen group that kidnapped him, all have protested their innocence. The official view is that Fatah was responsible. Current rumours are that he is dead, or being held by the IFLP or the IDFLP in Jordan, or by the Iraqis in Baghdad. Certainly he has been a particular bete noire of the fedayeen for some months; nasty little articles have from time to time appeared in "Fatah" newspaper, generally commenting on the quarter of a million dinars he is said to have received from the Palace.


1/3.

C. W. Long, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

I would say if his
Paper never appeared.
R.E. 16/9.

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
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What about reason?
many more?

5. Various reasons are advanced for his kidnapping. One is that the fedayeen simply wish to prevent the publication of his newspaper, and are holding him until all his staff, fed up with not being paid, drift off to other jobs. Others say that he is being questioned about his West Bank contacts, his declared contempt for the fedayeen, and the possibility that he is involved in promoting the idea of a West Bank Palestinian State. The latter sounds more probable to us.

Yours ever,

Jimmy Carter

(G. P. Carter)

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Mr. E. [unclear] ✓
Mr. T. [unclear] ✓

Mr. [unclear] ✓
Strickcliff

SECRET.

(189)

Minutes

Mr. Long

Jordan Internal

NEJ 1/4

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

2. The report was that the Iraqis have given PLA 421 battalion their "independence"

this was obviously a complicating factor for Arafat's and Haditha's control of affairs. The Palace seemed totally inactive.

A. Ibbott
14 September, 1970.

Short of determined political leadership (which is something we have not before seen from the Palestine Liberation Army) this should not do too much damage.

W. [unclear]
14/9

I agree. I believe
The Iraqis won't pay
for this lot any more! 14/9

Enter a pm

14/9

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190

CYBER/CAZ A

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL. NO. 586

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 526 DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKNIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DIA JIS(NE) JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 15. AS AT 160715Z.

NIGHT 15/16

WAS QUIET. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED. AT PRESENT TRAFFIC IS
MOVING ENTIRELY NORMALLY BUT WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE
TO MAKE ROAD RECESS. AIRPORT IS OPEN.

NET 1/4

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF

18/5

FCO PASS PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKNIS NEW YORK
BONN AND DEFCOMCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED. SENT TO D.C.C.]

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BT CLAIR

FLASH AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 594

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED
REGISTRATION
NET 1/4

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 594 DATED 16/9/70 REPTD FOR INFO TO
BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON JISNE MOD DIA IMMEDIATE
AND BAGHDAD MOSCOW PARIS ROUTINE.

pm
am
(8/5)

FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF THE LETTER OF ASSIGNMENT FROM
KING HUSSEIN TO BRIGADIER MOHD DA'UD ASKING HIM TO FORM A
PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

1. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT FORCES HOSTILE TO OUR NATION
HAVING BEEN MAKING PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING A NUMBER OF AIMS.
INCLUDING SHAKING THE PILLARS UPON WHICH THE STATE RESTS,
DESTROYING NATIONAL UNITY, UNDERMINING THE MORALE OF THE
PEOPLE AND THE ARMED FORCES, DESTROYING THE CONFIDENCE
OF THE PEOPLE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, CREATING
DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE
FORCES OF OTHER ARAB NATIONS, ESPECIALLY IRAQ, AND
CREATING DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND
THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMY.
/2. THERE

2. THERE HAVE BEEN FORCES THAT HAVE TRIED TO DIVIDE THE U.A.R. FROM THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD AND MAKE IT SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS BY ITSELF. THE U.A.R. HAS, HOWEVER, ALWAYS ACTED FROM A TRUE ARAB POSITION AND A BELIEF IN A UNITED DESTINY, AND FROM CONCERN TO DISCHARGE COMPLETELY ITS ROLE TO LIBERATE ALL OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY.

3. CONTRADICTIONS IN JORDAN'S NATIONAL EXISTENCE, THE FAILURE OF SOME GOVERNMENT APPARATUS TO FACE UP TO EVENTS AND CHALLENGES FAITHFULLY AND COURAGEOUSLY AND SUPERFICIAL AND SELFISH POLICIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION AND CAUSED IT TO REACH THE UTMOST EXTENT OF GRAVITY. THE RESULT OF ALL THIS IS THAT THE STATE IS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE SERIOUS POSSIBILITY OF DESTRUCTION BY HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH RECENT DAYS HAVE SHOWN ARE BEING PREPARED. " WE HAVE FOLLOWED EVERY COURSE IN FACING THIS DETERIORATING SITUATION....I HAVE GIVEN DEEP THOUGHT TO THIS MATTER AND ASKED MYSELF WHETHER THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE LEADERS, FORCES AND ASSETS OF THIS ENTITY (JORDAN) WILL SERVE THE CAUSE OF DESTINY AND NATIONALISM IN ANY WAY. I HAVE ARRIVED

AT THE CONVICTION THAT THE CONTRARY IS CORRECT AND THAT THERE IS ROOM ONLY FOR BRAVERY AND FOR RESTORING THE STATE TO A POSITION OF STEADFASTNESS.''

4. IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE CITIZEN AND HIS PROPERTY, THE HONOUR OF THE SOLDIER, THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND ORDER AND THE DESTINY OF THE HONEST FEDAYEEN, 'I ENTRUST YOU WITH THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER AND CHARGE YOU WITH THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL ACT IMMEDIATELY TO COUNTER THE HOSTILE PLAN. TO PROTECT SECURITY AND RESTORE ORDER AND IMPOSE THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, PROTECT THE RESISTANCE FROM THE SAME HOSTILE PLAN, AND ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE POSITIVE COOPERATION WITH IT (THE RESISTANCE)''.
 5. 'I ASK YOU TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WITH SUCH FIRMINESS AND EFFORT AS IS REQUIRED, TO RESTORE SECURITY, ORDER AND STABILITY AND TO CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENT DECIDED UPON BY THE FOUR-MAN COMMITTEE ON 10.7.73 AND CONCLUDED BETWEEN

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE AGREEMENTS WHICH FOLLOWED IT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, THE FIVE-MAN COMMITTEE AND THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I ASK YOU TO PROTECT UNCOMPROMISINGLY
EVERYTHING THAT REGULATES THE RELATIONS OF THE STATE WITH
THE RESISTANCE AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THE PLO AND THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ARMY AND TO TAKE STEPS THAT WILL ENSURE THE ABILI-
TY OF THE REVOLUTION TO PLAY ITS SACRED ROLE ENJOYING MY
FULL SUPPORT AND THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE STATE APPARATUS''.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND ROUTINE TO PARIS

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[PASSED TO M.O.D.]

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N.E.D.

BY TELEGRAM NO 594) AND SAID THAT WE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION
THAT AN ATTACK ON AMMAN BY THE TROOPS WAS IMMINENT (AN IMPRESSION
AND, INCIDENTALLY, GIVEN TO OUR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES) THE KING
LAUGHED AND SAID HE WAS SHORT OF SLEEP. HE HAD INTENDED TO
CONVEY THAT FORCE WAS ONLY TO BE USED TO MEET FORCE BUT HE STILL
FEARED THAT IT MIGHT COME TO THIS ALTHOUGH HE HOPED NOT.

(F) THE KING SAID THAT HE AND HIS ADVISERS WERE VERY CONSCIOUS
OF THE NEED NOT TO PROVOKE THE PFLP INTO HARMING THE HOSTAGES;
LIKEWISE OF THE NEED TO MINIMISE THE RISKS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
IF FIGHTING BROKE OUT.

(G) HE HAD NO IDEA OF THE DISTINCT DEAL WHICH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE FEDAYEEN. HE REGARDED PUBLIC DISAPPROVAL
BY IRAQI, SYRIAN AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF THE PFLP'S ACTION AS,
FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, UNIMPORTANT.

3. THE KING WAS IN A RATHER DEFIANT MOOD BUT IS CLEARLY VERY TIRED

4. PLEASE SEE MY I.F.T.

FCG PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND IMMEDIATE TO LAMIS NEW YORK

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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SIR R. HOOPER CABINET OFFICE & HOME SECRETARY]

N.S.D.

N.S.D.

ARAB DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

A. & T.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF

MOD INTERNAL

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CIPHER CAT/A

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192

FLASH AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 596

16 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOR TELE NO 84 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1973 RELEVANT

NEJ 1/4

FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV CAIRO
BAGHDAD BEIRUT AND URMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 344. JORDAN INTERNAL.

18/9

1 SAW KING HUSSEIN AT HUNOR THIS MORNING.

2. THE MORE IMPORTANT POINTS TO EMERGE WERE AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) HIS PURPOSE IN FORMING THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS BOTH
TO ENSURE THAT HIS OWN TROOPS WOULD BE KEPT IN BETTER DISCIPLINE
THUS MEETING A COMPLAINT REPEATEDLY MADE BY THE PALESTINIAN
CENTRAL COMMITTEE THAT THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT HAD THE WILL BUT
NOT THE AUTHORITY TO RESTRAIN THE TROOPS, AND ALSO TO ENSURE
THAT IF THEY HAD TO FIGHT THE FEDAYEEN THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY
LED AND DIRECTED. MUCH OF THE ADMITTED INDISCIPLINE OF TROOPS
RECENTLY (E.G. AT IRBED) WAS CAUSED BY THEIR LACK OF CONFIDENCE
IN THE SUPREME COMMAND. HABIS MAJALI ENJOYED THE CONFIDENCE
AND RESPECT OF ALL.

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/(B)

(B) AS FOR THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE
FEDAYEEN AND THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT, HIS NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD
HOLD THEIR SIDE OF THE BARGAIN PROVIDED THE FEDAYEEN DID THE
SAME.

(C) THE KING WAS VERY PLEASED WITH REACTIONS SO FAR TO HIS NEW
GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS LEADED BY A PALESTINIAN OFFICER. HE HAD
ALREADY RECEIVED MANY VISITS AND CONGRATULATIONS FROM PALESTINIANS
AS WELL AS OTHERS AND FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS,
HE WAS BY NO MEANS CONFIDENT THAT SOME FEDAYEEN WOULD NOT TRY TO
CREATE TROUBLE: IF SO THEY WOULD "CATCH IT". PLANS HAD BEEN
MADE FOR ALL EVENTUALITIES. IT WAS A BAD SIGN THAT THE PFLP
HAD, IT WAS REPORTED TODAY, BEEN RECEIVED BACK INTO THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE.

(D) NO TROOPS HAD BEEN MOVED INTO AMMAN BUT UNITS HAD BEEN
"RE-DISPOSED" IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD SO AS TO ENABLE THEM MOST
EFFECTIVELY TO DEAL WITH TROUBLE IF IT AROSE.

(E) WHEN I REFERRED TO THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE KING (AND OTHERS
FROM THE PALACE) HAD SPOKEN TO MEMBERS OF MY STAFF LAST NIGHT

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 595

16 SEPTEMBER 1975

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 595 DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1975 ~~NEJ~~ 174

FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW

PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKRIS NEW YORK BAH MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND

JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 16 AS AT 161200Z.

1. DAY'S STAFF RECCED ROUTES TO AIRPORT, CENTRAL AMMAN, AND RING ROAD AMMAN TO SUWEILEH TO CROSS ROADS EAST OF WADI SIR TO ROAD JUNCTION NORTH EAST OF MAUR TO RADIO TV STATION AREA SOUTH OF AMMAN BETWEEN 0830 AND 0930 HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY.

2. NO SIGNS OF ANY RECENT MILITARY ACTIVITY WERE NOTED. SOOK SHOPS WERE TRADING BRISKLY AND POPULATION SEEMED RELAXED. HARDLY ANY FEDAYEEN OR GOVERNMENT UNIFORMED PERSONNEL WERE TO BE SEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

/ON THE

ON THE STREETS. ROAD CHECK POINTS ARE ONLY LIGHTLY MANNED EXCEPT AT THE NEAR WADI SIR WHERE SOME 6 MILITARY POLICE AND 6 ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND POLICEMEN WERE WORKING.

3. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND GENDARMERIE SPOKEN TO WERE IN GOOD SPIRITS AND SEEMED PLEASED THAT A MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN APPOINTED.

4. DURING THE MORNING REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED OF A RENEWAL OF FIGHTING IN ZERKA. THIS AND FEDAYEEN ADVERSE COMMENT ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS INCREASED TENSION. TAXIS ARE REPORTED AS NOT NOW AVAILABLE TO GO TO ZERKA. TRAFFIC IS THINNING AS IS NORMAL AT MIDDAY THE JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN DENIES ANY CLASH AT ZERKA.

5. AT MIDDAY THE OUTLOOK DOES NOT SEEM SO POSY AS EARLIER THIS MORNING. PARTICULARLY SO AS IT WAS NOW REPORTED THAT PFLP HAVE REJOINED THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 595 TO ECO.

-3-

6. JORDANIANS ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS THAT IDF HAVE CARRIED OUT EXTENSIVE GROUND AND AIR RECCES IN THE SOUTH JORDAN VALLEY DURING THE PAST 48 HOURS AND THAT ARMoured VEHICLES ARE CONCENTRATING NEAR JERUSALEM.

7. EVACUATION. REMAINDER BRITISH COMMUNITY TOTALS 163

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DIA JIS(HE) AND JIS GULF

ECO PASS PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKNIS NEWYORK BOMN

AID DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

ECO/WH DISTRIBUTION

N.D.D.

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

194

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 851

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

FORWARDED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 851
OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1970 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE
TO AMMAN BERNE WASHINGTON AND PRIORITY TO CAIRO AND BEIRUT

JORDAN - INTERNAL SITUATION.

REC 1/4

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AT WORKING LEVEL OF THE THE NEWS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN IS THAT THE KING HAS AT
LAST BEEN DRIVEN BY THE DETERIORATING SITUATION INTO
TAKING FIRM ACTION WHICH HE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN EARLIER.
THEY DO NOT ON PRESENT EVIDENCE BELIEVE THAT THE KING HAS
BECOME A PRISONER OF THE ARMY, BUT RATHER THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED
THE LOGIC OF EVENTS AND REALISED THAT UNLESS HE NOW GIVES
UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT TO THE ARMY, HE WILL LOSE CONTROL COMPLETELY.
THIS MEANT A REPUDIATION OF HADITHA'S RECENT CONCILIATORY
EFFORTS TO FIND A (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) MODUS
VIVENDI WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND IMPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT
WOULD NOW TAKE A TOUGHER LINE TOWARDS THEM. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
BELIEVE THAT THE KING HAS ACTED JUST IN TIME AND THAT WITH LUCK
IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO LATE FOR HIM TO RE-ESTABLISH HIS AUTHORITY
WITH THE HELP OF THE ARMY AND HALT THE DRIFT TOWARDS
CHAOS. TO THAT EXTENT THEY REGARD THIS AS A HOPEFUL MOVE.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO BERNE AND WASHINGTON.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION
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CYHPR/CAT A

STATE AMMAN

TO F.C.O.

195

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

TELEGRAM NO 597

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FC TELEGRAM NO 597 DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV WASHINGTON JIS(NE)

AID MOD DIA.

M.I.P.T. JORDAN INTERNAL.

NES 1/4

(8/5)

IT IS OF COURSE MUCH TOO EARLY TO OFFER ANY CONFIDENT

INTERPRETATION OF THE EVENTS AND NON-EVENTS OF THE PAST TWENTYFOUR
HOURS, EXCEPT PERHAPS THAT THEY ILLUSTRATE HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR
KING HUSSEIN TO GROPE HIS WAY TOWARDS AN AMELIORATION OF THE
MUTUAL HATRED AND FEAR EXISTING AND INCREASING BETWEEN HIS EAST
BANK AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLES, BUT I FIND HIS OWN EXPLANATION OF
HIS MOTIVES CONVINCING.

2.. AT FIRST SIGHT THE APPOINTMENT OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT,
TOGETHER WITH THE PIGEON-HOLING OF GENERAL MASHOUR HADITHA,
MAY WELL BE INTERPRETED BY THE FEDAYEEN AS AN INDICATION THAT
THE KING IS MOVING TOWARDS A TOUGHER POLICY. HOWEVER, ON
REFLECTION THEY AND THE LUCKLESS CIVILIAN TOWNSFOLK HERE MAY
DISCERN SOME RAYS OF COMFORT:-

/(A) THE

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-2-

(A) THE NEW JORDAN MINISTER WHO IS WELL KNOWN TO MY STAFF AS THE JORDANIAN LIAISON OFFICER TO THE UNTSO IS A PALESTINIAN AND ALMOST CERTAINLY NO REPORT TO HAWK. WE DO HOWEVER, I FEAR, REGARD HIM AS A PLEASANT, IF RATHER CLOOMY, LIGHTWEIGHT.

(B) AS THE KING IMPLIED, THE APPOINTMENT OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT SHOULD SOOTHE THE WOUNDED PRIDE OF THE JORDAN ARMY AND MAKE THEM MORE AMENABLE TO HIS AUTHORITY, AND ALSO TO SOME EXTENT DEMONSTRATE THAT HE HAS TRIED TO MEET THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S CRITICISM OF THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT'S IMPOTENCE OVER CONTROLLING THE TROOPS, AND ENFORCING SUCCESSIVE AGREEMENTS.

(C) THE PRINCIPAL BETE NOIRE OF THE FEDAYEEN, NAMELY ZAID RIFAI, HEAD OF THE ROYAL DIVAN, AND THE KING'S RIGHT HAND MAN, HAS BEEN RELEGATED TO AN EMBASSY ABROAD.

3. THE SITUATION SHOULD BECOME CLEARER SOON, BUT AS OF NOW I AM BOUND TO SAY, DESPITE THE CALM REPORTED IN MY LAST SITREP, THE SECURITY OUTLOOK FOR JORDAN, AND AMMAN IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS HAZARDOUS.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) AND MOD DI4

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 852

16 SEPTEMBER 1972

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 852 OF 16 SEPTEMBER RPTD FOR

INFO TO AMMAN.

M.I.P.T.

pc
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18/5

JORDAN INTERNAL.

ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAS NOW CONFIRMED TO
MILITARY ATTACHE THAT THEY REGARD THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT AS A
MOVE BY THE KING TO CALL IN THE MILITARY AS A LAST BID TO
RE-ESTABLISH HIS AUTHORITY RATHER THAN THE MILITARY FORCING
THE KING'S HAND. THEY CONTINUE TO TAKE A POSITIVE VIEW
OF THE SITUATION AND HAVE BRIEFED ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER
IN FLIGHT ACCORDINGLY.

2. AS I IMAGINE H.H. AMBASSADOR AT AMMAN WILL BE REPORTING
FULLY ON THE LATEST MOVES I AM NOT SENDING FURTHER
DETAILS OF THE ISRAELI ARGUMENTS UNLESS INSTRUCTED.

MR. BARNES.

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 602

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 602 DATED 16/9/70 REPTD FOR INFO TO

NEJ 1/4

PRIORITY BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON

BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DIA JISNE AND JIS GULF

JORDAN INTERNAL

SITREP NUMBER 17 AS AT 161600Z

1. NO INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN AMMAN BUT CONTINUING
FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IS OBVIOUS.

2. JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN IS ADVANT THAT NO
CLASH BETWEEN ARMY AND FEDAYEEN OCCURED AT ZERKA THIS MORNING.
HE CLAIMS THE MIDDAY BBC BROADCAST IS A LIE.

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-2-

3 . WITH TENSION HIGH RUMOURS ARE RIFE AND THE POPULATION

VERY JUMPY, BUT IT HAS BEEN AN UNEVENTFUL DAY MILITARILY.

DEFCON : CEN PASS PRIORITY TO JISNE MOD DIA AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS DEFCONCEN PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UNKIS NEW YORK AND BONN

PRIORITY.

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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BLASH AMMAN

TO F.C.O.

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TELEGRAM NO 634

17 SEPTEMBER 1973

IN

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 634 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1973 REPEATED 1/4

FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKHIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND
JIS GULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 18 AS AT 170300Z

AT FIRST LIGHT TODAY FIRING BROKE OUT IN AMMAN.

FEDAYEEN MORTARS AND KATUSHA HAVE BEEN FIRED.

FIRING SEEMED TO START IN THE AREA OF THE RADIO AND T.V. STUDIOS
BUT IS NOW BECOMING MORE GENERAL.

IT SEEMS THAT THE ARMY IS NOT RETURNING FIRE TO ANY GREAT
EXTENT AS YET AT PRESENT.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) MOD DI 4 AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS DEFCONCEN PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKHIS NEW YORK AND BONN
MR. PHILLIPS. [REPEATED AS REQUESTED, SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FLASH AMMAN

TO F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NO 606

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

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NEG 1/4

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 606 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW

PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND

JIS GULF.

1-
18/9

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 19 AS AT 170400Z

FIRING HAS NOW BECOME GENERAL IN AMMAN.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) MOD DI 4 AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS DEFCONCEN PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK AND BONN

MR. PHILLIPS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED, SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FLASH AMMAN

TO F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NO 637

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 637 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW

PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI 4 JIS(NE) AND *pc*

JIS GULF.

am

18/9

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITREP NUMBER 20 AS AT 170444ZZ.

FIRING IN AMMAN IS NOW HEAVY BY BOTH SIDES. A MIXED FORCE OF

JORDANIAN ARMoured VEHICLES AND INFANTRY HAVE BEEN SEEN MOVING

TOWARDS 3 RD CIRCLE

EMBASSY STAFF UNABLE TO GET INTO OFFICE FURTHER DAMAGE REPORTED

TO EMBASSSSY BUILDING.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO JIS(NE) MOD DI 4 AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS DEFCONCEN PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK AND BONN

MR. PHILLIPS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED, SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FLASH AMMAN

TO FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 648

17 SEPTEMBER 1974

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NEJ 1/4

YOU WILL UNDERSTAND NEED FOR BREVITY.

VERY HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUES.

EMBASSY LIGHTLY DAMAGED AND MOST STAFF PINNED IN HOUSES.

ARMY SEEM TO BE CARRYING OUT PLANNED OPERATION TO
RETAKE FEDAYEEN AREAS USING TANKS AND INFANTRY.

PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

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FLASH TEL

TO FCO LONDON

TELEGRAM U/II

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

TOP SECRET

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SITREP NO 21 AS AT 170600Z

NET 1/4

JORDANIAN ARMY TROOPS HAVE MOVED ALONG JEBEL AMMAN TOWARDS CITY

CENTRE AND HAVE REACHED INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL

SWEDISH CAMERAMAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN WOUNDED.

P-
18/5

TROOPS ARE NOW AT THIS EMBASSY'S LOCATION.

FEDAYEEN OCCUPIED HOUSES ARE MORE NUMEROUS IN THE AREA OF

END. CIRCLE WHICH THE TROOPS ARE NOW APPROACHING.

ACTIVITY SEEMS TO BE CONCENTRATED ON JEBEL AMMAN AREA RATHER

THAN JEBEL HUSSEIN. FIRING IS CONTINUOUS, FEDAYEEN MORTAR FIRE

IS INTERMITTENTLY FALLING ON JEBEL AMMAN AROUND ZARAH AND GHQ

JORDAN ARMED FORCES AREA.

PATON TANKS AND ABOUT A COMPANY OF INFANTRY ARE OPERATING ON THE

HIGH GROUND BETWEEN RADIO AND TV STATION.

AIRPORT IS CLOSED.

NO CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED AMONGST BRITISH COMMUNITY.

FCO PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS.

FCO/AM/DISTRIBUTION:

H.E.D.

SECRET
 FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 TELEGRAM NO. 2055

TO WASHINGTON
 16 SEPTEMBER 1970
 (HED)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2055 OF 16 SEPTEMBER
 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN.

AMMAN TEL. NO. 584 : JORDAN INTERNAL

THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY HAS SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO
 GENERAL HAIG AT THE WHITE HOUSE (IN THE TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF
 KISSINGER).

2. HAIG STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD NO
 PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAN TO INSTAL A MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
 THEY HAD SECURED AN UNDERTAKING FROM KING HUSSEIN THAT, IN THE
 ANNOUNCEMENT HE INTENDS TO MAKE ON THE FORMATION OF A MILITARY
 GOVERNMENT, HE WILL CALL ON THE FEDAYEEN NOT TO HARM THE HOSTAGES.
 OTHERWISE THE U S GOVERNMENT HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION, BUT HAIG
 WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR GIVING AIR SUPPORT
 FOR THE JORDAN ARMY.

3. HAIG SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS KNEW NOTHING OF THIS DEVELOPMENT
 BUT IT WAS HIS JUDGEMENT THAT IF THINGS WENT WRONG FOR KING
 HUSSEIN THE ISRAELIS WOULD INTERVENE.

4. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT HAD SEEN THE LATEST
 P F L P TERMS FOR THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES AS REPORTED IN BERNE
 TEL. NO. 272 AND CONSIDERED THAT THEY WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE: THEY
 WERE "VERY EXPENSIVE".

DOUGLAS-HOME

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 OFFICE].

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204

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CYPHER/CAT 4

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 834

TO CAIRO

16 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 834 OF 16 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO ALGIERS, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, BENGAZI,
KHARTOUM, JERBA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, ADEN, RABAT, TUNIS.

JORDAN.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE EXPECT SERIOUS TROUBLE IN JORDAN,
PARTICULARLY IN AMMAN, EARLY TODAY AS A RESULT OF A DECISION
BY THE KING TO SETTLE ACCOUNTS WITH THE FEDAYEEN.

2. THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY AT THIS STAGE. HOWEVER,
SINCE IT IS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT SUCH ACTION BY THE KING
WOULD BE REPRESENTED AS HAVING BEEN TAKEN AT WESTERN INSTIGATION,
YOU SHOULD TAKE SUCH PRECAUTIONS AS YOU JUDGE NECESSARY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL

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EMERGENCY STAFF.

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pm
am
18/9

Minutes

Mr. Tripp

Mr. Moon rang at 0915 hours. The Prime Minister is likely to want an F.C.O. assessment of last night's events. (Is the King stronger/weaker? divergence of U.S. and British views on King's intentions etc.) Can we give this some thought and ring Mr. Moon with a preliminary assessment.

NET 1/7

Sw
(A. Ibbott)
16 September, 1970

Copy to: Mr. Hanbury-Tenison

*True.**Sw*
*16/9**P*
16/9

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

EN CLAIR
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 611

TO F.C.O.
17 SEPTEMBER 1970

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NET 1/4

UNCLASSIFIED.

SITREP NO 22 AS AT 170800Z.

8 TANKS HAVE BEEN SEEN ON JEBEL ASHRAFIYA MOVING TOWARDS TOWN
CENTRE WHERE THE HEAVIEST FIRING IS NOW TAKING PLACE
A CURFEW HAS BEEN IMPOSED AND IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED
THAT ANYONE SEEN ON THE STREETS WILL BE SHOT. SO FAR AS
WE KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN NO CASUALTIES TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY.

FCO PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS.

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18/5

207

EN CLAIR
FLASH AMMAN

TO FCO

TELEGRAM NO 612

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10
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PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING AS BEFORE

POOL DESPATCH.

FUEL DUMP HIT IN CENTRE OF CITY SENDING BLACK COLUMN SMOKE
SKYWARDS. SOLDIERS ON HIGH WALLS PIN DOWN COMMANDOS
IN HIDE OUTS IN CITY CENTRE.

A TELEPHONE OPERATOR REPORTED ARMY TAKEN OVER POST OFFICE.
AND REFUSING FOREIGN CALLS. FURIOUS BATTLE RAGED OUTSIDE
INTERCONTINENTAL FOR CONTROL OF PARTLY FINISHED BUILDING
FAVoured BY GUERILLAS AS STRONG POINT. MACHINE GUN BULLETS
SMASHED INTO HOTEL WHERE SCORES OF JOURNALISTS HUDDLED ON
FLOOR FOR SHELTER

BRITISH EMBASSY HIT BY MORTAR FIRE AND TANKS STATIONED OUTSIDE
EMBASSY FIRING AT GUERILLAS.

pm
um
18/9

(ALL JOURNALISTS SAFE AND WELL ONE WOUNDED SWEDISH PHOTOGRAPHER)

MR PHILLIPS

[PASSED TO B.B.C. AND REUTERS]

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F L A S H WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE


TELEGRAM NUMBER 2729

17 SEPTEMBER 1975

CONFIDENTIAL AND GUARD

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 2729 OF 17 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BONY BERNE AMMAN TEL AVIV BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK
AND BEIRUT
JORDAN.

((DTG 170845Z))



KISSINGER TELEPHONED ME AT 2830Z TO SAY THAT REPORTS WERE REACHING
THEY THAT FIGHTING WAS GOING ON QUOTE ALL OVER AMMAN UNQUOTE. AS
A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, CERTAIN PRELIMINARY STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN
TO ALERT A U S BRIGADE IN GERMANY AND AN AIRBORNE DIVISION AT
FORT BRAGG. THE PRESIDENT HAD ORDERED THAT THIS PRELIMINARY ALERT
MUST STOP SHORT OF MEASURES LIKELY TO BE DETECTED BY THE PRESS AND
THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE INTENTION OF MAKING ANY MILITARY MOVE. IF
AN EVACUATION BACKED BY FORCE BECAME NECESSARY, THE TROOPS HAD
ALREADY BEEN EARMARKED.

2. KISSINGER SAID THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION INSIDE JORDAN WAS
FAR FROM CLEAR TO THEM, BUT THEY WERE STILL IN TOUCH WITH U S
EMBASSY IN AMMAN. THEY HAD EVIDENCE FROM INTERCEPTS THAT THE
FEDAYEEN HAD CALLED FOR IRAQI HELP.

3. THE EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP WOULD BE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE
AT 171130Z TO REVIEW THE SITUATION BUT WAS ~~NOT~~ UNLIKELY TO TAKE
ANY DECISION REGARDING POSSIBLE INTERVENTION UNLESS THE SITUATION
WAS BY THEN CLEARLY DISASTROUS. THE PRESIDENT IS STILL IN CHICAGO
(WHERE SISCO ALSO IS) AND ACCORDING TO PRESENT PLANS WILL CARRY

/ OUT

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- 2 -

OUT HIS ARRANGED PROGRAMME FOR TODAY.

4. KISSINGER ASKED ME TO BE MOST CAREFUL TO PROTECT THE MILITARY INFORMATION IN THIS TELEGRAM AND PARTICULARLY TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS NOT PLAYED BACK TO U S POSTS OR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT OUTSIDE THE EMERGENCY ACTION UNIT. HE UNDERTOOK TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD LIKE ANY INFORMATION WE HAD ABOUT THE SITUATION INSIDE JORDAN.

5. THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FIND OUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN THIS SITUATION, OF WHICH AT PRESENT THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE.

PCO PASS PRIORITY TO ALL EXCEPT NEW YORK.

MR FREEMAN.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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(AMERICAN)
M.O.D.(INT.)

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209

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 862

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

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CONFIDENTIAL (DTG 171005Z)

ADDRESSED FCO TEL NO 862 OF 17 SEPTEMBER RPTD FOR
INFO TO FLASH AMMAN, JISNE, WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAM NO 852:

196

JORDAN INTERNAL.

RECEIVED IN

NET 1/4

WE HAVE REMAINED IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ISRAEL MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE WHO ARE EVIDENTLY KEEPING THE SITUATION UNDER
CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE BY VARIOUS MEANS.

pa
um
18/5

2. THEIR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT

(A) THERE IS HEAVY FIRING BY THE JORDANIAN ARMY IN
SALT, SUELA (ON CROSS-ROADS ON JERICHO/AMMAN ROAD), ZERKA
AND AMMAN.

(B) JORDANIAN TANKS ENTERED AMMAN AND ZERKA AT APPROXIMATELY
11 A.M. LOCAL TIME.

(C) HEAVY FIRING BY THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS REPORTED
AT WAHDAT, HEADQUARTERS OF THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATION (SEE
(C) OF MY TELEGRAM NO 858).

(D) GUERILLAS ARE REPORTED AS DESCRIBING THEIR SITUATION
AS DESPERATE.

3. UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT ME OTHERWISE, WE SHALL CONTINUE
TO REPORT IDF INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN
TELEGRAMS FROM THE MILITARY ATTACHE TO MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, REPEATED AS ABOVE.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON (FLASH)
DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH JISNE.

HR/BARNES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED: TO WASHINGTON: SENT TO D.C.C.]

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Mr. Egan

Ent NEJ/

17/9

pr am
18/9

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NEJ 1/4

SECRET and GUARD

210

Mr. Danner ~~to RB~~ ~~minutes~~ 16/9.

Mr. Tripp

Sir P. Adams.

King 16/9.

Situation in Jordan

Mr. ~~Dane~~ ^{Dain} of the Cabinet Office called today to inform us that D.I.4, Ministry of Defence, have received indirectly an interesting report through a member of the U.S. Naval staff in London. The officer concerned, who was probably being indiscreet, said that the Americans had recently received a message from King Hussein. In the message King Hussein had asked the Americans to "ensure that the Israelis do nothing that would prejudice or aggravate the situation". He had also said that depending on Fedayeen reaction he would ask the United States or Israel for assistance if need be. The King said that the new government was determined to remove the Fedayeen. The Army would only enter Amman if necessary; but the government would take over communications and a curfew would be imposed if need be.

C.W. Long

(C. W. Long)
16 September, 1970

Copies to: Private Secretary
Private Secretary No. 10
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
Emergency Staff

This confirms the assessment given by Mr. Sisco last night - and may have been one of the factors in it. It is usual for the King to ask the Israelis, through the Americans, to lay off Jordan when he has a particularly tricky project in mind.

This is Adams

SECRET and GUARD

16/9

NEJ 114

Jordan: Internal Situation

S45 (211) Cdy sent to
No 10
Xat
la
16/9.

King Hussein's decision to install a military government came after a fortnight of sporadic fighting between the King's régime (backed by the Army) and the fedayeen. Throughout this period, there was little sign of the emergence of any arrangement such as that which had ended the similar confrontation in June. The previous arrangement had only been made possible by the King's acceptance of the resignation of two of his most hawkish military advisers and the mediation of the Chief of Staff, General Haditha, who was in close touch with and retained the confidence of the moderate fedayeen, notably Yasser Arafat.

2. The King's latest move came as a result of strong pressure on him from the Army to settle accounts with the fedayeen. By dismissing the government and accepting the disappearance of General Haditha, the King has created a very brittle situation in which he has almost certainly forfeited the confidence of the moderate fedayeen. In this situation, with the King relying on military advice and the fedayeen virtually in control of Irbid (the second largest town in Jordan) and numerically strong in many areas of Amman, the risks of open civil strife are very high. Widespread fighting could easily be provoked by small incidents. We do not know how long the fedayeen would be able to hold out. Their ammunition may be short. But the probability is that King Hussein could only defeat them militarily at a great cost in lives.

3. The American assessment of the immediate consequences of the King's decision was more sanguine than our own. This was

/largely

This piece of information was derived from Amman tel no 584. It is subsequently found out to be inaccurate. (S45) 16/9.

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largely due to the fact that they had earlier information from the Palace and to our inability to communicate with Amman during the crucial hours before the King's announcement was made. But even if fighting does not erupt immediately, the King's move is bound to be seen as a provocation by the fedayeen and thus likely to provoke a major confrontation between them before long.



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cc. Mr. Goddard for Suf S
Mr. Arthur E.

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

11/10/70

N Evans (timed) 11/10/70. September 7, 1970

We spoke

11/10/70

We have a meeting

Dear Ian,

8/11/70

on N.E. flying to - morrow

8/11/70

Over the weekend the Prime Minister has read a number of telegrams about the Middle East, in particular in the context of the Jordanian request for a four-Power statement on Iraqi intervention. The telegrams seen by the Prime Minister include Ukmis New York to F.C.O. Nos. 1832, 1835 and 1837 of September 3, F.C.O. to Moscow No. 741 of September 3 and F.C.O. to Ukmis New York 1105 of September 4.

The Prime Minister has commented:-

"If the four Powers do not agree we should carry out our own policy. The others have had bilateral talks. Why should not we? Let us get on with it.

E.H."

Yours sincerely

Christopher Robson

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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~~NEO.~~ - for draft reply

(213)

~~C. B. M. G. G. G. G.~~

10 Downing Street

~~W. G. G. G. G.~~

Whitehall

~~per office.~~

WGC/q September 3, 1970.

DH reply submitted.

Dear Ian,

Encl. R.E. 10/9.

The Prime Minister has seen Amman telegram No. 445 of September 2 and in particular paragraph 2 setting out the Jordanian proposal that the British, the Americans and the French should concert with the Russians a joint statement supporting the Jordanian position and condemning Iraqi intervention.

The Prime Minister has asked what view the Foreign and Commonwealth Office take of this proposal, and I should be grateful if you would let me have a note as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I am drawing the Prime Minister's attention to Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram No. 248 of September 2 and Paris telegram No. 779 of September 3 which appear to be relevant to his enquiry.

to Amman
/

Yours sincerely

Christopher Roberts

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



NED.

(214)

I have asked No 10 to show the PM
UKM^{is} NY.1837 and Folio 5 10 Downing Street
to UKM^{is} NY. Can we prepare a Whitehall
more substantive note for the PM - in view of his
comment below.

1M⁴/9 September 4, 1970.

Dear Ian,

I wrote to you last night about the Jordanian proposal that the British, the Americans and the French should concert with the Russians a joint statement supporting the Jordanian position and condemning Iraqi intervention. I added that while awaiting your advice, I would show the Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram No. 248 to Amman of September 2 and Paris telegram No. 779 of September 3.

In the light of the Paris telegram, the Prime Minister has commented:-

"I have much sympathy with the French view. E.H."

Yours sincerely

Dr reply submitted -

Christopher Roberts

Enc.

R.E. '79.

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



NED. - for action + dft reply please

cc. Mr Graham for Sops

10 Downing Street

Mr Arthur

Whitehall

(215)

Ps/Mr Goddard

September 7, 1970

11/10/70

Mr. Watkins.

Arden MacRae.
9/9

Dear Ian,

Over the weekend the Prime Minister has read a number of telegrams about the Middle East, in particular in the context of the Jordanian request for a four-Power statement on Iraqi intervention. The telegrams seen by the Prime Minister include Uknis New York to F.C.O. Nos. 1832, 1835 and 1837 of September 3, F.C.O. to Moscow No. 741 of September 3 and F.C.O. to Uknis New York 1105 of September 4.

The Prime Minister has commented:-

"If the four Powers do not agree we should carry out our own policy. The others have had bilateral talks. Why should not we? Let us get on with it.

E.H."

Dft reply submitted.

Yours sincerely

Enic. R.E. 10/9.

Christopher Robson

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Pmm

CONFIDENTIAL

71-1

RECEIVED IN
ISTRY 10

Mr. Long
Encl. NED

Mr. McCluney

NET 1/4

R.E. 16/9.

Jordan and Iraq

Mr. Roberts at No. 10 wrote to you on this subject on 3 September, 4 September and 7 September. I now submit a draft reply to his three letters.

2. The draft reply deals in some detail with the way in which we reacted to developments. I hope that it explains clearly how we reacted to the French proposal for a four power meeting in New York. I hope, too, that it makes quite clear that we participated in the bilateral action taken in capitals (see the Prime Minister's comment quoted in Mr. Roberts' letter of 7 September).

3. You will remember that the Department submitted a draft reply to Mr. Roberts' letter of 3 September at the weekend. You subsequently asked the Department to prepare a fresh draft to take account of the Prime Minister's comment quoted in Mr. Roberts' letter of 4 September. We were on the point of submitting this fresh draft when we received Mr. Roberts' letter of 7 September.

R. M. Evans

(R. M. Evans)
Near Eastern Department
10 September, 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Renwick
Sir P. Adams

PM
21.

14 September, 1970.

I am replying to your letters of 3 September, 4 September and 7 September, quoting the Prime Minister's comments on a number of telegrams dealing with the suggestion made by the Jordanians at the outset of the present crisis in Jordan that the four powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) might issue a joint statement in New York.

The terms in which the Jordanian suggestion was conveyed to H.M. Ambassador in Amman are set out in Amman telegram No. 445. Our first reaction to the suggestion was as set out in FCO telegram No. 248 to Amman. Our view about the likelihood of all four powers being able to agree on the terms of a joint statement did not subsequently vary. When, however, we learned that the French mission in New York had been instructed to seek to concert a joint statement and to propose a four power meeting for this purpose (Paris telegram No. 779 and UKMIS New York telegram No. 1837), we decided to instruct our mission to support the French unless the Americans were positively unenthusiastic about their proposal (FCO telegram No. 741 to Moscow, paragraph 3). Mr. Warner subsequently reported from New York that the Americans were strongly opposed to the French proposal and that Dr. Jarring did not like the idea of a four power meeting (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1837). Having received this report, we decided to instruct Mr. Warner to seek to dissuade his French colleague from pursuing his proposal, using the line of argument that it would not be useful for him to do this (FCO telegram No. 1105 to UKMIS New York).

Although the French expressed disappointment at our unwillingness to continue to support them (Paris telegram No. 791), it is clear that they made no serious effort to press their proposal themselves. Mr. Warner reported that his French colleague considered that the whole exercise was almost certainly dead (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1844).

/Although

C. Roberts, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Although the four powers did not take action on the Jordanian suggestion (in spite of active sponsorship by the French), a good deal of action was taken bilaterally in capitals. We participated on 4 September when H.M. Ambassador in Moscow spoke to the Soviet Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs who is responsible for the Middle East, suggesting that the Soviet Union should exercise its influence with the Iraqis to prevent them from intervening in Jordan (FCO telegram No. 741 to Moscow and Moscow telegram No. 1022).

...

I enclose copies of all telegrams referred to in this letter.

(Sgd.) I. McCluney

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TOP COPY

218

WYTHIER/CAT A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DIA

TELENO FOH 171335Z 17 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MODUK DI 4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 171335Z OF 17 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO DA AMMAN JIS(NE) WASHINGTON.

FOH 171335Z.

OUR LATEST INFORMATION FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE IS
THAT:-

- A. THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS CONTINUING TO FIGHT SUCCESSFULLY
IN AMMAN, DRIVING TOWARDS THE SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE CITY WHERE
THE WAHDAT CAMP IS LOCATED.
- B. IT IS REPORTED THAT SOLDIERS ARE ACTING WITHOUT MERCY
TOWARDS SNIPERS ON ROOF TOPS AND ALL OTHER OPPOSITION.
- C. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN ARE MAKING
PREPARATIONS FOR A POSSIBLE INTERVENTION, INCLUDING A FULL ALERT.
FEDAYEEN APPEALS TO THEM HAVE BEEN HEARD OVER THE AIR. BUT
THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVE OF ANY MAJOR UNITS FROM PRESENT
LOCATIONS IN HAFRAQ AREA TOWARDS AMMAN AND NO CLASHES REPORTED
BETWEEN THE IRAQI AND JORDANIAN ARMY UNITS. THE IDF STRESS
THE RELATIVE LACK OF MOBILITY ON THE PART OF THE IRAQIS AND
THEIR LOW FIGHTING QUALITY.
- D. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE ALSO REPEATEDLY APPEALED TO SYRIA AND
EGYPT TO INTERVENE ON THEIR BEHALF BUT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS
OF ANY ACTIVE RESPONSE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFCOMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MODUK DIA AND JIS(NE).

MR. BARRIES
FCO/MI DISTRIBUTION
N.EAST. DEPT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]
CONFIDENTIAL

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MM
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CYPHER/CAT.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DIA

TELEGRAM NO FOH 171800Z

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

4-25 661

(219)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO MODUK DIA TELEGRAM NO FOH 171800Z SEP-REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO DA AMMAN JISKE WASHINGTON

FOH 171800Z.

RECEIVED IN

NEJ 1/4

JORDAN.

FROM BRITHMILAT. REF MY FOH 171335Z. SITREP AS AT 171700Z

SEP 18:-

ONE. IDF REPORT SITUATION IN AMMAN IS STILL CONFUSED AND
HEAVY FIRING CONTINUES. FIGHTING TO DATE IS SAID TO BE WELL
IN ARMY'S FAVOUR AND THE FEDAYEEN SITUATION IS STILL DESCRIBED
AS DESPERATE. APPEAL FOR CEASE-FIRE BY PRIME MINISTER IS
UNLIKELY TO BE HEEDED AS TERMS ARE SAID TO BE TOO HUMILIATING
FOR FEDAYEEN TO ACCEPT.

TWO. SITUATION REGARDING IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN IS THAT
JORDAN ARMY HAS SURROUNDED WITH TANKS IRAQI BRIGADE IN
ZERKA. MAIN IRAQI FORCE IS CONCENTRATED AT MAFRAQ AND
APART FROM ODD SCOTIE AND SPORADIC FIRING HAS MADE NO MOVE.
IDF BELIEVE DECISION WILL HAVE TO BE MADE WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS
WHETHER IRAQI FORCES INTERVENE OR NOT. IDF APPRECIATION IS
THAT THERE WILL BE A LIMITED OR TOKEN INTERVENTION BUT NO
GENERAL INTERVENTION BY IRAQ.

THREE. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT SYRIAN FORCES ARE
CONCENTRATING BEHIND THEIR OWN BORDER BUT IDF DISCOUNT ANY
ACTIVE INTERVENTION BY SYRIA.

FOUR. THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION TO EVENTS BY EGYPT. IDF
HAVING SCANNED EGYPTIAN NEWSPAPERS, INCLUDING PRO-NASSER NEWSPAPERS
PUBLISHED IN LEBANON, SAY THAT OPINION IS CONFUSED INDICATING
THAT NASSER HAS NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND OR AT LEAST HAS NOT
DECIDED WHAT LINE TO TAKE IN PUBLIC.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON

DEFCONCEN PASS FLASH TO MODUK DIA AND JISNE.

/BARNES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED, SENT TO D.C.C.]

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EM.STAFF

P.U.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

SYNTHETIC/CAT A

FLASH ATTACH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 613 17 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

NET 1/4

COLLEAGUE SPOKE WITH ZAID RIFAI AT 1700 LOCAL TIME.
HE SAID THAT THE WHOLE CITY WAS BROADLY UNDER ARMY CONTROL
WITH EXCEPTION OF WAHDAT CAMP AREA AND PARTS OF JEBEL HUSSEIN.

MR. PHILLIPS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
H.EAST. DEPT.
EMERGENCY STAFF
P.O.S.D.

COPY TO:
MR. P.J. MOON NO.10 DOWNING ST.

88888

SECRET

[Handwritten signature]
21/94

21

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2732

17 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL.

GUARD.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 2732 OF 17/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO BONN BERNE TEL AVIV BAGHDAD UKMIS NEWYORK AND BEIRUT.
MY TEL NO 2729: JORDAN.

PARA 3 AND PARA 4 FOR QUOTE EMERGENCY ACTION GROUP UNQUOTE OR
QUOTE UNIT UNQUOTE READ QUOTE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP UN-
QUOTE.

2. THE W.A.S.A.G. IS CHAIRED BY KISSINGER AND INCLUDES ALEXIS
JOHNSON, ADMIRAL MOORER, HELMS (C.I.A.) AND PACKARD (UNDER-SECRETARY
FOR DEFENCE). IT IS IN EFFECT THE EXECUTIVE ARM OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. ERROR REGRETTED.

FCO PASS BONN BERNE TEL AVIV BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT.
MR FREEMAN.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.
N.A.D.
ARABIAN D.
U.N.D.
DEF.D.
P.U.S.D.
EM.STAFF
AMERICAN D.
W.E.D.
W.O.D.
NEWS D.
COMMS.D.
CONS.D.
PERS.OPS.D.
SECURITY D.
RES.D.(W.E.)
(AMERICAN)
M.O.D.(INT.)

B. M. M.
21/9

CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

CYPHER CAT/A

TEL A S H PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 849 OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SITUATION IN JORDAN.

B. M. M.
2/14

REC'D
REC'D
NET 1/4

WHEN I CALLED ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON ALPHAND READ ME A TELEGRAM FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN.

2. THE GIST OF IT WAS THAT THERE WAS HEAVY FIGHTING WITH TANKS FIRING THEIR MAIN ARMAMENT AS WELL AS MACHINE GUNS. AT THE MOMENT OF TELEGRAPHING, IT SEEMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD THE UPPER HAND, BUT THAT IN THE FRENCH EMBASSY'S VIEW THEIR TROUBLE WOULD COME WHEN THEY GOT INTO THE SMALL STREETS OF AMMAN WHERE THE FEDAYEEN WERE LURKING IN LARGE NUMBERS. THE TELEGRAM WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY WERE VERY CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES, WHO WERE HELD AT WAHDAT. APPARENTLY THE FEDAYEEN PLAN WAS TO MAKE THIS A MAJOR STRONGPOINT WHICH WOULD BE HELD AT ALL COSTS. THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN WERE NOT AT PRESENT INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING BUT THE IRAQI RADIO HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT THEY BACKED THE FEDAYEEN.

3. THE TELEGRAM REPORTED THAT THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD SUMMONED ALL ARAB AMBASSADORS AND TOLD THEM THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE FEDAYEEN AGAINST THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. ALPHAND TOLD ME THAT IN HIS VIEW HE THOUGHT HUSSEIN'S FORCES WOULD FIND THEMSELVES HAVING TO FIGHT NOT ONLY THE FEDAYEEN BUT ALSO THE SYRIANS AND THE IRAQIS. THE GREAT QUESTION-MARK IN HIS MIND WAS WHAT THE AMERICANS WOULD DO IF IT LOOKED AS THOUGH HUSSEIN WAS GOING TO BE BEATEN.

4. I REFERRED TO A STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AFTER YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE MAKING DISCREET ENQUIRIES TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD HELP OVER THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. COULD HE TELL ME WHAT IT WAS THE FRENCH WERE DOING? ALPHAND SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN ENDEAVOURING THROUGH DISCREET CHANNELS TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD DO ANYTHING TO HELP, BUT IT WAS BETTER THAT NOBODY /SHOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

SHOULD KNOW WHAT THEY WERE DOING. INDEED HE WAS ANXIOUS THAT THIS ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN MADE. IF HE WAS GOING TO DO THESE THINGS DISCREETLY, THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT IT UNTIL IT WAS OVER. HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN ONE OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SAYING THAT THIS ANNOUNCEMENT HAD MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM. BUT ANYHOW, ALPHAND WENT ON, HE FEARED THAT ALL THIS HAD NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS IN AMMAN.

5. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

MR. SOAMES

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION
NR. EASTERN DEPT.

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NNNNN

FLASH TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 863

17 SEPTEMBER 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

17 SEPTEMBER 1974

ADDRESSED FCO TEL NO 863 OF 17 SEPTEMBER RPTD FOR INFO
TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN AND BAGHDAD.

WASHINGTON TEL NO 2729, PARA 5:

JORDAN.

NET 1/4

WE HAVE NO AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON ISRAELI
INTENTIONS. MILITARY PLANS ARE ALWAYS KEPT EXTREMELY SECRET
HERE AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ANY DECISIONS MAY NOT BE
REACHED QUICKLY.

2. OUR ESTIMATE SO FAR HAS BEEN THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE
UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE UNLESS THERE ARE CLEAR SIGNS OF
IRAQI OR SYRIAN INTERVENTION ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE.

3. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, ISRAEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
TOLD MILITARY ATTACHE AT WORKING LEVEL THIS AFTERNOON,
IN CONVEYING INFORMATION IN HIS FCH 171335Z, THAT
THEY ESTIMATED THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY COULD COPE AND
THAT ANY INTERVENTION WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO KING
HUSSAIN.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON.

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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NR. EASTERN DEPT.

NNNN

TOP SECRET

CYPHER CAT/A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 515

CONFIDENTIAL
TO F.C.O.
18 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.
SITREP NO 23 AS AT 180500Z. SEPT 70.

REGISTRY No. 1C

NES 1/4

FROM AIR ATTACHE.
FIRING VIRTUALLY UNINTERRUPTED FOR 15 HOURS YESTERDAY USING ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS. BUT THE NIGHT PASSED QUIETLY PUNCTUATED BY SPORADIC OUTBURST OF SMALL ARMS FIRE.

AT 180315Z FAIRLY EXTENSIVE FIRING MOSTLY SMALL ARMS STARTED AGAIN AND IS CONTINUING.
THE DAMAGE MUST BE VERY EXTENSIVE JUDGING BY THE SCALE OF HEAVY BOMBARDMENTS, HUGE PALLS OF SMOKE AND FIRES THAT CAN BE SEEN IN THE MAIN REFUGEE AREAS.
ALL POWER AND PHONES CUT ONLY CONTACT WITH EMBASSY FROM FIRST SECRETARY'S HOUSE BY R.T.
CURFEW IS STILL IN FORCE.
ARMY CERTAINLY APPEARS TO HAVE THE SITUATION IN HAND.
ARMoured CARS PATROLLING IN DIPLOMATIC QUARTERS.
THERE IS NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THIS EVENT AND ANYTHING THAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST 3 YEARS.
CASUALTIES MUST BE ENORMOUS.

Pd. MWM
21/9.

FCO PASS AS NECESSARY.
MR. PHILLIPS.

FCO/WH/DISTRIBUTION:
H.E.D.

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See 11/9

(225)

Sir J. Greenhill to Mr. Armstrong at 16.10



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

(1/1)

4 September, 1970

R.E. 16/9. 11/9. M. Evans. 4/15. Peter.

Sir P. Adams. This gives a vivid picture of the situation a week ago - I think the P.O.S. might be interested here.

Herewith another round-up to supplement the telegrams; I hope that a bit of informal background is helpful and given present conditions of work this sort of letter comes more easily off the pen, or rather, than a more formal communication, though I shall have to get round to a despatch before very long.

NET 11/9

2. I see that in my letter to you of 6 August I wrote of "a slow returning to normal" and that we were keeping our fingers crossed. Now, a month later, after a week in which we have had three virtual night battles, several clashes by day and the attempted assassination of the durable King, I am wondering what is the norm. My staff, who by now are pretty case-hardened, are taking it all very calmly; it is the inconvenience and restricted movement more than anything else that is such a bind (not to mention the continued non-arrival of our non-confidential bags which has nothing to do with the fedayeen). As the guns opened up on Tuesday night I was forced at the last minute to cancel a dinner party I had laid on for Archbishop Appleton who, with unprophetic lack of foresight, chose to visit Amman from Jerusalem between 30 August to 1 September; he was more or less pinned down by fire at the other end of Jebel Amman while my domestic staff were face down in the basement at this end. I think in truth the latter were more frightened by the noise of a Saladin ("one of ours") which was banging away with its main armament more or less under our windows, than they were of retaliatory fire from the fedayeen, though Christopher Lush just over the road had a chunk knocked off his roof and a bullet hole penetrated

he will find as why.

/quite

① Mr. Tripp. The non-

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R. M. Evans


16/9.

Confidential bags were held up because there was often no room for them on MEA flights from Beirut. They have now agreed to send private mail by confidential bag.

to Amman. Comms to send private mail by confidential bag.

CONFIDENTIAL

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quite dead; a little lower down. Another dwelling hit that night was that of Said, my vast Sudanese driver (whom you will undoubtedly remember; his father was given by King Abdullah as a present to Kirkbride!). With tears in his eyes he described how "Wahid Katyushka" had wrecked his veranda, smashed his windows, reduced his bowels to water and necessitated a monetary loan, which I weakly conceded. The Archbishop departed rapidly early on Wednesday in a fiery (or at least smoky) chariot loaded with cholera vaccine, a present from the Jordan Army; this was, I gather taken off him by the Israelis when he crossed the Jordan and is now being held at Jericho.

3. Our Embassy Bedouin Guards are probably at least as much of a menace to our safety as are the fedayeen. You may recall that they loosed off five hundred rounds in Sunday night's exchanges, in return for which the Embassy received one hit from an armour-piercing bullet and an acknowledgment from the fedayeen press; nor did they fail to contribute to Tuesday night's proceedings, this time receiving a mention by Damascus radio. All this, and the fatal shooting in our doorway in July too, prompted me to send Christopher Lush and Colonel Richard Harrison (in uniform) to call upon the Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver a note which, while expressing gratitude for the presence of our guards, asks that they confine their musketry to repelling direct attacks on the Embassy itself. Hashem was wearily sympathetic and promised to do what he could, but meanwhile the insatiable Bedouin are now busy reinforcing a strongpoint immediately next door, where they have a fixed line for a machine gun directed at a fedayeen emplacement across the valley. I am told that during the June troubles one of them was firing away from a battlement constructed by himself lying on top of an oil tank (ours).

4. The trouble about the present situation is that there are some people on each side who have nothing to lose by a violent test of strength. The Army almost certainly do have the edge when it comes to pounding with artillery and quick-firing medium and /long-range

CONFIDENTIAL

But I
stopped him
at 5 or 6
miles.
900.

CONFIDENTIAL



long-range weapons and Hussein's "hawks" (though not, I believe, Hussein himself) want to exploit this advantage. I have reason to believe that in Tuesday night's firing, which was sparked off by the attack on the King, they killed and wounded a relatively large number of fedayeen. And I am sure they can do it again and again but without making a significant difference to the numerical strength which the fedayeen can deploy if it comes to street fighting in Amman. On the other side there are, of course, extremist fedayeen who are desperate because if they do not do something now and if the peace talks make progress, they are going to lose their support to the moderates who will be prepared to settle for half a loaf (roughly the pre-1967 frontiers) rather than a whole one (the pre-1948 frontiers).

5. But the most depressing feature is an apparently total (and one can only hope temporary) breakdown of confidence between the King and Arafat: Hussein appears to think that Arafat is becoming as extreme as the rest of them, and does not want to cooperate: while Arafat appears to believe (perhaps correctly) that Hussein and his government are only waiting for a really favourable opportunity to liquidate the whole fedayeen movement, or at the very least "assist" it to wither away if and as peace negotiations make progress. There is however one motive favourable to a compromise solution and common to both sides, namely a deep aversion on the part of the majority to a repetition of the "June terror".

6. We have now had two quiet nights in succession but yesterday (as reported separately by telegram) we had an official car taken at gun point within half a mile of the Embassy. That makes two, one having been taken in June. It is poor consolation that on the same day the Americans lost four, the Chinese one, the Royal Palace one and that in addition scores of private cars were stolen. We are trying to devise methods of minimising the risk but we have to make trips to the airport and communication with the Commercial Office down Salt Road presents a particular problem. I think we shall have to make more use of taxis for a while.

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7. I had the wardens in yesterday and gave them a résumé of the situation as we saw it and asked them to spread the word. I also stressed that the situation was not one in which British or even foreigners in general were the targets of hostility, but rather that the danger, as they knew, lay in becoming accidentally involved in the cross fire between the Government and the fedayeen. The way to minimise the risk was to keep in touch with us, keep away from known risky areas of Amman, and keep their heads down whenever shooting was going on. In my judgment we had not reached the stage where I felt it necessary to advise or arrange for members of the community to leave Jordan. They took all this cheerfully enough.

8. I am sending copies of this letter to Dick Beaumont in Cairo, John Barnes in Tel Aviv, Alan Edden in Beirut, and Donald Hawley in Baghdad, in case something of the flavour of our present existence here may be of interest to them.

Yours ever,


J.F.S.

(J.F.S. Phillips)

CONFIDENTIAL

11 enter in 17/9

226



1/1

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

8 September, 1970

Dear Christopher,

NEJ 1/4

King Hussein's Radio and Television Broadcast

- - - I enclose a copy of our press extracts for 30 August which contains an extended summary of King Hussein's speech on T.V. and radio, broadcast the night before and repeated on the Sunday. (The fighting on Sunday evening broke out immediately the King finished speaking). The full English text issued by the Jordanian News Agency is, as usual, so appallingly terrible as to be practically unreadable.

Yours sincerely,


C. P. Carter

(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

c.c. Chancery, at:
Beirut.
Cairo
Baghdad

R

MM

2/1/9

Mr. Carter

JORDAN PRESS EXTRACTS,
Sunday, 30.8.1970

Headlines :-

Ad-Dustour : King Hussein makes a nationwide broadcast.
(Repeated in Ad-Difaa and Al-Urdun).

King Hussein presides over a meeting of the Council of Ministers. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa and Al-Urdun).

Jordan accuses Israel of trying to sabotage the peace talks.

Statement by the Ministry of the Interior on the automatic telephone exchange incident. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa and Al-Urdun).

Ad-Difaa : Abu Ammar calls for continuing the struggle against the enemy. (Repeated in Ad-Dustour).

Jordan's delegation to the session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Al-Urdun : President Nixon and Mr. Kosygin may meet next month.

Fateh : Statement by the Central Committee on recent provocative acts.

Ad-Dustour, Ad-Difaa and Al-Urdun

King Hussein's nationwide broadcast

Amman: JNA : King Hussein made a nationwide broadcast last night. His Majesty said that Jordan had adopted a positive attitude towards the American proposals for entering into talks with the United Nations envoy in order to implement U.N. Security Council resolution No. 242 of 1967 for a number of reasons. These include :

- 1- we work together with the United Arab Republic, accept what she accepts and reject what she rejects.
- 2- the American initiative (known as the Rogers proposals) is an invitation to enter into talks with the United Nations envoy in order to enforce the U.N. Security Council resolution for the implementation of which we, the United Arab Republic and several other Arab States have so often called.
- 3- when we call for enforcement of the Security Council resolution, we set out from two principles..i.e., Israel's complete and total withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied by her since June 5, 1967 and ensuring the full rights of the Palestinian Arab people in its usurped homeland undiminished.

King Hussein's nationwide broadcast (Cont'd.)

- 4- we have accepted the American initiative as a result of concentration on the case by the United States and the Soviet Union; the two great powers mainly concerned about the gravity of the situation in the area on account of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the danger which it poses and which threatens the world with a terrible conflagration..

The King told citizens that Dr. Gunnar Jarring had started talks with the parties concerned for the implementation of the Security Council resolution and that Jordan's Ambassador to the United Nations had been charged with the holding of preliminary talks with Dr. Jarring. He promised to acquaint citizens with the progress of these talks. The King stressed the need to make every effort to free "our people in the occupied territory as soon as possible." He backed the attitude of the United Arab Republic under the leadership of President Nasser. He described the United Arab Republic as the strongest Arab power and said that the UAR brethren had made the greatest sacrifices for the Arabs and the Palestinian Arab people. He explained that the Arabs could not attain their national aspirations unless the UAR brethren were at the head of those working for those aspirations. His Majesty rejected criticism of the attitude and sacrifices of the United Arab Republic and Jordan and said : " Under no circumstances shall we accept responsibility for the loss of Palestine for unknown generations and abandonment of our people there because of reluctance to go through any door that leads to the liberation of all our occupied land and rescue of our people there."

The King said: "The political move made by us and the United Arab Republic has caused a negative reaction on the part of some Arab States and of the Palestine resistance organisations. These circles considered it as a peaceful course inconsistent with that of the armed struggle. We have explained beyond a doubt that we are in fact the vanguard and substance of the armed struggle. By our efforts in various fields, we seek to recover the occupied land, to liberate our people there and to save the Holy City. We will not allow the hateful occupation to become an accomplished fact as a result of time."

King Hussein affirmed that his country was keen to maintain firm fraternal relations with all Arab States, " whatever our differences with regard to any resolution.." He took pride in every Arab soldier " who gives us the honour of standing with us on our land."

The King said that the Zionist encroachment following June 1967 and the danger of the Israeli military machine imposed a unification of the Arab military effort under a joint command headed by General Muhammad Fawzi, the UAR War Minister and Commander-in-Chief, who was charged with the task of commanding the Western and Eastern Fronts. He explained that revised arrangements, approved at the meeting of the Defence Council of Confrontation-line States recently held in Tripoli, provided for the dissolution of the Eastern Front and for the discharge by the Commander-in-Chief of his tasks and control through his headquarters, consisting of a group of staff officers representing the Arab armies, on three fronts viz., the UAR Western Front, the Syrian Arab Republic Northern Front and the Jordanian Eastern Front. These arrangements also required that all the Arab forces stationed in the territory of any of the three States should come under the direct orders of the commands of the

King Hussein's nationwide
broadcast (Cont'd).

three fronts. The King said: "New negative attitudes have reflected on these arrangements in a radical manner and things now call for immediate action to make an arrangement for regulating the military presence between us and the Arab armed forces on our land, particularly the Iraqi military forces. The object is to serve the general Arab military effort. This is what we are discussing and we hope to be successful."

The King deplored reports in the newspapers of the Palestine resistance movement indicating that the movement imagined that a clash would take place with the Jordanian authorities. Referring to warnings by the resistance movement whenever there were army movements, the King said that the resistance movement was acting as if the army was not entitled to move within its own land and among its own people. On accusations brought in the newspapers of the resistance movement, King Hussein said: "We prefer not to reply to them because we believe that we will be striking at a force, belonging to us, which we want as a militant and growing force." The King called for preserving national unity and appealed to all concerned, particularly those holding positions of leadership, to think of the consequences of their actions and statements. He warned that any attempt to blow up "this stronghold of our steadfastness, our national unity or our entity" or to attack "our citizens" would be dealt with in a way which would put things right.

King Hussein presides over a meeting
of the Council of Ministers

Amman: JNA: King Hussein presided over a part of the meeting of the Council of Ministers at mid-day yesterday. His Majesty, who was accompanied by Prince Muhammad, gave directions to the Council on major issues. His Majesty also held a meeting with Prime Minister Abdul Munem al Rifai.

Statement by the Ministry of the Interior

Amman: JNA : A spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior made a statement yesterday in which he said:

On 29.8.1970, Al-Sharara, organ of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, reported that machines of the authority opened fire at 10 p.m. on Friday on a number of members of the militia as they were distributing a statement near the automatic telephone exchange building in Amman. The report said: "Two freedom fighters were killed and a number of persons were wounded. The resistance forces, which arrived at the scene, were able to silence the enemy's guns and to occupy the telephone exchange building. Those concerned will not go unpunished and the hand of the revolution will reach them wherever they may be."

Commenting on the above report, the spokesman said:

Some armed elements belonging to the above organisation wanted to paste a leaflet on the walls of the automatic telephone exchange building at about 8.30 p.m. An argument developed between them and the watchman, who asked them not to paste it. They told the watchman that the leaflet would be pasted by force of arms. Immediately afterwards, fire was opened on the telephone exchange building from alleys and roofs of buildings. This compelled the watchman to take shelter behind the Western gate of the building. Public security elements inside the

Statement by the Ministry of
the Interior (Cont'd.)

building sought the help of the police directorate which in turn contacted the armed struggle command.

When the shooting intensified, the elements inside the building, including members of the armed struggle command, had to return fire. At about 10.50 p.m., elements of the above organisation, using loudspeakers, called on the elements inside the building to lay down their arms, surrender and leave the building. They warned that they would destroy the building.

At 11 p.m. they fired three rockets at the building. There was a heavy exchange of fire which ceased at midnight after the arrival of additional public security, liberation army and armed struggle forces and following efforts by the Central Committee of the Resistance Movement.

The spokesman deplored the fact that the Popular Democratic Front should have described those in the telephone building as "the enemy" and threatened to kill them at a time when they were brethren-in-arms from the elements of the public security and the armed struggle command...The spokesman pointed out that the Front ought to level its guns at those occupying the homeland.

The spokesman thanked the Central Committee of the Resistance Movement and elements of the Armed Struggle and the Liberation Army for their efforts, which contributed to containing and ending the incident.

Jordan accuses Israel of trying
to sabotage the peace talks

U.N. Headquarters: Reuters: Jordan on Friday night accused Israel of trying to sabotage the Arab-Israeli peace talks by launching rocket and air attacks against Jordanian territory. In a letter to the U.N. Security Council, Jordanian Charge d'Affaires Salch Kabariti said that two civilians were killed and six others, including three soldiers, were wounded during Friday's attacks. He said that rocket and machine-gun fire was directed at Deir Alla on Friday morning and a ten-minute air attack was launched against Deir Alla on Friday afternoon. He said that such raids demonstrated once again Israel's aim of undermining present political efforts.

Formation of an Arab national front

Amman: Abu Amar, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, spoke about political dangers and the measures relating to the current phase. He called for mobilization of all Arab potentialities to continue the fight against the Zionist enemy. He affirmed the determination of the Palestinian revolution to continue the fight until the attainment of victory. Abu Amar was addressing a meeting held yesterday afternoon between the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and members of Arab and friendly delegations to the extraordinary session of the Palestine National Congress...It is learned that it has been decided that the Central Committee should call for an Arab conference aimed at forming an Arab national front and preparing a charter providing for supporting and participating in the revolution.

Jordan's delegation to session
of U.N. General Assembly

Amman: It has been decided that Foreign Minister Anton Atallah should lead the Jordanian delegation to the coming session of the U.N. General Assembly, opening on September 15. Dr. Muhammad al Farra, Jordan's Ambassador to the United Nations, will be deputy leader of the delegation. Other members of the delegation are:

Miss Laurice Helas, Ambassador, Foreign Ministry.
Sayid Hani al Masri.
Sayid Farouq Qasrawi
Sayid Saleh Kabariti
Sayid Khalil Othman
Sayid Michele Hamarnach
Sayid Khaled Tash

Governor of Amman

Amman: At its meeting yesterday, the Council of Ministers decided to appoint Sayid Salim al Masa'da, President of the Income Tax Court of Appeal, to the post of Governor of Amman.

Saudi Aid

Amman : The Jordanian Treasury received a payment of JD.2,025,000 on account of Saudi Arabia's aid in accordance with the Khartoum summit resolutions.

Labour affairs

Amman: A royal decree has been issued, ratifying the Labour (Amendment) Law.

Fatch

Statement by Central Committee

Fatch today carries a statement in which the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation says that it met on Saturday afternoon and studied the causes of recent incidents, which resulted in the killing or wounding of a number of soldiers of the Jordan Army and the Liberation Army, commandos and civilians. The Central Committee attributes these incidents to "the suspicious circles hostile to the people and to commando action" and says that those circles have prompted their agents to perpetrate the acts in question in accordance with the plan of "local agents connected with imperialist circles" aimed at liquidating commando action. The Central Committee adds: "At the same time, there were some individual faults on the part of some commando elements. In reality, these faults represented the reaction to a state of provocation by suspicious forces."

Referring to the telephone exchange incident, the Committee said: "It appeared that elements of the Popular Struggle Front had pasted some posters on the wall of the automatic telephone exchange building. There was no clash between those elements and the guard. Shortly afterwards, the Popular Democratic Front received a forged telephone call. The caller claimed that he spoke for the Armed Struggle Command. He told the Front that the telephone exchange guard had detained a number of elements of the Front. As a result, a group from this organisation moved to release its elements. The report to the Front was not true. It later appeared that the Armed Struggle Command

Statement by Central Committee (Cont'd.)

had not contacted the Popular Democratic Front. All the incidents are now the subject of joint investigations because suspicious quarters are trying to cause an estrangement between commandos and soldiers..."

The statement refers to a number of incidents which took place on 29.8.1970 and says that, while all the commandos who have committed offences are being interrogated and will be tried before the revolution's court, the Government have taken no action against any soldier committing an offence or against any of the suspicious quarters concerned..

Other media

Ad-Dustour, Al-Urdun and Fatch carry no editorials today...

The Ad-Difaa editorial today says that Israel has submitted a request to the United Nations that Dr. Jarring should ask some Arab States to release what Israel describes as "Jewish detainees" and permit them to emigrate to occupied Palestine. The paper points out that Israel seeks to deceive world public opinion with regard to the continued detention by Israel of two Algerians kidnapped from a British airliner etc..

The Ad-Difaa front-page commentary (by Ibrahim) deals with King Hussein's nationwide broadcast.. The article deplors the incidents in Amman... It is convinced that irresponsible elements, which have no national feelings, are "inciting" such incidents for purposes that do not serve the case. They serve enemies of the case. Those who listen to foreign radio stations know who those enemies are.. The article calls for cooperation between the Government and the resistance movement to prevent such incidents.

ENDS.

PRESS OFFICE,

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN, JORDAN.

11 Thornton Avenue
Streatham C.W.
S.W. 2.

Dear Sir

I don't know your name as do not know the
position of all the new cabinet

(227)

But one thing I do know and that is if we are to survive
we will not do it by the effete attitude of our administration
over 25 to 30 years

And I am of a belief that the present fighting in Jordan
is an organized plot to (accidentally) murder
Hussein. if you follow me.

This man a great friend of Britain with an English wife
needs help of a military nature. and so also do the
Airline Victims.

Instead of Bleating & arguing I suggest you commission
M. Talbot of Aden fame out ofbury St and make him
a general put him in command of 2 Airborne Div.
one for Jordan one for the Arab strip with Orders
to kill without mercy every Guerilla taking part
in this Blackmail. after warning them to hand over
planes & Victims or else

This is only language savages understand.

It is an historical fact of life that if half educated
new savages ever get away with Blackmail the
element will grow into a monia. that will be
impossible to maintain.

As for Liela she is young has seen great poverty
and believes she is right to fight for her country -

No useful purpose can be served by her judicial
murder or imprisonment here or in Jorval.

After all a couple of million men you don't even give
a job of work were doing the same 25 years ago
to line greedy butchers pockets -

But I have a plan so that I believe will put
the Hijack gangster out of Business
you could ask the Experts at the Biological
Warfare for an opinion.

Just a Hidden Jo Camera behind a one way
mirror at end of the passenger cabin and
microphones also hidden along inside of cabin.
The minute a warning is given two Bullet proof
gas proof doors are closed behind the Pilot's cabin

And a sleep gas Odorous but safe to life
is pumped into passengers cabin putting out
Villains & passengers alike. who will be carried
back to base.

To avoid frustrating the plan these doors
should be close on takeoff & coffee tea
& food served in Flasks by pilots to avoid
opening gas doors.

yours faithfully
J R Peters.

PS it is no reflection on any cabinet Minister at all
but ~~decisions~~ deciding policy like a load of
hand bag merchants instead of Bold grandiose
thinking that Churchill the last of the great
English gentlemen did so well is the only
answer to International terrorism.

These Arabs are evil to their own people much
less Europeans. They even today are almost fearful
in their cruelty.
yours faithfully
J R Peters.

500
MAIN REGISTRY

HOME OFFICE

Whitehall

London S.W.1

Telephone : 01 930 8100 ext 148

15 1960 1970

The attached letter is
forwarded as it appears to deal
with a matter appropriate to
your department.

The writer ~~has~~/has not
been informed.

NE
No reply.

Pl. enter x p.a.

NEED

17/9

RECEIVED IN

TO COUNTRY N. 10

NEJ 1/4

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CYPHER CAT/A

ROUTINE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1009 17 SEPTEMBER 1970

RESTRICTED

ADDS TO FCO TELNO. 1009 DATED 17/9/70 REPEATED FOR INFO
TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO. 884.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

APART FROM FACTUAL REPORTS OF THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
INCLUDING VERBATIM ACCOUNTS OF HUSAIN'S AND ARAFAT'S
ANNOUNCEMENTS THERE HAS BEEN NO PRESS COMMENT AT ALL TODAY
ON DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON.

SIR R. BEAUMONT +

*[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]**DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION*

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EN CLAIR

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO F C O

TELEGRAM NO. 623

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

M.I.P.T.

NEJ 1/4

THE NATIONAL (PAN ARAB) LEADERSHIP OF THE BA'ATH PARTY ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 16 SEPTEMBER ABOUT THE EVENTS OF THAT DAY IN JORDAN . THE ROGERS' PLAN ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT WAS ACHIEVING ITS AIM OF LIQUIDATING THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION. EGYPTIAN PROPAGANDA HAD PAVED THE WAY FOR THE U. S. CONSPIRACY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN EGYPT AND IRAQ. NOW THE PEACE PROPOSALS HAD GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO 'TREACHEROUS ELEMENTS' IN JORDAN TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN ARMY AND THE COMMANDOS. THIS WAS A DIRECT THREAT TO BOTH COMMANDO ACTION AND THE IRAQI FORCES STATIONED IN JORDAN . THE STATEMENT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE BA'ATH PARTY WOULD MOBILISE ITS FORCES TO FIGHT IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDOS IN JORDAN AND CALLED UPON ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARAB FORCES TO CO-OPERATE IN THIS .

MR. HAWLEY

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CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 633

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

REGISTRY NO. 10

1

CONFIDENTIAL T.A.R. 1201/18

NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 633 OF 18 SEPTEMBER AND R F I IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV MOSCOW WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MY TEL NO 629 : JORDAN.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TELLS ME THAT HE WAS SUMMONED AT 1.00 A.M. THIS MORNING TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF 'FRIENDLY COUNTRIES' - THE BLOC, NORTH KOREA, INDIA - BY NI'MA AL NI'MA, THE UNDER SECRETARY AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. NI'MA SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN SUMMONED DUE TO THE GRAVE SITUATION IN JORDAN. BATTLE WAS RAGING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THE COMMANDOS AND THE SITUATION WAS VERY DANGEROUS. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THEREFORE REQUESTED THE 'FRIENDLY COUNTRIES' TO USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES WITH THE HASHEMITE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN TO STOP BLOODSHED. ANY INITIATIVE IN THAT DIRECTION WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY THE IRAQIS.

2. NI'MA CONTINUED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE HOSTAGES IN JORDAN. ON THE ONE HAND THE IRAQIS WERE FULLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. ON THE OTHER THE DEFEAT OF THE JORDAN ARMY IN JORDAN HAD PROMPTED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST THE 'FRIENDLY COUNTRIES' TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO PUT AN END TO BLOODSHED SO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXCUSE FOR FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

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3. MEANTIME , NI'MA WENT ON, '' PRESIDENT BAKR HAD APPROACHED ARAB COUNTRIES WITH A VIEW TO PUTTING AN END TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN JORDAN. HE HAD ONCE AGAIN CALLED ON THE KINGS AND PRESIDENT TO TAKE DIRECT ACTION WITH THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT TO SAVE LIFE AND TO HALT THE PRESENT CLASHES.

4. NI'MA HIMSELF APPEARED TO BE A VERY WORRIED MAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, AND PARIS.
MR.HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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CYPHER/CAT A
 IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1312

CONFIDENTIAL
 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 18 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL TOR 181016²

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. 1312 OF 18 SEPTEMBER RFI PRIORITY
 TO CAIRO, KHARTOUM, AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, BENGHAZI.

LIBYAN ATTITUDE TO THE SITUATION IN JORDAN.

THE LIBYAN REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL HAVE MADE NO
 (NO) OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO DATE OF THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE
 JORDANIAN CRISIS. BUT THE TONE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL LIBYAN
 NEWS AGENCY IN REPORTING COLONEL QADAFI'S MEETING WITH NASSER
 AT MERSA MATRUH YESTERDAY, THE SUBSEQUENT DESPATCH OF THE
 UAR CHIEF-OF-STAFF TO AMMAN WITH A MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN
 AND YASIR ARAFAT FROM NASSER, QADAFI AND NIMEIRI AND THE
 IMPENDING MEETING OF ARAB HEADS OF STATE IN TRIPOLI IS
 UNIFORMLY HOSTILE TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO KHARTOUM, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON,
 UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BENGHAZI.

MR. HANNAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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PM

FLASH TEL AVIV TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DI4
TELEGRAM NO FOH 180945Z 18 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

NET 1/4

ADDRESSED TO FLASH MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 180945Z SEPT
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH DA AMMAN, JISNE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 180945Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.
REF MY FOH 171800Z SEPT.

SITRP AS AT 180700Z SEPT IS:-

ONE. IDF REPORT SITUATION IN AMMAN AS QUOTE QUITE CLOUDY
UNQUOTE. MOST AREAS HAVE TANKS IN THE STREETS BUT THE TOWN
IS FAR FROM CLEAR. THERE IS AN ARMY PRESENCE BUT THE SOLDIERS
ARE RELUCTANT TO GET OUT OF THEIR ARMoured VEHICLES AND INTO
HAND TO HAND COMBAT WITH THE FEDAYEEN. THE IDF MAKE THE
ADDITIONAL POINT THAT THE JORDAN ARMY IS UNTRAINED FOR AND
HAS NO EXPERIENCE OF STREET FIGHTING OR OPERATIONS IN
BUILT-UP AREAS. THEY COMMENT THAT FEDAYEEN GOT THEIR SECOND
BREATH WHEN THEY REALISED SOLDIERS WOULD NOT GET OUT OF
THEIR TANKS AND TAKE THEM ON EXCEPT WITH THEIR HEAVY FIREPOWER
WHICH THE ARMY USED QUOTE MERCILESSLY UNQUOTE. PRESENT
SITUATION IS THAT THERE IS MUCH SHOOTING BY FEDAYEEN FROM
ROOFTOPS WITH THE ARMY RETALIATING BY SHELLING AND DESTROYING
THE BUILDINGS FROM WHICH THE FIRE IS COMING. ARMY INTENTION
IS SAID TO BE TO RING THE CITY PRIOR TO MOUNTING CLEANING UP
OPERATION AND ALSO TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF FEDAYEEN.
ARMY CASUALTIES ARE SAID TO BE VERY LIGHT AND FEDAYEEN
CASUALTIES TO BE QUOTE IN HUNDREDS UNQUOTE. IDF SAY THERE IS
NO BLOOD BATH AS YET.

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/TWO. THERE

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-2-

TWO. THERE IS NO INDICATION YET OF ANY SYRIAN OR IRAQI INTERVENTION. SITUATION IN NORTH OF COUNTRY QUOTE COULD BE TRICKY UNQUOTE PARTICULARLY WHERE BORDER IS CONTIGUOUS WITH SYRIA AND IRAQ. THE IDF SAY PARTS OF THIS AREA COULD WELL BE UNDER CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN BUT MORE BY DEFAULT IN THAT THERE IS NO JORDAN ARMY PRESENCE. IN IRBID THERE IS SOME SHOOTING BY ARMY ON OUTSKIRTS. THE ARMY HAVE NOT YET ENTERED CITY.

THREE. LAST NIGHT GENERAL SADEQ (?) EGYPTIAN C. OF S. FLEW TO JORDAN LANDING AT MAFRAQ WITH MESSAGE FOR BOTH SIDES FROM PRESIDENTS OF EGYPT, LIBYA AND SUDAN. HE REACHED AMMAN AT MIDNIGHT. THE APPEAL IS SAID TO BE FOR HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN TO STOP FIGHTING EACH OTHER AND TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITHOUT BLOODSHED.

FOUR. IDF ARE NOT QUITE SATISFIED WITH EVENTS AS THEY APPEARED YESTERDAY AND EXPRESS DOUBTS AS TO ARMY'S ABILITY TO CLEAR AMMAN QUICKLY. THEY ARE ALSO APPREHENSIVE THAT JOINT APPEAL BY NASSER, QUADDAFI AND HUMERI MAY WEAKEN KING'S RESOLVE TO CONTINUE SHOWDOWN WITH FEDAYEEN. THE DEVELOPING SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF JORDAN ALSO CAUSES IDF SOME CONCERN.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFENCE COMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD DI4 AND JISNE.

MR. BARNES

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

[REPEATED TO WASHINGTON].

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FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MOD DI 4

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 181110Z

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

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B/M

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO TO DA AMMAN, JIS HE, 2/1,
WASHINGTON.

FOH 181110Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 180945Z SEPT.

SITREP AS AT 181030Z SEPT.

NET 1/4

ONE. IDF SAY ARMY IS SHELLING AMMAN PARTICULARLY AREAS WHERE
FEDAYEEN ARE CONCENTRATED. SHELLING IS BY ARTILLERY AND IS SAID
TO BE HEAVY. TANKS ARE REPORTED AS AGAIN ENTERING CITY WHICH
ACCORDING TO IDF SUGGESTS SOME MAY HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN DURING
HOURS OF DARKNESS.

TWO. IDF QUOTE FEDAYEEN RADIO AS SAYING HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN
MOVED TO QUOTE SAFE AREAS UNQUOTE. IDF BELIEVE THE GROUPS
PREVIOUSLY HELD IN AMMAN ARE STILL HELD THERE BUT ARE PROBABLY
IN QUOTE DEEP CELLARS UNQUOTE.

THREE. SHELLING BY ARMY CONTINUES IN IRBID.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS DEFCOMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD DI 4 AND JIS HE.

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO WASHINGTON].

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234

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO F C O

TELEGRAM NO. 622

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

RMM
2/4

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 622 DATED 17/9 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT , CAIRO AND TELAVIV .

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE ADDRESSED BY PRESIDENT
BAKR ON 16 SEPTEMBER TO ARAB KINGS AND HEADS OF STATE.

NET 164

'' FOLLOWING THE 5 JUNE CATASTROPHE COMMANDO ACTION
EMBODIED THE HOPE OF THE ARAB NATION THAT CALAMITY WOULD
BE TRANSFORMED REVERSED AND ELIMINATED (SEMI COLON)
IT WAS A PROOF OF THE READINESS OF THIS NATION TO STRUGGLE
TO ACHIEVE ITS AIMS AND RIGHTS . IT IS NO WONDER THAT THE
HEARTS AND EYES OF MILLIONS OF SONS OF THIS NATION WERE
DIRECTED TOWARDS THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AS IF
TOWARDS A CLIMPSE OF HOPE AFTER THE CLOOMY DARKNESS AND
HOPELESSNESS THAT FOLLOWED THE JUNE CATASTROPHE .
THEREFORE EVERY SINCERE ARAB AND HONEST MAN WHO BELIEVES
IN THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO EXISTENCE AND LIFE FINDS IN THE
CONTINUATION OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT THE ONLY WAY TO
GUARANTEE THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO THEIR
LAND AND COUNTRY. ANY ATTEMPT THEREFORE WHICH AIMS AT
LIQUIDATING THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IS MERELY A MEANS TO
ACHIEVE THE AIMS OF THE ZIONIST IMPERIALIST ALLIANCE AND
SINCERE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO COLLABORATE IN RESISTING
AND PREVENTING ITS LIQUIDATION. THE DANGERS TO WHICH THE
DESTINY OF THE ARAB NATION IS EXPOSED AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE,
AS A RESULT OF ACTION AIMED AT THE LIQUIDATION OF THE
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND THE EXPOSURE OF THE ARAB PEOPLE
IN SISTERLY JORDAN TO CIVIL WAR , REQUIRES THAT WE EXERT
ALL EFFORTS TO PREVENT BLOODSHED AND PROTECT THE LIVES OF
CITIZENS. WE ARE FULLY CONFIDENT THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL
BE MADE TO GUARANTEE THE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINE
REVOLUTION FROM THE DANGERS FACING IT .

MR. HAWLEY

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L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2075

TO WASHINGTON
18 SEPTEMBER 1970
(N.E.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL

181112Z.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2075 OF 18/9 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, BONN, BERNE, TELAVIV, CAIRO.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF TELEX CONVERSATION WITH H.M. AMBASSADOR
AMMAN AT 0900Z TODAY.

2. THE JORDANIANS SAY THAT MOST OF THE CITY HAS BEEN CLEARED
UP, THOUGH SOME POCKETS OF RESISTANCE REMAIN, NOTABLY AT THE
WAHDAT CAMP. THE ARMY HOPE TO CLEAR UP AMMAN BY THIS AFTERNOON.

3. THE KING HAS REQUESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS BE ASKED TO STOP
FIRING AT FEDAYEEN AT THE NORTHERN END OF THE JORDAN VALLEY.
HE HAS ALSO PROTESTED STRONGLY TO US OVER THE TONE OF BBC
BROADCASTS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE RELYING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON
FATAH SOURCES.

4. THE JORDANIANS BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE LOCATED THE WHEREABOUTS
OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE HOSTAGES, AND ARE SENDING IN SPECIAL
UNITS TO FETCH THEM.

(THIS STATEMENT SHOULD ON NO ACCOUNT BE GIVEN ANY PUBLICITY).

5. THE AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT THERE IS A FAIR
CHANCE THAT THE KING WILL ACCEPT MEDIATION BY MASSER OR THE
ARAB LEAGUE IF HE IS UNABLE TO FINISH THE FEDAYEEN OFF. BUT HE
IS LIKELY TO GIVE THEM A REAL BASHING FIRST. THERE IS NO SIGN
OF INTERVENTION BY IRAQI TROOPS TO DATE: EARLIER REPORTS
THAT THEY WERE MOVING AWAY FROM THE SCENE OF ACTION REMAIN
UNALTERED.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN 13.35Z on 18/12~~ENTER OF THE TWO FEIGERS TO WHOM I SPOKE TO EARLIER~~~~RMR TRIPP~~AMMAN

QM UNFORTUNATELY THE PALACE HAD NO FURTHER NEWS/ABOUT HOSTAGES.

FIVE MINS AGO.

2. THE PALACE REPORT THAT 50 SYRIAN TANKS

~~THE PALACE REPORT THAT THE SYRIAN TANKS~~ ARE CONCENTRATED ON
THE FRONTIER EAR DE^{RA} THEY HAVE NOT CROSSED THE FRONTIER
BU T HAVE FIRED AT JORDANIAN POSITIONS AND THE PALACE THINK

THAT " SOMETHING MAY WELL HAPPEN UP THERE "

THEY

DO NOT WANT HMG TO SAY ANYTHING AT THIS STAGE/UT WOULD
LIKE US TO INFORM THE AMERICANS WITH WHOM THEY ARE NOT IN
TOUCHM OUR NEXT CONTACT WITH THE PALACE WILL BE T 1500Z
AND I THINK I SHOULD PERHAPS TALK TO YOU AGN T. ~~1445Z~~ 1445Z.

KKK

~~AND~~ NOTHING MORE SEE U LATER.ENDS

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EN CLAIR

ROUTINE CALFO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1017A

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

237
NES 1/4

ADDRESSED ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 1017A OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1970,
REF TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, TRIPOLI, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON
AND KHARTOUM.

228
MY TELEGRAM NO 1009 (NOT TO ALL): EVENTS IN JORDAN.

TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT NASSER AND COL.
QADDAFI MET AT MERSA MATRUH ON 17 SEPTEMBER AND AFTER CONTACTING
GENERAL NUMEIRI AGREED THAT THE U.A.R. CHIEF OF STAFF SHOULD LEAVE
FOR AMMAN CARRYING A LETTER FROM THE THREE LEADERS TO KING
HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT.

2. ACCORDING TO AHRAM, THE LETTER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:

(I) THE PRESENT FIGHTING IN JORDAN CONSTITUTES THE MOST
DANGEROUS SITUATION SINCE JUNE 1967.

(II) THE THREE COUNTRIES ARE EXERTING ALL THEIR EFFORTS
IN SPITE OF CONSIDERABLE HESITATION AT JOINING THE MARKET OF
THOSE WHO ARE BIDDING FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE PALESTINIAN
RESISTANCE BY PARTISAN ACTION AIMED AT ACHIEVING CHEAP ADVANTAGE
AT THE COST OF INNOCENT BLOOD.

(III) AMONG THE FACTORS IN THE BALANCE ARE:

(A) THE BLOOD WHICH MAY BE SHED IF THE PRESENT SITUATION IS
ALLOWED TO CONTINUE.

(B) THE SECURITY OF THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

(C) THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF THE OFFICIAL AUTHORITY
IN JORDAN.

(D) THE LEGALITY AND INDISPUTABLE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE
TO CONTINUE ITS STRUGGLE AND TO EXPRESS THE WILL OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE.

(E) THE POSSIBILITY OF RETAINING MINIMUM EFFECTIVENESS TO CONFRONT
THE ENEMY ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

/IV) SO FAR

(IV) SO FAR AS THE RESISTANCE IS CONCERNED, IT IS REALISED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN UNJUSTIFIED PROVOCATIONS AND ACTIONS WHICH NOT ONLY REFLECT ON THE RESISTANCE BUT ON THE WHOLE ARAB NATION, NEVERTHELESS, THESE PROVOCATIONS AND ACTIONS CANNOT BE BLAMED ON ALL THE RESISTANCE AND HELP MUST BE GIVEN TO THE HONOURABLE ELEMENTS IN THE RESISTANCE TO HOLD THE LEADERSHIP AND DIRECT MATTERS. THE PROTECTION OF THE RESISTANCE IS A SACRED DUTY, EVEN THOUGH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE RESISTANCE NEED PROTECTION FROM THEMSELVES.

(V) THE THREE STATES APPRECIATE THE SELF-RESTRAINT WHICH KING HUSSEIN HAS SHOWN FOR A LONG TIME, BUT FEAR THAT SOME OF THE RECENT STEPS HE HAS TAKEN MAY BE INTERPRETED AS GOING BEYOND NATIONAL OR PATRIOTIC REQUIREMENTS. THE THREE STATES APPEAL TO KING HUSSEIN TO STOP EVENTS FROM DRIFTING INTO A DANGEROUS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE RESISTANCE FORCES, SINCE BOTH ARE ULTIMATELY ONE FORCE WITH ONE AIM AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY.

(VI) A CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STRUGGLE WILL TRANSFORM THE EASTERN FRONT INTO A CIVIL WAR BETWEEN ARABS, FROM WHICH ONLY THE ENEMY CAN GAIN ADVANTAGE.

(VII) THE CONTINUED ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT TROUBLE BY AUCTIONEERING, WITHOUT ASSUMING AN ACTIVE ROLE, CAN ONLY OPEN THE DOOR TO INTERNATIONAL DANGERS.

(VIII) OUR FIRST DEMAND IS THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD STOP AND THAT AN OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR CONSULTATION IN ORDER TO FIX A FIRM BASIS FOR THE FUTURE. THE UNIFICATION OF THE RESISTANCE ORGANISATIONS OPENS THE DOOR FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SOLID CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE RESISTANCE COMMAND AND THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES.

3. IN A COMMENT ON THE CURRENT U.A.R. ATTITUDE, THE POLITICAL EDITOR OF AHRAM SETS OUT THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES:

(I) U.A.R. SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE REGARDLESS OF THE EXCESSES COMMITTED BY SOME OF THE ORGANISATIONS.

(II) CAIRO HAS DECLINED TO ADOPT AN ATTITUDE BASED ON SENTIMENT ALONE SINCE THIS COULD IMPEDE HER ATTEMPTS TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE PARTIES TO THE CRISIS.

(III) THE U.A.R.'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT DISPUTE IN AMMAN SHOWS THAT THE STRUGGLE WILL BE LONG AND BITTER. / (IV) WHOEVER

CAIRO TELEGRAM NO. 1017A TO F.C.O.

- 3 -

(IV) WHOEVER WINS THIS BATTLE, BETWEEN 20 AND 30 THOUSAND ARAB LIVES COULD BE LOST.

(V) NEITHER VICTOR NOR VANQUISHED WILL EMERGE FROM SUCH A BATTLE WHICH CAN ONLY END IN CERTAIN CATASTROPHE FOR THE ARABS.

(VI) THE U.A.R. SINCERELY REGRETS THE PART PLAYED BY CERTAIN ARAB ELEMENTS INCLUDING THE BA'ATHISTS IN BAGHDAD WHOSE ONLY EFFORT IN THE CRISIS HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE FIRE AND SEDITION AND WHO HAVE SHOWN ONCE AGAIN THAT ALL THEIR ATTITUDES REST ONLY ON A BATTLE OF WORDS.

FCO PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON

SIR R. BEAUMONT

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 623

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 623 OF 18 SEPTEMBER R F I
AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

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ROUTINE TO NET 1/4

234
229
MY TELS. NOS. 622 AND 623 : JORDAN.

BAKR'S CALL FOR JOINT ACTION WAS COMMUNICATED BY THE UNDER SECRETARY AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE EVENING OF 18 SEPTEMBER TO ARAB AMBASSADORS. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE UNDER SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF JOINT ACTION TO PUT AN END TO THE MASSACRE IN JORDAN AND TO WORK TO SAFEGUARD AND PROTECT COMMANDO ACTION AND THE MOVEMENTS JUST AND LEGAL RIGHTS AND DEMANDS.

2. TODAY'S PRESS ALSO ANNOUNCED A MASS DEMONSTRATION THIS AFTERNOON BY POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS, LABOUR UNIONS AND THE MASSES 'IN CONDEMNATION OF THE MASSACRES COMMITTED BY THE FASCIST MILITARY GOVERNMENT'. THE STORMING OF THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY BY SOME 200 PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN STUDENTS YESTERDAY IS ALSO REPORTED. SOME PROMINENCE IS GIVEN TO A HEADLINE READING 'SIX FLEET ON THE MOVE. AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN JORDAN MOST LIKELY' AND A BROADCAST BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT STATING THAT THREE AMERICAN PLANES LOADED WITH AMMUNITION WERE YESTERDAY ON THEIR WAY TO AMMAN IS QUOTED.

FCO PASS ROUTINE WASHINGTON.

MR. HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 629

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL T.S.R 1323/18

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 629 OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1970 R F I ROUTINE TO
AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM : JORDAN.

BAKR'S CALL FOR JOINT ACTION WAS EXPRESSED IN COMPARATIVELY
RESTRAINED TERMS AND, APART FROM THE INCIDENT AT THE JORDANIAN
EMBASSY, THERE HAVE SO FAR BEEN NO SIGNS OF EXCITEMENT HERE.
THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ANY MILITARY STAND-TO AND IRAQI
SOLDIERS YESTERDAY WEARING WALKING-OUT DRESS WERE OBVIOUSLY TAKING
THEIR WEEKEND LEAVE.

2. NO-ONE HERE CONSIDERS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE LIKELY TO COMMIT
THE SALAHUDDIN FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDOS, THOUGH THERE
MUST OBVIOUSLY BE SOME DANGER OF THEIR BEING INVOLVED IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES. I SEE NO REASON TO CHANGE THE GENERAL ASSESSMENT
MADE IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 586. THE IRAQIS SEEM TO BE TAKING THE
POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI - OR EVEN POSSIBLY U.S. - INTERVENTION
SERIOUSLY. THIS CONSIDERATION WILL NO DOUBT INHIBIT THEM
AND MAKE THEM MORE DISPOSED TO WORK FOR SOME REASONABLE ACCOMMODAT-
ION BETWEEN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN JORDAN AND THE COMMANDOS.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AMMASH MAY BE GOING TO JORDAN IN AN ATTEMPT
TO MEDIATE.

3. THE INCIDENT AT THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN
RELATIVELY MINOR AND THE BUILDING IS UNDER STRONG GUARD.
THERE HAVE SO FAR BEEN NO PARTICULAR MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-
BRITISH FEELING IN THE PRESS AND GENERAL TENSION IN BAGHDAD IS
NOT DISCERNABLE.
FCO PASS ROUTINE WASHINGTON.

MR. HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE BEIRUT
TELEGRAM NO. 459

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
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18 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 459 OF 18 SEPT
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO AMMAN..

MY TELEGRAM 454.

LOCAL REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN JORDAN.

STUDENTS LATER REOCCUPIED THE GROUND FLOOR
OF THE BUILDING HOUSING THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY
OFFICE, AND ARE STILL THERE. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE
OCCUPIED THE OFFICES THEMSELVES.

2. WELL INFORMED CONTACTS HAVE WARNED US THAT
FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ARE LIKELY THIS AFTERNOON.
THEY ALSO SAY THAT SOME 1,000 SA'IQA HAVE
REACHED BEIRUT FROM SYRIA OVERNIGHT AND ARE
DETERMINED TO PROVOKE OTHER INCIDENTS WITH THE
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES.

3. PALESTINIANS ARE AGAIN GATHERING IN THEIR CAMPS
BUT OTHERWISE THE TOWN IS CALM.

4. PLEASE REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM AND MY TELEGRAM UNDER
REFERENCE TO AMMAN BY TELEGRAPH IF CONDITIONS PERMIT.

MR. EDDEN.

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TELEGRAM NO. 464
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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
18 SEPTEMBER 1970

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C. J. HYNES

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 464
OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1970, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO AMMAN.

MY TEL NO. 459. [LOCAL REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN JORDAN]

DEMONSTRATIONS DID NOT MATERIALISE. ALL SEEMS QUIET AT LEAST
FOR THE MOMENT.

2. PLEASE REPEAT AS FOR MY TEL UNDER REF.

MR. EDDEN

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FLASH TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 871

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 871 OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1970 NET 1/4
RPTD FOR INFO FLASH TO AMMAN IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON ROUTINE
TO BERNE, CAIRO, BEIRUT, BONN.

235
YOUR TEL NO 2075 TO WASHINGTON :

JORDAN INTERNAL.

MILITARY ATTACHE PASSED FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3
TO IDF FOR THEIR INFORMATION, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE
WAS SPEAKING NEITHER ON INSTRUCTIONS NOR AS AN EMISSARY
OF KING HUSSEIN.

2. IDF WERE PUZZLED BY REFERENCE TO FIRING ON FEDAYEEN.
THEY SAID THAT THEIR ROUTINE MORNING PATROLS RETURNED FIRE
ONLY IF FIRED UPON FIRST. SO FAR AS THEY KNEW NO SHOTS
HAD BEEN FIRED THIS MORNING.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROUTINE BERNE, AND BONN.

MR. BARTHS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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FLASH TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 872

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 872 OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1970 RPTD FOR INFO
TO AMMAN, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UK MI'S NEW YORK.

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MILITARY ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM NO FOH 181930Z (NOT TO ALL):

JORDAN.

MILITARY ATTACHE'S TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE LATEST SITUATION
REPORT FROM ISRAEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. YOU WILL SEE
THAT THIS IS A GOOD DEAL LESS EUPHORIC ABOUT THE KING'S
CHANCES THAN THE ISRAELIS WERE SHOWING THEMSELVES YESTERDAY
AND INDEED THAN THE KING HIMSELF SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SUGGESTING
TO H.M. EMBASSY AMMAN.

2. THERE ARE ALSO THE SIGNS OF ALLEGED INTERVENTION
FROM SYRIA, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS SEEM TO THINK THAT THE
POSSIBILITY OF IRAQI INTERVENTION EVEN WITH THE TROOPS ALREADY
IN JORDAN IS RECEDING.

3. WE HAVE NATURALLY BEEN ASKING OURSELVES WHETHER A
SITUATION IS BUILDING UP WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ISRAELI
INTERVENTION OR EVEN WHETHER THE ISRAELIS ARE PAINTING
THE PICTURE UNNECESSARILY BLACK IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY
INTERVENTION.

4. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THIS IS THE CASE.
WE HAVE SEEN NONE OF THE USUAL SIGNS THAT EVEN A PARTIAL
MOBILISATION MIGHT BE IN PROGRESS. U.S. AND CANADIAN
ATTACHES, WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH, AND WHO HAVE
BEEN COVERING MOST OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN THEM, HAVE TOLD
US THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF UNUSUAL TROOP MOVEMENTS.
WE HAVE SEEN ANTI AIRCRAFT GUNS BEING DEPLOYED AT THE
SMALL LOCAL AIRFIELD OUTSIDE TEL AVIV BUT THERE WAS NO
ATTEMPT AT CONCEALMENT AND THIS COULD WELL BE AN
EXERCISE.

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/5. IT IS

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5. IT IS EVIDENT HOWEVER THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE APPREHENSIVE LEST THE KING'S WILL MAY BE WEAKENING AND LEST HE MAY BE CONSIDERING SOME FORM OF COMPROMISE, IF ONCE HE CAN ESTABLISH A STRONG ENOUGH NEGOTIATING POSITION. AS SEEN FROM HERE THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR APPREHENSION, NOT ONLY IN THE RELUCTANCE OF THE TROOPS TO GET DOWN TO HAND TO HAND FIGHTING BUT ALSO IN THE REPEATED OFFERS BY MAJALI. BUT WE CANNOT TELL FROM HERE WHAT SUBSTANCE THERE IS IN THESE FEARS.

6. CERTAINLY IT SEEMS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD TRY TO INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING IN AMMAN ITSELF. BUT THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY WATCHING THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND WILL BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO ANY OUTCOME WHICH MIGHT LEAVE IN FEDAYEEN HANDS SUBSTANTIAL PARTS OF JORDAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE AREAS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO ISRAEL, SUCH AS THE HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING THE JORDAN VALLEY.

7. THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TEL NO 418. OBVIOUSLY MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE SCALE AND LIKELY EFFECT OF IRAQI INTERVENTION. AS I REPORTED YESTERDAY, THE ISRAELIS WERE THEN SUGGESTING THAT THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD BE A DISSERVICE TO KING HUSSEIN AT PRESENT.

FLASH
F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, UK MIS NEW YORK.

MR. BARNES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 181930Z B

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TO MOD UK DI 4

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

244

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DTG 181935Z

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21 SEP 1970

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ADDRESSED MOD UK DI 4 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO
AMMAN, JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 181930Z SEP FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY 181110Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 181800Z SEPT.

1. IDF STATE THAT PROGRESS OF TANKS INTO AMMAN WAS
VERY SLOW CULMINATING IN A HALT BEING CALLED AT 1000Z.
THE SITUATION IN AMMAN WAS DESCRIBED AS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT
THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT.

2. THE FEDAYEEN ARE STATED AS BEING IN CONTROL OF TOWN OF
IRBID. THE JORDAN ARMY CONTINUES TO SHELL THE TOWN FROM THE
OUTSKIRTS.

3. AT 1230Z IT WAS REPORTED THAT A COMPANY PLUS OF TANKS
APPARENTLY SYRIAN HAD ENTERED TOWN OF RAMTA.
THERE WERE NO OTHER SIGNS OF IRAQI OR SYRIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEEN EXTREMELY CAREFUL TO AVOID
ANY CONTACT WITH THE JORDAN ARMY. THERE WERE REPORTS OF
SAIQA FEDAYEEN CROSSING INTO JORDAN FROM SYRIA. THESE WERE
HOWEVER LIGHTLY ARMED.

4. THE IDF HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE COMMANDER OF
NUMBER ONE DIVISION OF THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN WAS PLANNING TO
MOVE HIS HQ BACK TO IRAQ. THERE WERE ALSO SIGNS OF
PREPARATIONS BY THE IRAQI FORCES TO REMOVE THEIR AMMUNITION
DUMPS TO IRAQ.

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/5. THE ABSENCE

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5. THE ABSENCE OF IRAQI INTERVENTION SO FAR AND INDEED THE SIGNS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE DISENGAGING SHOULD IN THE IDF VIEW HAVE GIVEN THE KING TIME HE NEEDED TO FINISH THE OPERATION BY DUSK TODAY. BUT THEY POINT OUT THAT HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE EXPLOITED THIS ADVANTAGE AS HE MIGHT HAVE DONE AND HIS TROOPS SEEM RELUCTANT TO GET TO GRIPS OUTSIDE THEIR TANKS.

6. THE IDF CONFIRM THERE HAS BEEN NO FIRING BY THEIR FORCES ON THE JORDAN FRONT SINCE THE CURRENT CRISIS BEGAN. THEY ALSO CONFIRM THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT FIRE UNLESS THEY THEMSELVES ARE FIRED UPON.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS DEFCOMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH JIS NE AND MOD DI4.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED, SENT TO D.C.C.]

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245

F L A S H FOREIGN/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2080

TO WASHINGTON
18 SEPTEMBER 1970
(NE) ~~NET~~ 1/4.

CONFIDENTIAL 181425Z SEP

ADDSD WASHINGTON TELNO 2080 OF 18/9 RPTD FOR INFMN F L A S H TEL AVIV
IMMEDIATE BERNE PRIORITY BONN BEIRUT CAIRO AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

JORDAN INTERNAL

H.M. EMBASSY AT AMMAN HAVE HEARD FROM THE ROYAL PALACE THAT 50
SYRIAN TANKS ARE CONCENTRATED ON THE FRONTIER NEAR DERA. THEY
HAVE NOT CROSSED THE FRONTIER BUT HAVE FIRED AT JORDANIAN
POSITIONS. THE PALACE THINK "SOMETHING MAY WELL HAPPEN UP THERE".
2. THE PALACE ASKED US TO INFORM THE AMERICANS OF THIS.
WE ACCORDINGLY TOLD THE US EMBASSY HERE AT 1405Z.
YOU MAY WISH TO CONFIRM THIS TO THE STATE DEPT. OTHER POSTS
SHOULD TREAT THIS REPORT AS FOR THEIR INFORMATION ONLY.

DOUGLAS HOME.

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U. A. S. H. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2091

246
TO WASHINGTON

18 SEPTEMBER 1970 (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL (182230Z)

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2091 OF 18 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BONN BERNE BEIRUT TEL AVIV AND CAIRO.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF FOUR TELEX CONVERSATIONS WITH H.M. AMBASSADOR
AMMAN TODAY.

(A) 12.30Z THE AMBASSADOR REPORTED SOME FIRING BUT NOT IN THE
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY. COMPARED WITH YESTERDAY FIRING
WAS LIGHT. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT THE ARMY WAS MOPPING UP THE FEDAYEEN
AS EFFICIENTLY AS THEY MIGHT.

(B) 13.35Z. ACCORDING TO THE PALACE FIFTY SYRIAN TANKS WERE
CONCENTRATED ON THE FRONTIER NEAR DERA AND HAD FIRED ON JORDANIAN
POSITIONS.

(C) 16.30Z THE AMBASSADOR STILL HAD NO NEWS OF THE HOSTAGES.
HE SAID INTERMITTENT FIRING CONTINUED. THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE
EMBASSY WAS FAIRLY QUIET.

(D) 19.15Z THE PALACE REPORTED THAT SYRIAN TANKS HAD CROSSED THE
JORDANIAN FRONTIER TO A DISTANCE OF 250 YARDS. THE SYRIANS CLAIMED
IN RESPONSE TO REMONSTRATIONS FROM THE JORDANIANS THAT THEY WERE
STILL IN THEIR OWN BORDERS. THEY HAD HOWEVER SHELLLED SOME JORDANIAN
POSITIONS. THE JORDANIANS HAD NOW, UNOPPOSED BY THE IRAQIS,
INTERPOSED A TANK FORCE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE KING WAS
EXERCISED ABOUT THE REPORTED SYRIAN TANKS ON HIS NORTHERN BORDER
TO THE EXTENT OF ASKING FOR DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION. THE
AMBASSADOR WAS NOT CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT THIS MEANT AND WE ASKED
HIM FOR ELUCIDATION. (WE HAVE PASSED A FULL ACCOUNT OF THIS MESSAGE
TO THE US EMBASSY HERE).

/ACCORDING TO

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-2-

ACCORDING TO THE PALACE THE OCCUPATION OF THE WAHDAT CAMP HAD REACHED THE STAGE OF INDIVIDUAL SEARCHES OF HOUSES BY JORDANIAN ARMY INFANTRY, WHO WERE HOPING TO PICK UP NEWS OF THE HOSTAGES. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT A BATTLE HAD BEEN GOING ON ABOUT TWO MILES NORTH-WEST OF THE EMBASSY WHERE THE JORDANIAN ARTILLERY HAD HIT WHAT LOOKED LIKE A MAIN FEDAYEEN ARMS DUMP.

THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE ANY DEFINITE NEWS ABOUT THE HOSTAGES BUT HAD HEARD A STORY THAT THEY HAD BEEN MOVED, POSSIBLY YESTERDAY, TO MAFRAQ AND WERE NOW HELD BY PFLP SURROUNDED BY IRAQIS, THEMSELVES SURROUNDED BY JORDANIANS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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~~NET~~ 1/4

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 417

TO TEL AVIV
18 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 181553Z

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 417 OF 18 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, BERNE AND PARIS.

THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING AT MY REQUEST.

2. MR. EBAN THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOW IN A DOMINANT POSITION PROVIDED HE HAD THE POLITICAL WILL TO FOLLOW THROUGH HIS INITIAL MILITARY SUCCESS. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF SYRIAN OR IRAQI ACTION APART FROM WORDS.

3. MR. EBAN SAID THAT THE BERNE GROUP WAS CONSIDERING THE NEXT MOVE OVER THE HI-JACKED HOSTAGES TOO MUCH IN ISOLATION FROM THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. THE KEY QUESTION IN JORDAN NOW WAS WHO HAD SOVEREIGNTY: ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE HOSTAGES MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. ONE POSSIBILITY WAS THAT THE HOSTAGES COULD BE HANDED OVER TO KING HUSSEIN: THIS ACTION MIGHT PROVIDE ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE.

4. MR. EBAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS GLAD OF A CHANCE TO CLEAR THE AIR WITH US OVER THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN IF ONLY THE SEVEN FEDAYEEN HELD IN EUROPE WERE RELEASED, ISRAELIS BELIEVED THEY WOULD BE PAYING A "TOTAL PRICE": ALL THESE PEOPLE WERE KNOWN MURDERERS OF ISRAELIS. THIS ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION FOUND IT MOST UNREASONABLE WHEN THE BRITISH PRESS HAD SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. IN PARTICULAR, THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT PREPARED TO QUOTE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE OR TO SIGN A BLANK CHEQUE FOR THE PFLP. IF THERE WERE ANY PRINCIPLE IN THE MATTER IT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO

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SURRENDER TO BLACKMAIL. CONSIDERABLE NERVE AND PATIENCE WAS NEEDED IN DEALING WITH SUCH SITUATIONS- AND THE ISRAELIS HAD HAD SOME EXPERIENCE.

5. I AGREED THAT THE PFLP ACTIONS WERE REPREHENSIBLE BLACKMAIL. HOWEVER, WE ALSO HAD A DIFFICULTY OVER PUBLIC OPINION: FOR WE COULD EASILY SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE BRITISH HOSTAGES, BY RELEASING MISS KHALID AND THE BODY. ALTHOUGH WE HAD FROM THE OUTSET TAKEN THE LINE THAT WE MUST BE CONCERNED TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY THIS WAS NOT AN EASY LINE TO MAINTAIN IN THE FACE OF DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE BRITISH NATIONALS. IT WAS THIS REASON THAT WE WERE PRESSING THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TO MAKE A MOVE. MR. EBAN AGREED WITH ME THAT THE MOST URGENT THING NOW WAS TO MAKE CONTACT WITH KING HUSSEIN. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS SHOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE BECOME INVOLVED IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS: THE MANDATE OF M. BOISSIER (WHEN HE MANAGED TO GET TO AMMAN) SHOULD BE LIMITED AT PRESENT TO APPROACHES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE LATEST REPORT THAT THE KING'S FORCES WERE ATTACKING WANDAT CAMP WHERE THE HOSTAGES WERE BEING HELD, WITH THE AIM OF SECURING THEIR RELEASE. THERE WAS NOTHING WE COULD DO UNTIL WE KNEW WHETHER THIS OPERATION HAD SUCCEEDED.

6. MR. EBAN CONFIRMED THAT NONE OF THE HOSTAGES WERE STRAIGHT-FORWARD ISRAELI NATIONALS. OF THE 35 AMERICANS, 5 WERE RABBIS, AND OF THESE, 2 WERE DUAL NATIONALS: BUT ALL IN FACT LIVED IN THE UNITED STATES AND WERE TRAVELLING ON US PASSPORTS.

7. I TOLD MR. EBAN THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD EARLIER TODAY INFORMED HM AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAD OPENED FIRE OVER THE CEASEFIRE LINE IN THE NORTH OF THE JORDAN VALLEY. THE KING HAD SAID HE WOULD BE DEALING WITH THAT AREA AFTER THE FEDAYEEN RESISTANCE IN AMMAN HAD BEEN DEALT WITH: THE ISRAELI ACTION WAS NOT HELPFUL. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, MR. COMAY, REMARKED THAT THE KING NO DOUBT

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FCO TEL NO.417 TO TEL AVIV

-3-

WAS ABLE TO CONVEY THIS INFORMATION DIRECT TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT IF HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION WAS SERIOUS.

8. TURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE GENERALLY I SAID THAT SINCE THE RUSSIANS CLEARLY KNEW THAT THE AMERICANS WERE AWARE THAT THEY HAD CHEATED OVER THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE, I WAS SURPRISED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD NOT PUBLISHED THE EVIDENCE IN GREATER DETAIL. WORLD PUBLIC OPINION WAS NOT YET AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF THE RUSSIAN DECEPTION. MR. EBAN REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE AMERICAN MISHANDLING OF THE CEASEFIRE VIOLATION IN THE FIRST TEN DAYS OF THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT IN THE PRIDE OF AUTHORSHIP OF THE CEASEFIRE THEY COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT DOBRYNIN'S SOLEMN ASSURANCES HAD BEEN SWEEP ASIDE. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, US EVALUATIONS HAD BEEN SIMILAR TO THE ISRAELI ONES OR EVEN MORE DAMNING. ISRAEL WOULD BE TAKING THE MATTER UP WITH THE AMERICANS IN NEW YORK TOMORROW, AND WOULD SUGGEST THAT SINCE THIS WAS A MATTER OF SUCH INTERNATIONAL CONCERN THE AMERICANS SHOULD PUBLISH MORE INFORMATION.

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F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 347

TO AMMAN

18 SEP 1973. (248)

(EMERGENCY STAFF)

NET 1/4

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ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 347 OF 18 SEPTEMBER AND TO BEIRUT
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO, BAGHDAD, BONN, BERNE, TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON.

TELEX CONFERENCE OF 0900Z ON 18 SEPTEMBER. BBC.
(NOT TO ALL)

KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE WAS COMMUNICATED IMMEDIATELY TO ACTING
DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND HEAD OF ARABIC SERVICE BBC.

2. BOTH EXPRESSED CONCERN AND EVERY WISH TO REDRESS BALANCE IN
BBC REPORTING. REASON FOR IMBALANCE IS EXTREME DEARTH OF MATERIAL
FROM JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT SIDE AND FLOOD FROM GUERRILLA SOURCES
IN BEIRUT.

3. BBC WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF, AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ARE POSSIBLE,
BBC CORRESPONDENT AMMAN (ELPHICK) COULD BE GIVEN INTERVIEW BY
PALACE. IF ELPHICK IS INACCESSIBLE BBC HAS TWO OTHER MEN IN AMMAN
(CLAYTON AND BLAICKIE) WHO WOULD FILE STORIES. IT WOULD ALSO BE
MOST HELPFUL IF CHALLIS, WELL KNOWN TO GIVEN, COULD RECEIVE SPECIAL
BRIEFINGS BASED ON AMMAN'S TELEGRAMS AND ANY OTHER SUITABLE MATERIAL.

4. BBC POINTED OUT THAT MAIN ARABIC SERVICE NEWS LAST NIGHT GAVE
PRIDE OF PLACE TO GOVERNMENT NEWS FROM AMMAN AND TO CHALLIS'S
REPORTS.

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PRIORITY CALL

TO FOR FOR AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

249

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1011

1 SEPTEMBER 1970

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ADDRESSED PRIORITY FOR TEL NO 1011 FOR 19 SEPTEMBER 1970,
REF PRIORITY TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, TRIPOLI, TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON AND KHARTOUM.

NET 1/4

231/2
MY TELEGRAMS NOS. 1017 AND 1018:

EVENTS IN JORDAN.

AHRAM TODAY REPORTS THAT GENERAL SADIQ HAD A THREE HOUR MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 18 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWED BY A MEETING WITH ARAFAT AND RESISTANCE LEADERS, DURING WHICH HE HANDED OVER THE TRIPARTITE MESSAGE, HE IS EXPECTED TO HAVE A FURTHER MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN TODAY.

2. AFTER REPORTING THAT THE U.A.R.'S BASIC IMMEDIATE AIM IS TO STOP THE CLASHES BETWEEN BOTH SIDES, AHRAM QUOTES A U.A.R. ASSESSMENT THAT LOSSES SO FAR AMOUNT TO 5,000 KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THAT HOUSE TO HOUSE FIGHTING HAS SPREAD TO FIVE JORDANIAN TOWNS.

3. AFTER LISTENING TO THE MESSAGE KING HUSSEIN IS SAID TO HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(I) THE EXISTENCE OF JORDAN WAS AT RISK BECAUSE OF THE PARALYSIS OF AUTHORITY AFTER THE AIRCRAFT HI-JACKINGS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES FOLLOWED BY THE CALL FOR CIVIL INSURRECTION.

(II) THERE WAS A STATE OF REBELLION IN THE JORDANIAN ARMY BECAUSE OF THE INSULTS TO WHICH BOTH SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS HAD BEEN EXPOSED.

(III) HE HAD THOUGHT OF ABDICATING IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE WORSENING OF THE CRISIS.

(IV) HE HAD RESISTED FOR A LONG TIME SINCE IT WOULD MEAN THE END OF JORDAN AND WOULD ENABLE ISRAEL FINALLY TO RETAIN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK.

(V) HE HAD TRIED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH RESISTANCE LEADERS BUT IN VAIN.

4. IN REPLY, GENERAL SADIQ IS SAID TO HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

(I) THE ARAB NATION IS FACING A DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH EXCEEDS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE STATE.

(II) THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE WAS PLAYING AND COULD PLAY IN THE FUTURE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE ARAB STRUGGLE. IT WAS ENOUGH THAT THEY HAD MANAGED TO KEEP THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN EXISTENCE.

(III) THERE WOULD BE NO VICTOR OR VANQUISHED IN THE CURRENT BATTLE.

(IV) THERE WERE INTERNATIONAL PLOTS FACING THE ARABS AND THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB NATION.

(V) KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY WAS STILL ABLE TO PLAY A HISTORICAL ROLE IF HE COULD SAVE THE ARAB NATION FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN.

5. GENERAL SADIQ IS SAID TO HAVE INFORMED KING HUSSEIN OF HIS INTENTION OF MEETING ARAFAT, BUT NO ACCOUNT IS GIVEN OF THIS MEETING. PRESIDENT NASSER IS SAID TO BE CONTINUALLY IN TOUCH BOTH WITH AMMAN AND TRIPOLI AND KHARTOUM.

6. UNDER SEPARATE HEADING ENTITLED "WHAT HAS THE IRAQI BAKATH DONE?", ARAFAT QUOTES A REUTERS REPORT THAT THE IRAQI FORCES HAVE ALLOWED JORDANIAN TANKS AND ARTILLERY TO PASS THROUGH THE IRAQI POSITIONS IN ORDER TO RESIST COMMANDO TANKS BEING BROUGHT IN FROM SYRIA.

7. THE PRESS ALSO CARRIES AGENCY REPORTS OF LIBYAN DECISION TO CUT OFF ALL AID TO JORDAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1026

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED. 191045²

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ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FCO TEL NO 1026 OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1970,
REF IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, TRIPOLI, TEL AVIV
WASHINGTON, KHARTOUM, HQBFNE, UKMIS NEW YORK.

TP TELEGRAM NO 1023 : JORDAN INTERNAL.

HYRDFS TODAY PROMINENTLY REPORTS CONCENTRATION OF UNITS OF
U.S. SIXTH FLEET AND AIRLIFTING OF MARINE COMMANDO
UNIT TO CYPRUS
TO JOIN H.M.S. ALBION.

2. ALTHOUGH PENTAGON SPOKESMAN IS QUOTED AS GIVING OFFICIAL
REASON AS PLANNING FOR EVACUATION OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH
NATIONALS FROM JORDAN, REPLIES BY ZIEGLER WHEN ASKED IF U.S.
WOULD INTERVENE MILITARILY ON HUSSEIN'S BEHALF ARE SAID TO
INDICATE THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION IS A POSSIBILITY. COVERAGE
IS GIVEN TO THE CHICAGO SUN TIMES STORY, SAID TO BE BASED ON
A PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING, THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO INTERVENE
SHOULD SYRIA AND IRAQ ENTER THE CONFLICT AND TIP THE MILITARY
BALANCE AGAINST HUSSEIN'S FORCES.

3. THESE REPORTS HAVE GIVEN EDITORIAL WRITERS THE OPPORTUNITY
TO AVOID TAKING A POSITION ON JORDANIAN/ PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN
FAVOUR OF CONDEMNATION OF WESTERN IMPERIALISTIC ADVENTURES IN
THE ARAB CONFLICT. QAV' AL AHAM' WARNS THE U.S. AND U.K. THAT
EXPLOITING THE SITUATION BY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN UNDER THE
PRETEXT OF RECENT EVENTS WILL HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
WHOLE ARAB WORLD SEMI COLON THOSE WHO WISH TO FISH IN TROUBLED
WATERS ARE WARNED BY THE LESSONS OF HISTORY. AKHBAR SINGLES /OUT THE

CUT THE BRITISH 'RUNNING DOGS' FOR PARTICULAR ATTENTION
SAYING THAT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY WISHES TO REVIVE DREAMS OF A
FORMER EMPIRE AT THE EXPENSE OF JORDAN. IT IS SAID THAT THE U.S.
WANTS TO LEAVE 'THIS DIRTY BUSINESS' TO THE U.K. IN ORDER TO
AVOID ARAB REACTION AGAINST THEIR PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
SEMI COLON. BRITAIN IS SAID TO HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE AND WILL PLAY
THE ACTIVE ROLE, JUST AS IN 1956, WHILE THE U.S. PROTECTS THE
REAR OF THE IMPERIALIST FORCES BY DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRE AND
POLITICAL TRICKERY. THE TAIL OF THE DOG ALLUSION IS AIRED
AGAIN IN ASKING HOW FAR BRITAIN WANTS TO SINK THIS TIME.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK.
DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO HQDFNE

SIR R. BEAUMONT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED: PASSED TO M.O.D.]

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
IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1032

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
19 SEPTEMBER 1970

281

CONFIDENTIAL 190950Z

ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FCO TEL NO 1032 OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1970
RFI IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV,
ROUTINE AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW AND PARIS.



JORDAN SITUATION AND FUTURE OF ROGERS INITIATIVE.

IT IS PERHAPS PREMATURE IN THE HEAT OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE JORDAN ARMY AND THE FEDAYIN AND WHEN THE LIVES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, AND PARTICULARLY FOREIGN HOSTAGES, ARE AT STAKE TO GIVE OVERMUCH WEIGHT TO LONG TERM POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. IT SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE BORNE IN MIND, AS IT PROBABLY IS, BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT OVERT INTERVENTION IN JORDAN IN SUPPORT OF KING HUSSEIN BY THE UNITED STATES (OWING TO ITS RECORD OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL) AND A FORTIORI (UNDERLINED) BY ISRAEL ITSELF, WHICH LED TO KING HUSSEIN RETAINING HIS THRONE, MIGHT AUTOMATICALLY DISQUALIFY HIM AS A VALID PARTNER FOR PRESIDENT NASSER IN ANY JOINT NEGOTIATION WITH JARRING UNDER THE ROGERS INITIATIVE. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 1016 AND AS SUBSEQUENT EVENTS HAVE SHOWN, NASSER IS CLEARLY UNWILLING TO EXPOSE MORE FLANK THAN NECESSARY TO ARAB NATIONALIST CRITICISM SEMI COLON AND ASSOCIATION WITH A HEAD OF STATE WHO OWED HIS POSITION TO ISRAELI INTERVENTION (OR EVEN A PUBLIC THREAT OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION) MIGHT BE MORE THAN THE TRAFFIC WOULD BEAR, SINCE THE STANDARD OF PALESTINE RESISTANCE, THOUGH IT MAY BE LOWERED IN JORDAN WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO FLY ELSEWHERE. IT IS ALREADY CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE LIBYAN GOVT WITH WHICH NASSER WISHES TO REMAIN CLOSE, ARE MOVING FAIRLY SWIFTLY TO AN ANTI-HUSSEIN AND PRO - FEDAYIN POSITION. THE SUDANESE MAY DO LIKEWISE.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND ROUTINE TO PARIS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT. [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

S E C R E T

SH TEL AVIV

TO MOD U.K.

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 191000Z

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T (D T G 191000Z)

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO TO DA AMMAN
JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 191000Z SEP FROM BRITHILAT.

REF MY 181930Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 190900Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF SAY FIGHTING IN AMMAN IS STILL CONFUSED BUT ARMY
ALREADY HOLD LARGE AREAS OF CITY AND ARE STEADILY GETTING
ON TOP. INTERMITTENT FIRING CONTINUES.

TWO. ARMY HAS SENT STRONG FORCE OF TWO BRIGADES WITH
ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND 100 PLUS TANKS TO IRBID. TOWN REMAINS
IN FEDAYEEN HANDS BUT IS SURROUNDED BY JORDAN ARMY. IDF ESTIMATE
ATTACK WILL BE PUT IN SHORTLY.

THREE. THERE IS A REPORT THAT "AN IRAQI SOURCE"
HAS CONTACTED A SENIOR PERSONALITY IN THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
AND ASSURED HIM THAT IRAQI FORCES WILL EVACUATE JORDAN,
SAME SOURCE IS ALSO SAID TO HAVE TOLD JORDANIANS THAT
IRAQ WILL SUPPORT JORDAN AGAINST SYRIA IF THERE IS ANY
INTERVENTION BY LATTER. IDF NOW HAVE EVIDENCE THAT FIGHTING
EQUIPMENT IS ALSO BEING MOVED BACK TO IRAQ PARTICULARLY
FROM THE NUMBER ONE DIVISION OF THE IRAQI FORCES IN
JORDAN. THERE IS NO CO-OPERATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN THE IRAQI
AND SYRIAN FORCES IN JORDAN.

FOUR. THE SITUATION IN RAMTA IS THAT TOWN REMAINS IN
FEDAYEEN HANDS. APPARENTLY JORDAN ARMY WITH ONE BATTALION
OF INFANTRY AND TWO COMPANIES OF TANKS ATTACKED YESTERDAY
AFTERNOON AND FEDAYEEN APPEALED TO SYRIANS FOR HELP.
ARTILLERY SUPPORT WAS GIVEN TO FEDAYEEN FROM BEHIND SYRIAN
BORDER AND SOME TANKS, NUMBER UNSPECIFIED, CROSSED BORDER
AND PENETRATED 2KM INSIDE JORDAN.
TEL RAMTA POLICE STATION WAS TAKEN OVER BY SYRIAN FORCE.
THE JORDAN ARMY ATTACK WAS THROWN BACK BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS
THAT A COUNTER-ATTACK IS BEING MOUNTED SHORTLY. THE IDF
BELIEVE THE SYRIAN TANKS HAVE WITHDRAWN ACROSS THEIR
OWN BORDER.

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244

FIVE. IN MAFRAQ THE FEDAYEEN ARE IN CONTROL. THERE ARE NO JORDAN ARMY UNITS IN VICINITY BUT MAIN FORCE OF IRAQI TROOPS ARE CONCENTRATED THERE.

SIX. IN SALT THE ARMY CONTINUES TO TAKE OVER TOWN. THERE HAS BEEN SERIOUS FIGHTING IN AREA MAINLY BECAUSE FEDAYEEN SUPPLY DUMPS ARE LOCATED THERE. AT MIDNIGHT 18 SEPT THE CLEARANCE OF THE TOWN HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED.

SEVEN. THE IDF SAY THERE IS NOW NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THEREFORE IN THEIR VIEW NO COMPROMISE IS LIKELY. ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY EGYPT, HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO STOP FIGHTING BUT ALL ATTEMPTS HAVE FAILED. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, SADEQ IS EVIDENCE THAT ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE CONTINUE. EIGHT. FEDAYEEN REINFORCEMENTS MAINLY FROM THE

SAIQA GROUP ARE COMING IN FROM BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON. CASUALTIES ARE SAID TO BE NOT AS HEAVY AS INDICATED BY THE INTENSITY OF FIRE. THE IDF COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE FIGURE OF 5000 CASUALTIES PUBLISHED IN EL AHRAH. THE IDF HAD INFORMATION WHICH CONFIRMED THE FEDAYEEN CLAIM THAT COMMANDERS OF THE JORDANIAN 2ND DIVISION AND 12 TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HAD BEEN CAPTURED. THEY ALSO CONFIRM THE ARMY ARE CAPTURING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF FEDAYEEN. BOTH SIDES ARE BEGINNING TO HUSBAND THEIR AMMUNITION SINCE THE EARLIER PROFLIGATE AND INDISCRIMINATE USE OF WEAPONS. ANY SHORTAGES ARE BOUND TO HURT THE FEDAYEEN MORE THAT THE ARMY.

NINE. THE IDF SAY THAT THE FEAR OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION PARTICULARLY THE U.S. PRECAUTIONARY MOVES AND THE POSSIBLE THREAT OF ISRAELI ACTION HAS SCARED BOTH THE SYRIANS AND IRAQ. THEY EMPHASISE THAT THEY HAVE AVOIDED ANY THREAT OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION " WE HAVE KEPT VERY QUIET".

TEN. IDF ARE EXPRESSING CAUTIOUS BELIEF THAT ARMY IS GRADUALLY GETTING ON TOP AND SECURING THE COUNTRY.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN
DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD DI 4 AND JIS NE.

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
/SENT TO D.C.C./

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IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO F C O

TELEGRAM NO. 634

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL (190855Z)

NET 1/4

ADDRESS TO FCO TELNO 634 DATED 19/9 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON, NEW YORK AND MOD FOR DIA.
TEL AVIV TELNO 872 : JORDAN.

243

ONLY ONE WELL PLACED OBSERVER HERE HAS SUGGESTED THAT
THE IRAQIS, INFLUENCED BY THE NATIONAL COMMAND OF THE BA'ATH,
ARE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING COMMITTING THEIR TROOPS IN
JORDAN. ALL OTHERS I HAVE SPOKEN TO, INCLUDING IRAQIS,
CONSIDER IT UNLIKELY. THE UAR EMBASSY HERE HAVE A STORY
THAT THE IRAQIS IN NORTH JORDAN HAVE BEEN PREVENTING
SYRIAN REINFORCEMENTS FROM COMING SOUTH.
FCO PASS WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, AND DEFENCE COMMCEN.
DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS DIA.

MR. HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED: SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FLASH BAGHDAD

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
TELEGRAM NO. 636

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL (191109Z)

ADDRESS TO FCO TELNO. 636 DATED 19/9 RPTD FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON .

YOUR TELNO. 910 : JORDAN .



I ASKED FOR AN URGENT APPOINTMENT WITH THE UNDER SECRETARY BUT WAS NOT SURPRISED TO LEARN THE ELUSIVE NIMA WAS "TOO BUSY" . I , THEREFORE SAW JAMALI AND URGED THE IRAQIS AS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SYRIANS . HE WAS CLEARLY SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT THIS APPROACH BUT PROMISED TO REPORT WHAT I HAD SAID.

2. JAMALI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE DOING THEIR BEST TO TAKE THE HEAT OUT OF THE SITUATION AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THEY HAD APPEALED TO OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND "FRIENDLY" STATES TO USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES WITH KING HUSSEIN . IRAQI TROOPS HAD NOT BEEN COMMITTED BUT THE IRAQIS WERE STUNG BY BBC REPORTS THAT THEY HAD ALLOWED JORDANIAN TROOPS TO PASS THROUGH THEIR AREA. SUCH REPORTS CERTAINLY DID NOT HELP.

3. JAMALI CONTINUED THAT THE IRAQIS, LIKE OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS , WERE COMMITTED TO THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BUT LIKEWISE THEY HAD NOTHING AGAINST KING HUSSEIN . THEY DID, HOWEVER , THINK THAT HE HAD BEEN UNWISE TO APPOINT A MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND CONSIDERED THAT THE COMPROMISE SOLUTION WORKED OUT BETWEEN ABDUL MONEIM RIFAI AND THE COMMANDOS ON 15 SEPTEMBER SHOULD EVEN NOW BE THE BASIS OF A COMPOSITION BETWEEN BOTH SIDES.

4. JAMALI ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD URGE RESTRAINT ON KING HUSSAIN . HE ALSO ALLUDED TO THE UNITED STATES TROOP MOVEMENTS AND PROPHESED A VIETNAM SITUATION IF THEY SHOULD IN FACT LAND IN JORDAN . I SAID THAT MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THESE MOVEMENTS WERE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH A POSSIBLE EVACUATION FOR US NATIONALS.

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- 2 -

5. I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE RISK OF ISRAELI ACTION FOR THE SAME REASONS AS THOSE GIVEN IN CAIRO TELNO 1029 AND CONFINED MYSELF TO DWELLING ON THE GENERAL DANGERS OF THE SITUATION.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE UKNIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON .

MR. HAWLEY

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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FLASH TEL AVIV TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE UK

TELNO FOH 191200Z SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO TO DA AMMAN,
JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 191200Z SEP.

REF MY FOH 191000Z SEP.

JORDAN INTERNAL FROM BRITMILAT.

255

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NCS 1/4

- (252)
1. IDF REPORT THAT JORDAN ARMY APPEAR TO BE GAINING CONTROL OF AMMAN. IT IS LIKELY THEY WILL BE IN FULL CONTROL OF CITY SHORTLY.
 2. KING IS REPORTED AS BEING VERY CONCERNED OVER THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE IS LETTING IT BE KNOWN BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS THAT HE HOLDS ARAFAT RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR SAFETY.
 3. IN IRBID THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SITUATION. NO ATTACK HAS YET BEEN MADE BY JORDAN ARMY WHO CONTINUE TO SURROUND CITY WITH TANKS.
 4. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MOVES OF IRAQI UNITS IN NAFRAQ AREA. ONE BRIGADE (?) HAS MOVED WEST OF TOWN TO HIGH GROUND. IDF REGARD THIS AS CHANGE IN DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS TO PLACE IRAQI FORCES IN BETTER POSITION TO GUARD AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE IDF ATTACK. ALTERNATIVELY IT WOULD PLACE THEM IN BETTER POSITION SHOULD THERE BE ANY SYRIAN INTERVENTION REQUIRING ACTION BY THE IRAQI FORCES. IDF EMPHASISE THAT ALL THEIR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT IRAQIS HAVE NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING MILITARILY THEMSELVES.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN
MR. BARNES.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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N.E.D.

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 876

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

256

RECEIVED IN

AT 11.10

NET 1/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

(D T G 192100Z)

ADDRESSED FCO TEL NO 876 OF 19 SEPTEMBER PPTD FOR INFO
AMMAN, WASHINGTON, JIS NE, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, MOD DI4.

JORDAN.

SINCE MIDDAY WE HAVE HEARD VERY LITTLE FROM
ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. THIS MAY BE BECAUSE
THEY ARE NOW TAKING A MORE RELAXED VIEW OF THE SITUATION.
IT MAY ALSO PARTLY BE, AS THEY HAVE HINTED, THAT WE HAVE LITTLE
TO OFFER THEM IN EXCHANGE.

2. THEY HAVE TOLD US THIS EVENING, AT ABOUT 1830Z ,
THAT SYRIAN RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WERE OVER NORTHERN
JORDAN THIS AFTERNOON AND THAT THIS EVENING THE SYRIAN
AIR FORCE WAS PUT ON ALERT READY FOR TOMORROW MORNING. THE
ALERT APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

3. THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS.
I REPORT IT BECAUSE ANY SUBSTANTIAL SYRIAN INTERVENTION COULD
HAVE ITS EFFECT ON ISRAELI ACTIONS. AS FAR AS WE KNOW,
THIS IS THE FIRST INDICATION OF AIR ACTION IN THE CURRENT CRISIS.

4. IF YOU ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE INFORMATION WE ARE
OBTAINING FROM THE ISRAELIS, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING
YOU CAN TELL US TO PASS TO THEM. WE HAVE HAD NO TELEGRAMS
SINCE 1300Z.

/5. SINCE

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- 2 -

5. SINCE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED ISRAEL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAVE TELEPHONED (20412) TO SAY THAT TWO BATTALIONS OF SYRIAN TANKS ON THE FRONTIER NEAR RAMTA ARE FIRING AT JORDANIAN TROOPS, BUT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF THEIR FURTHER INTENTIONS.

FLASH
F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, AND DEFCONCEN.
DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH JUSNE, MOD DI 4.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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ENCLAIR

PRIORITY MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NO. 1079

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
19 SEPTEMBER 1970

(257)

UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1079 OF 19/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, NICOSIA, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, HQBFNE, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

SITUATION IN JORDAN.

NEJ 1/4

"IZVESTIA" LAST NIGHT PUBLISHED ARTICLE BY MATVEEV ON THE LATEST OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING IN JORDAN SAYING THAT IF EVENTS CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AS THEY HAVE SO FAR THERE COULD BE CIVIL WAR WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES BOTH FOR JORDAN AND FOR OTHER ARAB STATES. THE OUTBREAK OF INTERNECINE FIGHTING BENEFITS ONLY THE TEL AVIV EXTREMISTS WHO ARE HATCHING PLOTS FOR FURTHER MILITARY ADVENTURES AGAINST THE ARAB STATES. THE BLOODSHED IN JORDAN SERVES THE INTERESTS OF ISRAEL'S AMERICAN PATRONS: NEITHER THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES NOR THE PALESTINIAN ORGANISATIONS, NOR ANY ARAB COUNTRY CAN PROFIT FROM ITS CONTINUANCE.

2. CONCENTRATION OF UNITS OF THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH EVENTS IN JORDAN, AND REINFORCES THE DANGER THAT IMPERIALIST CIRCLES WOULD NOT BE AVERSE TO STIRRING THINGS UP AND USING THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN ENDS AGAINST THE ARAB PEOPLES. CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE USA WOULD BE GLAD OF A PRETEXT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLANS FOR VARIOUS "ACTIONS" IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS IS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT THE PARTIES CONCERNED SHOULD APPROACH THE PROBLEM BY RECOGNISING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THE INTERNECINE STRUGGLE SHOULD BE ENDED AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION PREVENTED.

3. TASS CARRIED A SIGNED COMMENTARY (NOT A TASS STATEMENT AS REPORTED BY THE BBC) ON SIMILAR LINES, MENTIONING ALSO MILITARY PREPARATION AT BRITISH AIR BASES IN CYPRUS, AND TODAY'S PRAYDA

/CARRIES

CARRIES AN ARTICLE BY GLUKHOV WHICH DIRECTLY ACCUSES THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR IMPERIALIST PATRONS OF PROVOKING THE INTERNECINE WAR IN JORDAN IN PURSUIT OF THE "DIVIDE AND RULE" POLICY.

ALL FRIENDS OF THE ARABS, "PRAVDA" CONTINUES, ARE CONVINCED THAT THESE EFFORTS WILL FAIL, BUT THE GUARANTEE OF THEIR FAILURE WOULD BE A CESSATION OF FIGHTING IN JORDAN AND AN ATTITUDE OF DETERMINATION, CALMNESS AND UNITY OF ACTION ON THE PART OF THE ARAB PEOPLES.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

DEFCOMMEN PLEASE PASS HQBFNE.

SIR D. WILSON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 910

TO CAIRO

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

~~NES~~ 1/4

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 910 OF 19 SEPTEMBER AND TO BAGHDAD
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV BEIRUT UKMIS NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON.

FOR AMBASSADORS FROM P.U.S.

KING HUSSAIN HAS REPORTED THAT SYRIAN TANKS HAVE CROSSED THE

JORDANIAN BORDER FOR THE SHORT DISTANCE OF 250 YARDS. THEY HAVE
SHELLED SOME JORDANIAN POSITIONS. HE HAS ASKED FOR DIPLOMATIC
SUPPORT. UNLESS YOU THINK IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, URGE
THE EGYPTIANS/IRAQIS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SYRIANS. THEY
ARE RUNNING THE RISK OF INVITING ISRAELI ACTION.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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ADDN. DISTRIBUTION
ATTACKS ON CIVIL AIRCRAFT

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CYPHER CAT/A
FLASH AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 618

CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 618 DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV MOSCOW
PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKNIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI 4 JIS(NE) AND
JIS GULF.

REGISTRY NO. 10

NEJ 1/4

SITREP AS AT 0730Z 20 SEPTEMBER.

THERE HAS BEEN A REVIVAL OF FIRING IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE
EMBASSY THIS MORNING PRESUMABLY CAUSED BY FEDAYEEN BY-PASSED BY
TROOPS ON PREVIOUS DAYS. OUR GENERATOR WAS PUT OUT OF ACTION
BY A HIT SOON AFTER 0300Z AND WE ARE HAVING TO USE
THE SMALL STANDBY WHICH IS INEVITABLY SLOWING DOWN OUR COMMUNIC-
ATIONS. ANOTHER BULLET PROBABLY ARMoured PIERCING ENTERED THE
SAFE ROOM NARROWLY MISSING A C.B.O. THE ARMY ARE RESPONDING WITH
ARTILLERY AS WELL AS LIGHTER WEAPONS WHICH IS MAKING LIFE
UNPLEASANT SINCE SOME OF THEIR TARGETS ARE UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE
TO US. I HOPE TO GIVE YOU A MORE GENERAL PICTURE WHEN I HAVE SEEN
THE KING.

2. LATER. IT IS NOW 1500Z AND DESPITE MY REQUESTS THE KING HAS
NOT YET BEEN AVAILABLE. LOCAL SITUATION LITTLE QUIETER.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKNIS NEW YORK BONN
AND DEFCONCEN

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI 4 AND JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.G.]

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(260)

FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telegram Unnumbered

20 September 1970

NET 1/4

SECRET

The King told me at 8.30 G.M.T. that large Syrian tank force was nearing frontier and had been engaged by his guns. We would welcome Israeli or other air intervention or threat thereof.

Mr. Phillips

[Copies sent to P/S No. 10 D.S., Sir R. Hooper, Cabinet Office and Mr. J. Thomson, Cabinet Office].

FILES

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PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

COPIES TO:

D14 MCD

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AMENDMENT SLIP

264

Amman telegram Unnumbered of 20 September to FCO.

[Syria/Jordan]

Please re-number as No.1.

FILES
N.E.D.
Emergency Staff
P.S.
P.S. to Mr. Godber
Sir P.Adams

Copies to:
DI4 MOD

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
21 September 1970

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S E C R E T

CYPIER/CAT A

F L A S H AMMAN . TO

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 2

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T

201200Z

262

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 Z 1 NES 1/4
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TELEGRAM NO. 2 OF 20 SEPTEMBER.

SYRIANS. TWO BRIGADES ARE BETWEEN EL BURRAH AND DIR/TRACK
LEADING TO ALSAB. REFERENCES TWO FOUR SEVEN TWO TWO THREE AND
TWO FIVE ZERO TWO FOUR ZERO. HUNDRED TX OS AND SCALE MAP. URGENT
INTERVENTION REQUESTED.

MR. PHILLIPS

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER
CABINET OFFICE AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE./

F I L E S

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PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

COPIES TO:

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GDHIER/CAT A

FLASH AMMAN . TO

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 2

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T

201200Z

TELEGRAM NO. 2 OF 20 SEPTEMBER.

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MR. PHILLIPS

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER
CABINET OFFICE AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE./

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EMERGENCY STAFF

PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

COPIES TO:

DI4 M.O.D.

D. I. O., *Cabinet office.*

S E C R E T

AMMAN

S E C R E T

263

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 3

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NES 1/4

MY EN CLAIR TELNO 623.

HUNTERS CANNOT OPERATE AFTER DARK BUT REMNANTS OF FORTY
BRIGADE WILL DELAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT KING DOUBTS IF THEY
CAN HOLD IRBID LONG.

MR. PHILLIPS

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER,
CABINET OFFICE, AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE/

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PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

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A S H AMMAN

TO. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 4

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T

264

R
SECRET
NET 1/4

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 359.

KING ASKED MORAL DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT, PUBLIC CONDEMNATION AND THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL STEPS, BUT APPEAL DELAYED BY CYPHER SNAG. SYRIAN TROOPS MASSING. CALL FOR INTERVENTION BY H.M.G. AND U.S.A. MAY COME SOON. KING JUST NOW ASKS ISRAELI AIR STRIKE NOW.

MR. PHILLIPS

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE AND MR. J. THOMSON CABINET OFFICE/

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P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

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265

FLASH AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 202020Z SEPTEMBER

S E C R E T

NE3 1/4

CCP

THE KING HAS TOLD US AS AT 1700Z HE WAS MEETING HIS CABINET TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION HE HAS DISPENSED HIS FORCES ROUND AMMAN IN A POSITION OF ALL ROUND DEFENCE JUST IN CASE IRAQ ALSO TRIED TO INTERVENE. THE CABINET IS TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO ASK FOR BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION STOPM

FCO PASS FLASH TO AMERICAN AND ISRAELI EMBASSY.

/COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO. 10 DOWNING STREET, SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE AND MR. J. THOMSON, CABINET OFFICE/

F I L E S

N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF

PRIVATE SECRETARY

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

SIR P. ADAMS

COPIES TO:

D 14, M.O.D.

D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T

NNNNN.

DECLAIR

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELEGRAM NO. 1080

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED. 201143²

NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER
1080 OF 20/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO WASHINGTON,
UKHIS NEW YORK, PARIS, CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, BACHDAD,
NICOSIA AND HQBFNE AND (SAVING) TO UKDEL NATO.

JORDAN.

PRAVDA OF 20 SEPTEMBER CARRIES A TASS STATEMENT ON THE CURRENT
FIGHTING IN JORDAN. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY.

2. QUOTE THE FRATRICIDAL CONFLICT IN JORDAN THREATENS THE VITAL
INTERESTS OF JORDAN, OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, AS
WELL AS THE INTERESTS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF THE
ARAB PEOPLES AND CAN ONLY BENEFIT THE ENEMIES OF THE ARAB PEOPLES,
ESPECIALLY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUING AGRESSION
UNQUOTE.

3. REFERRING TO THE MOVEMENTS OF THE U.S. 6TH FLEET AS WELL
AS OTHER REPORTS QUOTE THAT PLANS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM
OUTSIDE ARE BEING DRAWN UP BY CERTAIN CIRCLES IN A NUMBER OF
COUNTRIES UNQUOTE, THE STATEMENT GOES ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE SUCH
A DEVELOPMENT WOULD RENDER THE POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST EVEN
MORE ACUTE AND WOULD NOT ONLY ENDANGER THE INDEPENDENCE OF JORDAN
AND OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, BUT WOULD ALSO FUNDAMENTALLY
COMPLICATE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE UNQUOTE.

4. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN IS THE CAUSE OF DEEP CONCERN IN
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE HOPE IS EXPRESSED QUOTE IN OFFICIAL
SOVIET CIRCLES ... THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES,
THEIR LEADERS AND GOVERNMENTS, THE ARAB ORGANIZATIONS, WILL DO
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SECURE A SPEEDY END TO THE FRATRICIDAL
WAR IN JORDAN, TO PREVENT A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST UNQUOTE.

5. ARMED INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE WOULD , IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET UNION, SERVE TO WORSEN THE CONFLICT, TO QUOTE MAKE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES THEIR STRUGGLE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION, FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF A FIRM AND JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR VIOLATED RIGHTS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS. THOSE TO WHOM PEACE IS DEAR AND WHO ARE IN FAVOUR OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CANNOT RECONCILE THEMSELVES WITH THIS UNQUOTE.

6. QUOTE THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES CAN BE SURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL AS USUAL PURSUE A POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR JUST STRUGGLE FOR THE ASSERTION OF FULL INDEPENDENCE AND THE GUARANTEEING OF THEIR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FOR THE PRESERVATION AND STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE UNQUOTE.

7. FURTHER COMMENT : PRAVDA'S SUNDAY INTERNATIONAL REVIEW REFERS TO IMPERIALIST ATTEMPTS TO USE THE JORDANIAN SITUATION AS A MEANS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING. QUOTE IMPERIALIST CIRCLES ARE TRYING IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO STIMULATE THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION (EXISTING) BETWEEN CERTAIN ARAB STATES, AS REGARDS THE APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION UNQUOTE.

8. THE REVIEW , REFERRING TO THE MOVEMENT OF THE U.S. 6TH FLEET, ALSO MENTIONS THE FACT THAT PARACHUTE DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN PUT ON STANDBY ALERT AND POINTS OUT THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS ARE HIGHLY REMINISCENT OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS PREVIOUSLY PREPARED ITSELF TO INTERVENE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, UNIN'S NEW YORK, PARIS, DEFCOMMCEN AND (SAVING) TO UKDEL NATO.

DEFCOMMCEN PLEASE PASS HQBFNE.

SIR DUNCAN WILSON [REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2778

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET 210300Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 2778 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN AND
FLASH TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

JORDAN

KISSINGER TELEPHONED ME AT 0250Z TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD
RECEIVED A MOST URGENT MESSAGE FROM HUSSAIN ASKING HIM FOR AIR
STRIKES AND AIR COVER FROM ANY QUARTER. MESSAGE ALSO FORE-
SHADOWED A POSSIBLE EARLY REQUEST FOR LANDING OF TROOPS
AND ASKED HOW MUCH NOTICE AMERICANS WOULD NEED TO RESPOND TO
SUCH A REQUEST. HUSSAIN ASKED THAT AMERICANS SHOULD PASS THE MESSAGE
ALSO TO YOU, SINCE HE WAS UNABLE AT THAT TIME TO CONTACT H.M.
AMBASSADOR, AMMAN.

2.) I HAVE AGREED THAT TEXT OF MESSAGE SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO
YOU AT ONCE BY AMERICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON.

3.) KISSINGER STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW
TO RESPOND. WE SHALL BE KEPT INFORMED. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
MESSAGE, BUT NOT THE TEXT, HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE ISRAELIS IN
WASHINGTON, WHO SAID THEY WOULD QUOTE TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT
UNQUOTE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN.

MR. FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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FLASH WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2778

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET 210300Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 2778 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN AND
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UNQUOTE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE CAIRO TEL AVIV AMMAN.

MR. FREEMAN

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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TO MOD UK DI 4

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

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FROM BRITMILAT.

252

256

TWO. BY MIDNIGHT ZERKA WAS IN ARMY HANDS. FIGHTING CONTINUES IN SALT AND ARMY HAS NOT YET GAINED CONTROL OF TOWN. IRBID REMAINS UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL WITH ARMY SURROUNDING TOWN AND FIGHTING INTO ITS OUTSKIRTS THE ARMY HAS WIPED OUT A NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN BASES NORTH OF IRBID. THE MAIN ARMY ATTACK ON THE TOWN HAS NOT YET BEEN LAUNCHED. SOUTHERN JORDAN REMAINS QUIET AND UNDER CONTROL OF QUOTE THE ARMY AND THE BEDOUIN UNQUOTE. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN MAFRAQ WHICH REMAINS UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL WITH IRAQI TROOPS CONCENTRATED IN AREA. IT IS CONFIRMED THERE ARE NO JORDAN ARMY UNITS IN MAFRAQ AREA.

/THREE. DURING

THREE. DURING AFTERNOON OF 12 SEP ARMY LAUNCHED COUNTER ATTACK ON RAMTA. AT 1800 HOURS TWO TANK BATTALIONS FROM SYRIAN 88 ARMoured BRIGADE ATTACKED IN SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN. BY 2200 HOURS SYRIANS WERE THROUGH RAMTA AND ONE FORCE WAS SOUTH OF THE TOWN. THE IDF CONFIRM THE JORDAN ARMY COUNTER-ATTACKED THROUGH THE NIGHT AND JUST AFTER FIRST LIGHT REPORTED THE SYRIAN ARMoured FORCE HAD BEEN THROWN BACK BEHIND THE BORDER. RAMTA IS HOWEVER STILL REPORTED AS BEING IN FEDAYEEN HANDS.

FOUR. THE IDF CONSIDER THE SYRIAN INTERVENTION AS BEING QUOTE VERY DANGEROUS UNQUOTE. THEIR ASSESSMENT IS THAT SUCH INTERVENTION :

- (A) ENCOURAGES FEDAYEEN STILL FIGHTING IN AMMAN AND ELSEWHERE TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE,
- (B) ATTRACTS REINFORCEMENTS FROM BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON
- (C) DIVERTS THE JORDAN ARMY FROM ITS MAIN TASK OF CLEARING THE TOWN OF FEDAYEEN CAUSING IT TO DEPLOY TO THE BORDER REGION.
- (D) PUTS PRESSURE ON THE IRAQI FORCES TO INTERVENE IN SUPPORT OF EITHER ARMY OR FEDAYEEN,
- (E) HAS WIDE EFFECTS ON ATTITUDE OF OTHER ARAB STATES.

FIVE. THE IDF HAVE ASSESSED THE SYRIAN AIR ALERT REPORTED IN TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 876 OF 192100Z TO FCO AS BEING MORE ROUTINE THAN WAS PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. FROM ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS SYRIAN ALERT IT APPEARS THESE ARE NORMAL FOR ANY BORDER INCIDENT BUT IDF SAY THEY CANNOT BE ENTIRELY SURE THAT THE PATTERN APPLIES IN THIS INSTANCE. THE AIR RECCE WAS CARRIED OUT BEFORE THEIR ARMoured BRIGADE ATTACK IN RAMTA AREA AND THE IDF THINK IT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD UK DI4 AND JIS NE.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

SECRET

SH TEL AVIV

TO MOD UK DI 4

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 181930Z B

18 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

D T G 181935Z

ADDRESSED MOD UK DI 4 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO
AMMAN , JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 181930Z SEP FROM BRITMILAT.
REF MY 181110Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 181800Z SEPT.

1. IDF STATE THAT PROGRESS OF TANKS INTO AMMAN WAS
VERY SLOW CULMINATING IN A HALT BEING CALLED AT 1000Z.
THE SITUATION IN AMMAN WAS DESCRIBED AS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT
THAN PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT.

2. THE FEDAYEEN ARE STATED AS BEING IN CONTROL OF TOWN OF
IRBID. THE JORDAN ARMY CONTINUES TO SHELL THE TOWN FROM THE
OUTSKIRTS.

3. AT 1230Z IT WAS REPORTED THAT A COMPANY PLUS OF TANKS
APPARENTLY SYRIAN HAD ENTERED TOWN OF RAMTA.
THERE WERE NO OTHER SIGNS OF IRAQI OR SYRIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEEN EXTREMELY CAREFUL TO AVOID
ANY CONTACT WITH THE JORDAN ARMY. THERE WERE REPORTS OF
SAIQA FEDAYEEN CROSSING INTO JORDAN FROM SYRIA. THESE WERE
HOWEVER LIGHTLY ARMED.

4. THE IDF HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE COMMANDER OF
NUMBER ONE DIVISION OF THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN WAS PLANNING TO
MOVE HIS HQ BACK TO IRAQ. THERE WERE ALSO SIGNS OF
PREPARATIONS BY THE IRAQI FORCES TO REMOVE THEIR AMMUNITION
DUMPS TO IRAQ.

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/5. THE ABSENCE

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-2-

5. THE ABSENCE OF IRAQI INTERVENTION SO FAR AND INDEED THE SIGNS THAT THE IRAQIS ARE DISENGAGING SHOULD IN THE IDF VIEW HAVE GIVEN THE KING TIME HE NEEDED TO FINISH THE OPERATION BY DUSK TODAY. BUT THEY POINT OUT THAT HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE EXPLOITED THIS ADVANTAGE AS HE MIGHT HAVE DONE AND HIS TROOPS SEEM RELUCTANT TO GET TO GRIPS OUTSIDE THEIR TANKS.

6. THE IDF CONFIRM THERE HAS BEEN NO FIRING BY THEIR FORCES ON THE JORDAN FRONT SINCE THE CURRENT CRISIS BEGAN. THEY ALSO CONFIRM THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT FIRE UNLESS THEY THEMSELVES ARE FIRED UPON.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS DEFCOMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH JIS NE AND MOD DI4.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED, SENT TO D.C.C.]

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EN CLAIR
FLASH JORDAN
TELEGRAM NO 629

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

TOP

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270

UNCLASSIFIED. 210500Z.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 629 DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON.
YOUR TELNO 361: JORDAN INTERNAL.

RECEIVED IN
NEJ 1/4

THIS MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO THE KING LAST NIGHT.

FCO PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON

MR PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO P.S. NO.10 DOWNING ST. AND SIR R.HOOPER
CABINET OFFICE]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 621

20 SEPTEMBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

POOL STORY PLEASE PASS AS FOLLOWS:-

REUTERS PATRICK MASSEY, DAILY EXPRESS ARTHUR CHESMORTH, THE
 SUN IAN WALKER, DAILY MAIL GILBERT LEWTHWAITE, DAILY NEWS
 KEMP AND HASSMAN, THE TIMES PUAL MARTIN, DAILY MIRROR ELLIS
 PLACE, ITN MIKE NICHOLSON, DAILY SKETCH JOHN EDWARDS, THE
 GUARDIAN DAVID HIRST, LONDON EVENING NEWS JIM WATSON, BBC
 BOB FLPHICK AND MIKE CLAYTON, ASSOCIATED PRESS AND UPI, NEW
 YORK TIMES (ERIC FACE) LOS ANGELES TIMES (WILLIAM TUOHY) ON
 PASS TO REUTERS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO ALL ABOVE PAPERS.

KING HUSSEIN TODAY APPEARED TO BE WINNING THE BATTLE OF AMMAN
 BUT THE FEDAYEEN AFTER A TERRIFIC POUNDING ARE HOLDING OUT IN
 POCKETS IN THE HOPE OF THE SYRIANS COMING. TWO SYRIAN ARMoured
 BRIGADES ARE NOW OVER THE FRONTIER WITH ONLY A SINGLE JORDANIAN
 BRIGADE FACING THEM. THE FEDAYEEN BATTLING FROM STREET TO STREET
 HOPE THAT THE SYRIAN TANKS WILL ROLL INTO RESCUE THEM FROM THE
 FURY OF KING HUSSEIN'S SOLDIERS. FOR THE 500,000 PEOPLE WHO HAVE
 BEEN COVERING IN THEIR HOMES SINCE THURSDAY MORNING THE SITUATION
 BECAME TO LOOK DESPERATE. WATER, GAS AND ELECTRICITY ARE CUT OFF.
 ANYONE VENTURING OUT IN THE STREET TO SEEK FOOD RISKED DRAWING
 DOWN THE FULL FORCE OF ARMY FIREPOWER. AN ARMY OFFICER LAST NIGHT
 REPORTED THAT ABOUT 1,500 COMMANDOS HAD SURRENDERED IN THE FIGHTING.
 HE SAID HUGE STOCKS OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN CAPTURED.
 THE OFFICER RODE UP IN AN ARMoured CAR TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE 120
 OR SO PRESS AND TELEVISION MEN WHO HAVE BEEN COOPED UP IN THE HILL
 TOP HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL SINCE THE BATTLE BROKE OUT AT DAWN
 ON THURSDAY. HE SAID SEVERAL FEDAYEEN LEADERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED
 INCLUDING IBRAHIM BAKR AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER OF THE PAL-
 ESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION. THE OFFICER SAID MINIMUM FORCE
 WAS BEING USED BY THE ARMY TO CRUSH COMMANDO RESISTANCE. FROM
 THE HOTEL NEWSMEN HAVE WATCHED AS THE CITY WAS POUNDED MERCILESSLY
 BY ARTILLERY ROCKETS AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS. THROUGHOUT IT ALL

/THERE

THERE HAS BEEN NO WORD ABOUT THE 54 HI-JACK HOSTAGES BEING HELD BY COMMANDOS BUT GRAVE FEARS ARE FELT FOR THEIR SAFETY IF CAUGHT ANYWHERE IN THE FURIOUS BARRAGES THAT HAVE ROCKETED THE AREA DAY AND NIGHT. HUGE CLOUDS OF SMOKE DRIFT OVER THE CITY IN THE DAY TIME AND AT NIGHT FIRES ARE SEEN BURNING BRIGHTLY. MUCH OF THE BURNING SEEMS TO COME FROM THE AREAS OF PALESTINE REFUGEE CAMPS AT JEREL HUSAIN AND YAHDAH BOTH OF WHICH HAVE BEEN STRONG POINTS OF COMBATED ACTIVITY. UNOFFICIAL REPORTS SAID THERE HAD BEEN HEAVY FIGHTING IN BOTH CAMP AREAS.

BATTLE 2, AMMAN.

ESTIMATES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED RUN INTO THOUSANDS YESTERDAY FOR THE FIRST TIME JEeps TOUNED STREETS WITH LOUD HAILERS CALLING ON THE WOUNDED TO COME OUT AND BE TAKEN TO HOSPITAL. FROM THE HOTEL IT WAS POSSIBLE TO SEE THE ARMY HAD A TOUGH STRUGGLE IN THE PAST THREE DAYS. ROCKETS AND 50 CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS TORE HUGE HOLES IN WALLS AROUND THE VART RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT WHERE THE HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL IS SITED. IN THE DISTANCE BURNING COULD BE SEEN COMING INTO HOUSES FROM WHICH FEDAYEEN WERE BLAZING AWAY WITH AUTOMATIC FIRE. BURNED AND RATTLED BUILDINGS WERE EVIDENT ALL UP AND DOWN THE HILL SIDES SLOPING DOWN INTO THE CENTRE OF THE CITY. REPORTS FILTERING BACK FROM THE CENTRE SAID THE ARMY WAS SEVERAL TIMES FORCED BACK BEFORE WINNING CONTROL THERE. AS ITS TANKS THRUST IN COMMANDOS FOURED DOWN GRENADE AND ROCKET FIRE FROM ROOF TOPS LINING THE NARROW AND TWISTY STREETS. JUST A FEW HUNDRED YARDS FROM THE HOTEL THIS MORNING COMMANDOS COULD BE SEEN OPENING UP A BAST OF AUTOMATIC FIRE ON AN ARMY AMBULANCE. SOLDIERS WHO CAME INTO THE HOTEL ADMITTED THAT CLEARING UP SHIPERS COULD TAKE DAYS SOME OF THE TROOPS WERE BITTER. THE PEOPLE HELPED THE FEDAYEEN WHEN WE CAME IN GROWLED ONE DEBOWH TROOPER. AT THE HOTEL SHAKEN AND HOLED BY GUNFIRE ALL AROUND IT FOOD WAS RUNNING SHORT. TROOPS OUTSIDE WARNED THAT ANY PHOTOGRAPHER CAUGHT TAKING PICTURES WOULD BE SHOT. SEVERAL CAMERAMEN WHO TRIED TO SHOOT PICTURES HAD TO DUCK FOR COVER AS THE SOLDIERS OPENED UP.

IN THE END : BELIEVED WISHED THAT ANYONE : OR EVEN LOOKING OUT OF A WINDOW WOULD BE SHOT. HEAVY GUNFIRE CONTINUED THIS MORNING AROUND THE INTERCONTINENTAL ABOUT 12 FOREIGNERS WHO HAD BEEN SHELTERING AT NEARBY SHEPHERDS HOTEL WERE EVACUATED TO THE INTERCONTINENTAL TODAY AND TOLD OF THREE DAYS AND NIGHTS OF TERROR WHILE TROOPS AND FEDAYEEN DARTED IN AND OUT OF THE HOTEL VILLY BLASTING AWAY. THE GROUP INCLUDED BBC REPORTER DAVID LOGAN OF 24 HOURS, TRANSWORLD AIRLINES VICE PRESIDENT, RICHARD WILSON

AND T.M.A.'S DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS (OVERSEAS) CLAUDE CIRAUD. "WE STAYED ON THE FLOOR OF THE GROUND FLOOR BATHROOM FOR MOST OF THE TIME" CIRAUD SAID, "FEDAYEEN CHASED UP AND DOWN ALLEYS ROUND THE HOTEL FIRING FROM STREET CORNERS AND DARTING IN AND OUT OF THE HOTEL. THE ARMY FIRED BACK AT THEM WITH HEAVY MACHINE GUNS. WHEN WE LEFT THIS MORNING THE FEDAYEEN STILL SEEMED TO BE THERE AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL RESIDENTS SLEPT IN HOTEL CORRIDORS OR Huddled IN THE BASEMENT FOR THE THIRD NIGHT IN A ROW. THIS MORNING NEWS MEN VENTURING OUT ON TO A BACK TERRACE HAD TO RACE FOR COVER AGAIN AS ROTARS CRASHED INTO A NEARBY GARDEN.

MR. PHILLIPS

[RELAYED TO REUTERS & B.B.C.]

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IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1978

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
20 SEPTEMBER 1970

REFUSED IN

NES 1/4

CONFIDENTIAL 210150Z.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 1978 OF 20 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, PARIS, BEIRUT.
FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON TELNO 2773 TO YOU AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS:
SITUATION IN JORDAN.

THE JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVE'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE, HE CLAIMS, ONLY
TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND WITH THE FOUR POWERS
ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CALLING A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. HE IS
NOT AT ALL ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A MEETING.

2. IN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, FRENCH AND SOVIET
MISSIONS IT IS CLEAR THAT NONE OF THE OTHER THREE ARE IN FAVOUR
OF A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. MORIZET THOUGHT ACTION BY THE COUNCIL
WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE AT THE MOMENT AND COULD DO NO GOOD. THE
AMERICANS ADVISE DELAY TO ENABLE THEIR APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION
TO TAKE EFFECT AND ALSO TO ENABLE US TO SECURE CLEARER INFORMATION
ABOUT WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING. THE SOVIET MISSION THOUGHT THE
COUNCIL COULD DO NO GOOD AND THAT A DEBATE WOULD DEGENERATE INTO
A GENERAL DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.
BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND FRENCH AGREE THAT IF THE INVASION REALLY
IS SERIOUS IT WILL BE ALMOST ESSENTIAL FOR THE COUNCIL TO MEET.

3. WHILE NOT WANTING A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THE FRENCH WOULD
FAVOUR FOUR POWER ACTION IF POSSIBLE. THE AMERICANS CLAIM THAT
HUSSAIN'S APPEAL WAS TO EACH POWER INDIVIDUALLY (AND AMMAN TELNO
627 TO FCO BEARS THIS OUT) AND WENT AHEAD ACCORDINGLY BUT OUR
IMPRESSION IS THAT IF WE COULD GET THE RUSSIANS TO THE TABLE THEY
WOULD (RELUCTANTLY) COME TOO. MEANWHILE HOWEVER THE SOVIET MISSION
CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAVE RECEIVED NO APPROACH OF ANY
KIND FROM KING HUSSAIN.

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4. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH SIR C. CROWE. I THINK WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR CALLING A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD IN THIS CASE COME FROM JORDAN. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES JORDAN IS UNLIKELY AT PRESENT TO PRESS THIS. THEIR REPRESENTATIVE FEARS THAT THE DEBATE WOULD BE WIDENED E.G. BY A SYRIAN ATTACK ON ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD PRODUCE A JORDANIAN/ISRAELI/UNITED STATES LINEUP. (THE JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVE IS A MILITANT PALESTINIAN).

5. OUR BEST COURSE THEREFORE WOULD SEEM TO BE TO WORK FOR A FOUR POWER APPEAL. THE KEY LIES WITH THE SOVIET MISSION. THE FRENCH ARE TACKLING THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE BUT WE SHALL NOT KNOW THEIR POSITION TILL TOMORROW.

6. I MUST EMPHASISE THAT THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON FAIRLY SCANTY INFORMATION. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE MOST UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION ON THE GROUND IN JORDAN TO REACH ME BY 12.00Z TOMORROW.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE AMMAN, CAIRO, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT.

SIR C. CROWE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2103

21 SEPTEMBER 1976

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ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2103 OF 21 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

NY TELEGRAM NO. 2101.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXTS OF FURTHER MESSAGES WHICH WE HAVE
RECEIVED FROM AMMAN.

2. AMMAN TELNO. 2 (201200Z). "SYRIANS TWO BRIGADES ARE BETWEEN
EL BURRAH AND DIRT TRACK LEADING TO ALSAB REFERENCES TWO FOUR
SEVEN TWO TWO THREE AND TWO FIVE ZERO TWO FOUR ZERO HUNDRED
TX OS AND SCALE MAP. URGENT INTERVENTION REQUESTED".

3. AMMAN TELNO. 3 (201637Z). "REF. EN CLAIR TELNO. 623.
HOSTERS CANNOT OPERATE AFTER DARK BUT REMAINS OF FORTH BRIGADE
WILL DELAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT KING DOUBTS IF THEY CAN HOLD
IRBID LONG."

4. AMMAN TELNO. 4 (201338Z) (IN ANSWER TO A REQUEST THAT THEY
SHOULD TELEGRAPH URGENTLY THE EXACT TERMS OF ANY APPEAL FROM
THE KING). "KING ASKED MORAL DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT PUBLIC
CONDEMNATION AND THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL STEPS. BUT APPEAL
DELAYED BY CYPHER SNAG. SYRIAN TROOPS MASSING. CALL FOR
INTERVENTION BY HMG AND USA MAY COME SOON. KING JUST NOW ASKED
ISRAELI AIR STRIKE (GROUPS CORRUPT) NOW."

5. AMMAN TELEGRAM 202320Z SEPTEMBER. "THE KING HAS TOLD US AS AT 1700Z HE WAS MEETING HIS CABINET TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. HE HAS DISPENSED HIS FORCES ROUND AMMAN IN A POSITION OF ALL ROUND DEFENCE JUST IN CASE IRAQ ALSO TRIED TO INTERVENE. THE CABINET IS TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO ASK FOR BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION."

6. AMMAN TELNO 626 (202150Z) (IN RESPONSE TO OUR ENQUIRY WHETHER THE KING WAS ASKING US TO PASS THE REQUEST IN LAST SENTENCE OF AMMAN TELNO. 4 TO THE ISRAELIS OR WHETHER HE WAS PASSING IT HIMSELF THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS). "ZEID RIFA'I MADE THE REQUEST BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE KING'S BEHALF. HE ASKED US REPEAT US TO PASS THIS REQUEST TO THE ISRAELIS."

DOUGLAS-HOME

1. THE KING HAS TOLD US AS AT 1700Z HE WAS MEETING HIS CABINET TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. HE HAS DISPENSED HIS FORCES ROUND AMMAN IN A POSITION OF ALL ROUND DEFENCE JUST IN CASE IRAQ ALSO TRIED TO INTERVENE. THE CABINET IS TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO ASK FOR BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION."

2. AMMAN TELNO 626 (202150Z) (IN RESPONSE TO OUR ENQUIRY WHETHER THE KING WAS ASKING US TO PASS THE REQUEST IN LAST SENTENCE OF AMMAN TELNO. 4 TO THE ISRAELIS OR WHETHER HE WAS PASSING IT HIMSELF THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS). "ZEID RIFA'I MADE THE REQUEST BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON THE KING'S BEHALF. HE ASKED US REPEAT US TO PASS THIS REQUEST TO THE ISRAELIS."

CYPHER CAT 'A'

S E C R E T

FLASH TEL AVIV


TO MOD UK DI 4

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 210600Z

21 SEPTEMBER 1970 TOP COM

S E C R E T

ADDRESSED TO FLASH MOD DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO TO FLASH
DA AMMAN, JIS NE, WASHINGTON.



FOH 210600Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 201930Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 210300Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF REPORT SYRIAN TANK STRENGTH IN NORTHERN JORDAN
NOW 300 TANKS. THE EXPECTED BATTLE AT FIRST LIGHT DID
NOT TAKE PLACE BECAUSE JORDAN ARMY UNITS WITHDREW SOUTH
FROM IRBID AREA. THEIR LOCATIONS ARE NOT YET KNOWN. THE SYRIANS
ARE REPORTED TO BE DIGGING IN SOUTH OF IRBID WHICH IS
IN SYRIAN AND FEDAYEEN HANDS. UP TO NOW THERE HAS BEEN NO
AIR ACTION IN SUPPORT OF SYRIAN ADVANCE.

TWO. THE IDF SAY THERE ARE DISQUIETING REPORTS THAT
THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN MAY BE ASSISTING THE FEDAYEEN
QUOTE TO GET IN ON THE ACT UNQUOTE.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH DEFCOMCEN AND WASHINGTON.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD UK DI 4

MR. BARNES

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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FLASH TEL AVIV

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TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 211030Z
SECRET

TO MOD UK DI 4
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

ADDRESSED FLASH TO MOD DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO FLASH TO
DA AMMAN, JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

10
NES 1/4

FOH 211030Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 210600Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITRIP AS AT 211000Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF REPORT IRAQI FORCES ARE MOVING WEST. ONE COMPANY OF TANKS IS REPORTED MOVING TOWARDS IRBID ON RAMTA-IRBID ROAD WITH A FURTHER COMPANY OF TANKS ON THE MAFRAQ-JARASH ROAD. THE LATTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE OVERRUN AND CAPTURED A JORDAN ARMY RADAR STATION.

TWO. JORDAN ARMY TANKS ARE REPORTED AS MOVING NORTH TOWARDS IRBID FROM CENTRE OF COUNTRY. THESE TANKS ARE SAID NOT TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN AMMAN FIGHTING.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS MOD DI4 AND JIS NE

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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CYPHER CAT 'A'
FLASH TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NUMBER 881

CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

(276)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 881 OF 21 SEPTEMBER 1970
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BACHDAD, CAIRO,
AND WASHINGTON.

J O R D A N

A USUALLY WELL INFORMED JOURNALIST HAS TOLD US
THE REASON FOR THE JORDANIAN WITHDRAWAL LAST NIGHT
THAT THE 40TH JORDANIAN BRIGADE " CRUMBLER " AND THAT
ABOUT HALF ITS MEN DESERTED TO THE FEDAYEEN.

2. THIS PROMPTS THE QUESTION WHETHER OTHER JORDANIAN UNITS
WILL DO LIKEWISE.

3. ISRAELI MINISTERS ARE SAID TO BE MEETING NOW, HAVING
TAKEN NO DECISIONS AT YESTERDAY'S CABINET MEETING.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON (FLASH).

MR. BARNES

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.1 TO AMMAN OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1970

C O N F I D E N T I A L 210200Z SEPT

260

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 1970, 21 SEP 1970 YES 114
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ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 001 DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1970,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, PARIS, AND MOSCOW.

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

UKMIS TELEGRAM NO. 1978 TO F.C.O.

PLEASE URGE THE KING, IF HE HAS NOT ALREADY DONE IT, TO MAKE
HIS APPEAL ALSO TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

F C O PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN AND ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV
PARIS AND MOSCOW.

SIR C.CROWE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER CAT/A

FLASH AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 630

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 21 SEP 1970 REPEATED NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL. 210720Z.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 630 DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK
PARIS AND MOSCOW.

210720Z.

MY TEL NO 627: JORDAN INTERNAL.

EMISSARY FROM PALACE APPEARED AGAIN AT 0200Z IN COMPANY WITH MY
FIRST SECRETARY TO SAY THAT SITUATION AT IRBID WAS HAVING A VERY
BAD EFFECT ON MORALE OF JORDANIAN TROOPS CLEANING UP AMMAN, BESIDES
ENCORRAGING FEDAYEEN TO CONTINUE RESISTANCE. THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
AIR STRIKE BY "OUR WESTERN NEIGHBOURS ACROSS THE RIVER" WAS THE
ONLY WAY TO RESTORE THE SITUATION AND THE TROOPS MORALE OTHERWISE
THE KING WOULD HAVE TO ASK FOR U.S. AND BRITISH MILITARY INTERVEN-
TION. A SIMILAR MESSAGE CAME OVER THE EMERGENCY LINK AT 0400Z TODAY
WITH THE ADDITION THAT THE IRAQIS IN THE NAFRAQ/JARASH AREA WAS
SUPPLYING FEDAYEEN WITH AMMUNITION.

2. THE PALACE ARE OBVIOUSLY GETTING BADLY RATTLED. I HOPE
PERHAPS FORLORNLY THAT THE ISRAELIS CAN DIVERT SYRIAN ATTENTION
WITHOUT MAKING IT TOO OBVIOUS THAT THE OBJECT IS TO TAKE PRESSURE
OFF KING HUSSAIN.

FCO PASS FLASH TO WASHINGTON AND IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND
PARIS

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 631

TOP COPY
TO F.C.O. LONDON

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED IN
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21 SEP 1970

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210630Z. SEPT

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 631 DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD TEL AVIV
MOSCOW PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEW YORK BONN MOD DI 4 JIS'(NE)
JIS GULF.

SITREP AS AT 0600Z 21 SEPTEMBER.

THINGS HAVE SO FARE BEEN MUCH QUIETER THAN OF LATE ALTHOUGH THERE
IS STILL SOME FIRING GOING ON BY THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE TOWN
AND ON THE FAR SIDE OF JEBEL LUWEIBDY.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI 4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON BERNE UKMIS NEWYORK AND BONN

MR PHILLIPS

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 632

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
21 SEP 1970

TO F.C.I., D. LONDON

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 210645Z

JORDAN INTERNAL. AFTER A VERY NOISY MORNING THE CURFEW WAS LIFTED FOR A FEW HOURS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON IN THE WESTERN AREA OF JEBEL AMMAN AFTER THINGS HAD QUIETENED DOWN. THIS ENABLED A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS FROM THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL TO VISIT EMBASSY FOR A BRIEFING AND TO SEND OUT MESSAGES, AND ALSO FOR ONE TO VISIT SOME MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AND FOR MOST OF THEM TO VISIT EACH OTHER. ALL HAVE BEEN LOCATED AND ARE UNHARMED. I HAVE BROUGHT CARTER (THIRD SECRETARY) INTO EMBASSY TO HELP ME AND RELIEVED ONE MEMBER OF REGISTRY STAFF WITH ANOTHER. UNFORTUNATELY I CANNOT RELIEVE MY C.B.O.'S

MR PHILLIPS

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